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ABSTRACT 
 
Evaluation of Key Components of Draft Guidelines for the National Weather Service 
TsunamiReady
TM
 Community Program 
 
by 
 
Colleen Scott 
 
The National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program partnered with the National Weather Service 
(NWS) in 2000 to create the TsunamiReady
TM
 (TR) Community program.  TR is designed to 
help communities in coastal areas plan and prepare for tsunamis.  To achieve TR recognition 
communities must meet certain criteria including specific emergency planning and management 
actions within the categories of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.   
 
This study’s purpose was to evaluate the acceptability and usefulness of key components of a 
proposed revised set of TR Community program guidelines.  Research was guided by the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) using Community Based Participatory Research methods 
to gather input from expert panels composed of local expert community stakeholders from 5 
states and 1 US territory.  Two qualitative data collection methods were used: online 
prediscussion surveys administered via Survey Monkey© and focus group discussions. Fifty 
participants attended 1 of 6 focus group discussions, with 20 participants completing surveys.  
 
Data analysis focused on 8 discussion topics: subdivision of communities by vulnerability, 
proportion of the population to be protected, evacuation effectiveness, evacuation drills or 
exercises, vertical evacuation, educating businesses, educating residents, and acceptability of a 
revised guidelines format.  Supporting and opposing themes were identified, providing rich 
information of community-level perceptions regarding the guidelines.  Most notably, the fidelity 
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of the 2 ELM pathways were confirmed as separate.  The peripheral pathway demonstrated a 
significant need for clarification and definition of program terms and activities through the 
surveys, while focus groups facilitated the central pathway for participants to discuss and debate 
various program guidelines. 
 
This study provides several recommendations based on community input for updating and 
revising the TR Community program guidelines including: revisions to the overall format, a new 
focus on community tsunami hazard, and additional actions and activities to improve community 
tsunami mitigation and preparedness efforts.  Finally, the data and recommendations provided 
will be used to compile a final draft of the TR Community program guidelines for the NWS.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The TsunamiReady
TM
 (TR) Community program is a community-based emergency 
preparedness program managed by the National Weather Service (NWS) aimed at preparing 
communities throughout the US for tsunamis.  The following research describes the background, 
methods, findings, and recommendations from communities in Alaska, Oregon, California, 
Hawaii, North Carolina, and the US Virgin Islands shown below in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: TsunamiReady
TM
 Community Guidelines 2011 and 2013 Research Study Sites 
Emergency Preparedness  
Public Health 
Natural disasters have devastating effects on basic human needs such as access to shelter, 
food, and clean water. Preparedness and relief efforts therefore constitute important elements of 
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public health emergency preparedness.  Despite being overlooked by other agencies in the past, 
public health departments have played key roles in emergency response and the development of 
preparedness plans for many years (Morse, 2006).  The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) was created in 1979 when President Carter signed an executive order merging several 
emergency response agencies, including those providing public health works, into one single 
structure, bringing forth the idea of modern emergency management (Coyne, Leeson, & Sobel, 
2009).   
Building and elaborating upon the framework initiated by President Carter, in disaster 
situations today, emergency management agencies assume the lead role in local response efforts.  
Public health agencies adopt supportive roles in information management, emergency operations 
coordination activities, and mass care or the management and distribution of medical materials 
(Hunter, Crawley, Petrie, Yang, & Aragon, 2012).  Additionally, public health agencies lead 
surveillance and epidemiology activities, environmental health, and mental health and 
psychological support functions during the response phase of disasters. 
 Tsunamis as a Public Health Issue.  One of the largest and deadliest tsunamis in 
recorded history occurred on December 26,
 
2004, after a 9.3 magnitude earthquake rocked 
Northern Sumatra and the Nicobar and Andaman Islands (Union Territory of India) (Grilli et al., 
2007).  The tsunami generated by this earthquake caused over 200,000 fatalities, tens of 
thousands of individuals reported missing, and some 1 million left without a home in more than 
10 countries (Grilli et al., 2007).  Seven years later, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake generated a 
tsunami that devastated the Pacific coast of Japan.  This deadly tsunami caused more than 15,000 
fatalities and more than 5,000 missing persons in Japan alone (Akiba, 2011; Suppasri et al., 
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2012).  Tsunamis are infrequent events but the damage and destruction caused by them can be 
significant.  
In a systematic review including tsunami literature available from 1900 to 2009, Doocy et 
al. (2013) found that an estimated 2.5 million people world-wide were directly affected by 
tsunamis.  Of those 2.5 million people, more than 255,000 deaths and an estimated 50,000 
injuries were caused by tsunamis.  It is likely that the number of injured persons due to a tsunami 
is underestimated because of low injury reporting levels in the early 20
th
 century (Doocy et al., 
2013).  In an attempt to ascertain the true expected number of persons injured by tsunamis 
Doocy et al. applied statistical modeling techniques to all of the events that reported tsunami-
related deaths.  Using these statistical models, Doocy et al. estimate that between 10,900 and 
116,950 unreported tsunami-related injuries most likely occurred world-wide during the study 
period.  This study bolsters the understanding that tsunamis are infrequent events with the 
potential to cause significant damage and loss of life.  
TsunamiReady
TM
 
In April of 1992, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake with strong subsequent aftershocks uplifted 
roughly 24 km of the Californian coast near Cape Mendocino (Bernard, 2001, Carver, Jayko, 
Valentine, & Li, 1994).  The main shock generated a small tsunami that was recorded in 
California and Hawaii, but the <1.1m wave was not destructive.  Later, in 1994, an 8.3 
magnitude earthquake rocked the Kurile Islands and generated a tsunami warning that left local 
emergency managers feeling unprepared and unsure of appropriate response measures or 
activities, particularly for local tsunami (tsunamis with travel times of less than one hour) 
hazards (Dengler, 2005; Jonientz-Trisler et al., 2005).  These events, combined with geological 
evidence of a large magnitude earthquake that occurred in ca. 1700 along the Cascadia 
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subduction zone, causing a great tsunami in Oregon, Washington, and northern California, 
prompted US government officials to address the lack of tsunami preparedness along the west 
coast of the US and the need for improved tsunami detection, monitoring, warning, and 
preparedness (Bernard, 2001).  As a response to these needs, in 1995 the National Tsunami 
Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) was formed through a congressional action calling for a 
partnership to be formed between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the US Geological Survey 
(USGS), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the US Coastal States Territories (National 
Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, 2013).  
The primary goals identified by the NTHMP include: 1) raising tsunami awareness of 
affected populations; 2) developing integrated tsunami maps and inundation models; 3) 
improving tsunami warning systems; and 4) incorporating tsunami planning into state and federal 
multi-hazard programs (NOAA, 2013).   In response to these goals, an external partnership was 
formed between the NTHMP and the NWS to create the TR Communities program.  This 
program was designed using the NWS StormReady
®
 Communities program as a template 
(National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, 2000).  To achieve TR recognition, communities 
must meet certain criteria aimed at better preparing a community for a tsunami, including 
specific actions within the following categories: communications and coordination, tsunami 
warning reception, local warning dissemination, community preparedness, and administration 
(Appendix A).  
Tsunami Warning and Education Act 
 Until 2005 NOAA operated a national program created to warn the US Pacific coastal 
areas of tsunamis.  This program consisted of two regional US tsunami warning centers based in 
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the Pacific Ocean (Morrissey, 2005).  The two regional stations are directly operated by the 
NWS.  The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) is located within the basin of the Pacific 
Ocean at Ewa Beach, Hawaii.  The PTWC is responsible for monitoring tsunami activity in the 
Hawaiian Islands, the US Pacific territories, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the 
Caribbean Sea.  Established in 1949, the PTWC monitors for tsunamis and issues notifications 
(Morrissey, 2005).  The second regional tsunami warning center, formerly called the West 
Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC) is situated along the rim of the Pacific 
Ocean in Palmer, Alaska.  The WCATWC was initially created in 1964 following the Great 
Alaskan earthquake in Anchorage that caused a local tsunami (Morrissey, 2005).  The name of 
the WCATWC was changed in the fall of 2013 to the National Tsunami Warning Center 
(NTWC).  In addition to issuing warnings to emergency managers in Alaska, the scope of the 
NTWC has been expanded to provide warnings to US Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts, Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Atlantic coast of Canada (Morrissey, 2005).   
In December 2006 Congress signed into law the Tsunami Warning and Education Act 
(TWEA).  This purpose of this legislature was to authorize, expand, and strengthen NOAA’s 
programs to detect, forecast, warn, and mitigate tsunamis in order to protect the life and property 
of US citizens ("Tsunami Warning and Education Act," 2005).  NOAA’s Tsunami Program 
continues to be administered by the NWS.  The most notable product of this legislation is the 
major geographical expansion of the Tsunami Forecasting and Warning Program.  Prior to the 
passage of this bill, NOAA and the NWS focused tsunami detection, forecasting, and warning on 
the five states along the Pacific coast and the Pacific US territories.  With the passage of this new 
law, the NWS and NOAA expanded their programmatic obligation to 29 states including: the 
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states along the Atlantic coast, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea region ("Tsunami 
Warning and Education Act," 2005).   
   This significant program change doubled the size of the territory covered by the Tsunami 
Forecasting and Warning Program, with the proposed inclusion of an additional tsunami warning 
center in the Caribbean (Morrissey, 2005).  In a time of governmental cut-backs and program 
reductions, the resources allotted to the protection of these regions are now being spread even 
thinner.  With the passing of this legislation, NOAA and the NWS realized how important it 
would be for the Tsunami program to recognize the varying levels of tsunami risk associated 
with all of the US coastal states and territories now included in the program and allocate program 
resources appropriately.     
Research Significance 
 The current TR Community program guidelines were first instituted in June 2001 with 
the recognition of the program’s first two communities: Ocean Shores and Grey Harbor County, 
Washington (C. Maier, personal communication, July 24, 2013).  Over the past 12 years, there 
have been no official revisions, modification, or updates of the TR Communities program or 
guidelines as described on the NWS website.  Since the initial two communities gained 
recognition, an additional 130 communities (for a total of 132 communities as of January 2013) 
have completed the required actions to also become TR recognized (C. Maier, personal 
communication, July 24, 2013). As of the end of April 2014, there are now 168 TR recognized 
communities (National Weather Service, 2014).   
Recognizing the need to incorporate social science research to support and improve the 
NWS Tsunami Program mission and mission-related activities, the NWS released a request for 
22 
 
proposals (RFP) in 2010.   The RFP called for project proposals using social science research 
methods to address three primary objectives:   
1. Improve Tsunami Warning Center (TWC) products, including warnings, 
advisories, watches, and information statements,  
2. Evaluate the TsunamiReadyTM Program Improvement, and  
3. Assess previous and on-going tsunami-related social science studies including 
regional, state, and local efforts, to determine how to best integrate such 
information at the national level. 
This research contributes to the larger NWS funded research study by evaluating and 
offering program recommendations for key components of the TR Community program 
guidelines using expert community stakeholders from study communities across the United 
States and its territories in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.  The findings and recommendations 
from this research will help address objective 2 above. 
Research Purpose and Aims 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the acceptability and usefulness of key 
components within a revised set of national guidelines for the TR Community program 
including: 1) perceptions of effective evacuation strategies, 2) perceptions of required evacuation 
strategies; specifically vertical evacuation, and 3) perceptions of defining a proportion of 
population requiring protection through evacuation planning for inclusion in the TR guidelines, 
and 4) provide data and recommendations to the original research team so that they may compile 
a final draft of the TR Community program guidelines for the NWS.  The specific research aims 
identified to elicit the information for these topics are described below. 
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Aim 1:  Investigate the potential for subdividing the TR guidelines based on community 
vulnerability to tsunamis using definitions of: local (near-field) versus distant (far-field) tsunami 
hazard.  
 
Aim 2a: Determine rationale for support or resistance to the idea that TR communities must have 
an effective evacuation strategy for tsunamis. 
 
Aim 2b: Determine rationale for support or resistance to the idea that TR communities must have 
an effective vertical evacuation strategy for tsunamis when no natural high or inland ground is 
available. 
 
Aim 3: Determine the community perceptions regarding the concept of quantifying the 
population that should be protected by tsunami preparedness planning, as a potential required 
action for a community to achieve TR recognition. 
 
Aim 4: Provide data and recommendations to the original research team so that they may 
compile a final draft of the TR Community program guidelines for the NWS.   
  
24 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 The TR Community program is a community-based emergency preparedness program 
specific to the tsunami hazard created and managed by the NWS.  As the research described in 
this dissertation is interdisciplinary in nature, the following literature review has been 
constructed to ensure readers from each discipline are provided with background describing the 
major topics contributing to the development of the a community-based emergency preparedness 
program within the US: 1) emergency preparedness development within the US, 2) the NWS, 3) 
natural hazards, 4) tsunamis, 5) the TR Community program, and 6) the theoretical framework 
and methods guiding the research.   
Emergency Preparedness 
US Developments 
 The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake shook the city at 5:13am on April 16, 1906, taking 
claim as the worst earthquake in California History (Helquist, 2007; Hudson, 1976). The shock 
itself lasted approximately 2 minutes causing fires that raged uncontrolled for 3 more days 
(Hudson, 1976). In the aftermath of the earthquake and subsequent fire, 200,000 of the city’s 
450,000 citizens were rendered homeless with nearly 3,000 estimated fatalities (Helquist, 2007; 
Hudson, 1976). The economic loss for the city in terms of personal and public property was 
estimated at $5,000,000 in 1906 dollars (Hudson, 1976).  
 As the aftershocks of the earthquake subsided, military personnel stationed throughout 
San Francisco sprang into action. Although multiple military branches with bases in the area 
immediately responded to the disaster, the response was unorganized and without clear 
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management.  The federal government had not declared martial law, yet troops went into action 
under their own command (Hudson, 1976; Livingston, 2006). The U.S. Navy, Army, Marine 
Corp, and Revenue Cutter service all began to provide aid under different orders and separate 
leadership (Livingston, 2006). There was no national Red Cross or federal agency prepared to 
coordinate or provide the needed emergency response (Helquist, 2007).  The lack of organized 
response management did not facilitate effective or efficient help for public health needs such as 
urgent medical care, access to clean water, or sanitary living conditions (Hudson, 1976; 
Livingston, 2006). The situation dissolved into chaos in the weeks following the earthquake as 
branches of the military argued over authority and shared resources (Livingston, 2006). 
 During the confused and mismanaged emergency response following the earthquake, 
many citizens remained displaced from their homes without shelter or clean drinking water 
(Hudson, 1976). Instead of waiting for governmental resources to sort out responsibilities, many 
instead relied on their own families and friends for support (Henderson, 2006; Livingston, 2006). 
This public health disaster was complicated by the fact that with nowhere to go, many citizens 
set up unsanitary makeshift camps in fields outside the city (Henderson, 2006).With only one 
source of drinking water in the city, the Navy attempted to transport drinking water and milk into 
the city on ships (Livingston, 2006). This water had been sterilized to prevent disease, but there 
was no control over fair distribution to the people in need (Hudson, 1976). There was rampant 
looting, no functioning hospitals, and no clear means of communication (Livingston, 2006).  On 
April 18, two days after the disaster, the mayor gathered many prominent citizens in the Hall of 
Justice and created several committees that put citizens in charge of disaster relief (Hudson, 
1976). This is the first recorded creation of disaster relief committees including public health 
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related groups like “Relief of the Hungry”, “Restoration of City Water”, and “Sanitation” 
(Hudson, 1976).   
The 1906 San Francisco Earthquake demonstrates a public health emergency in which 
neither local nor federal government were prepared to quickly implement an organized response 
to protect the health and safety of the affected citizens after a natural disaster. Although citizens 
and military personnel alike provided aid, a unified response was not available to prevent the 
chaos and misappropriation of services and resources resulting in further degradation of the 
public’s health (Hudson, 1976). The 1906 San Francisco earthquake and subsequent aftermath 
was a large scale natural disaster and public health emergency that has served, and continues to 
serve, as a reminder of the need for appropriate emergency preparedness and response.  
The concept of national emergency preparedness occurred relatively recently; with the 
recognition of public health agencies as being vital elements of disaster preparedness and 
emergency response even slower to develop.  Despite being overlooked by other agencies in the 
past, public health departments have played, and continue to play, key roles in emergency 
response and the development of emergency preparedness plans.  Most commonly, public health 
agencies are recognized as leading the response against infectious disease outbreaks (Morse, 
2006).  Other examples of public health responding to emergencies include: inspecting and 
monitoring food supply and safety in restaurants after power outages, providing group shelters 
during heat-waves in areas where not all residents have access to air conditioning, and in some 
jurisdictions health departments are responsible for water supply safety during and after floods 
(Morse, 2006).  Each of these examples demonstrates how the government has included health 
departments and public health into emergency preparedness and response planning.   
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The first emergency managers working for the US government were part of the Civil 
Defense program preparing for a possible nuclear attack from the Soviet Union in the 1950s 
(Morse, 2006).  Over the course of the next 20 years, various agencies were developed with 
specific aims of creating operational plans and activities related to emergency preparedness and 
response (Morse, 2006).  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created 
when President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order in 1979 (Coyne et al., 2009).  With this 
order, FEMA was created by merging several disaster-related agencies into a single operating 
organization.  Agencies including the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Weather 
Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General 
Services Administration, the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, and various activities 
undertaken by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development were brought together in 
an attempt to streamline emergency management activities into one single agency (Coyne et al., 
2009). 
The National Weather Service.  Tracking and monitoring the weather has been 
important to United States citizens since the colonies were first founded.  Early colonists 
recognized that weather affects all elements of life, from the agriculture and farming industries to 
the trade and transportation industries.  President Ulysses S. Grant understood how important 
tracking the weather was for the country and prioritized nationwide weather monitoring when he 
signed into law a joint resolution of Congress in 1870 that authorized the establishment of a 
national weather service under the Secretary of War (National Weather Service, 2006).  This law 
required the newly created national weather service to record meteorological observations at all 
military stations in the nation and combines that information with reports from other points in 
both the US and its territories.  These observations would then be used to create weather 
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forecasting reports to warn of approaching storms and severe weather.  The national weather 
service agency was housed within the War Department from 1870 -1890 with headquarters 
located in Washington DC.  Several field offices were identified and linked with the 
headquarters via telegraph (National Weather Service, 2006). 
In 1890 President Harrison and Congress signed legislation renaming and moving the 
national weather service to the newly created US Weather Bureau in the Department of 
Agriculture (National Weather Service, 2006).  These legislative changes mark the transition of 
the national weather service from a military operation to a civilian agency.  Agency reporting 
responsibilities grew with advancing technology and the improved understanding of weather 
systems.  The Weather Bureau became responsible for providing flood warnings to the public, 
and also began tracking river flow and volume.  To provide more accurate reports and warnings, 
weather forecasters began to include more sophisticated methods of monitoring and tracking 
weather observations using kites and air balloon experiments to measure air temperature, relative 
humidity, and wind (National Weather Service, 2006).  With the advent of air travel and airports, 
the Weather Bureau realized how vital its role of accurate weather reporting and forecasting 
would be for the aviation community. 
As the Weather Bureau continued to work collaboratively with the aviation industry, 
additional offices and field locations were established across the country (Friday, 1994).  These 
additional offices assured more locations for both surface and upper-air meteorological 
observations and data to be transmitted and combined in larger forecasting efforts.  The addition 
of these offices and weather data helped improve the accuracy and detail of weather forecasts 
and severe weather warnings.  In 1940 President Roosevelt recognized that the role of the 
Weather Bureau was important not only within the aviation community but also for national 
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commerce.  With this new understanding, the President officially transferred the Weather Bureau 
into the Department of Commerce, where it remains today (National Weather Service, 2006).      
The US Army helped to continue the growth and development of the Weather Bureau in 
1941 with the donation of 25 surplus radars to monitor and track weather systems (National 
Weather Service, 2006).  With this donation, the army helped establish a network of weather 
surveillance radars, which are still in use today.  At this time, the Weather Bureau was officially 
issuing multiple weather-related warnings to alert and ultimately protect the general public from 
weather-related threats.  With the genesis of computer technology in the 1950s, more complex 
mathematical models were created that improved forecasting accuracy (National Weather 
Service, 2006). With new and improved technology, the Severe Weather Warning Center – a 
precursor to the National Severe Storms Center – was created and initiated operations in 1951 at 
Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2013).  
This center was responsible for providing forecast alerts of tornados, high winds, and large hail 
to the public.  These “severe weather bulletins” were the precursors for today’s weather 
advisories and warnings.   
By the mid-1960s the Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA) was 
created and housed within the Department of Commerce (National Weather Service, 2013).  The 
ESSA, incorporating several agencies including the Weather Bureau, was purposed with 
overseeing the nation’s weather and climate operations and forecasting.  With this move in 
agency location, the Weather Bureau was officially renamed the National Weather Service 
(NWS).  Just 5 years later President Richard Nixon called for another governmental reorganizing 
and the creation of NOAA (National Weather Service, 2013).  NOAA then absorbed the ESSA 
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and added multiple other agencies engaging in environmentally-related activities.  The NWS 
continues to be housed within NOAA today. 
Currently, the National Weather Service is one operating agency within NOAA and the 
Department of Commerce.  The NWS mission is to “Provide weather, water, and climate data, 
forecasts and warnings for the protection of life and property and enhancement of the national 
economy” (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2013).  With major advances in 
radars, satellites, improved information processing and communications systems, high-speed 
computers, and fully-automated weather observing systems, NOAA’s NWS is able to provide 
more accurate and precise weather forecasts and warnings across the nation (i.e. forecasting 
dangerous storms, like hurricanes, with predictions of storm travel paths with relative certainty 
and accuracy several days in advance).  With vast improvements in technology, NWS continues 
to work towards an agency vision of creating a Weather-Ready Nation.  This vision aims at 
providing accurate and precise weather forecasts and warnings that will ensure that “[the US] 
society is prepared for and [able to] respond to weather-dependent events” (National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, 2013).   
Developments in Federal Emergency Preparedness 
During the initial years of operation FEMA was an independent entity within the US 
government with direct congressional oversight (Coyne et al., 2009).  It was not until a series of 
major natural disasters in the late 1980s and early 1990s hit the US that some of FEMA’s 
emergency preparedness and response limitations were brought to light.  In 1989 Hurricane 
Hugo devastated the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico before tearing across the Carolinas (Hollis, 
2005; Schneider, 2008).  Following quickly upon this devastation, the Loma Prieta earthquake 
shook the San Francisco Bay area (Schneider, 2008).  It was during the response efforts to this 
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storm and earthquake that the nation learned how much more emergency management and 
coordination was required of FEMA, state, and local governments to effectively prepare for and 
respond to natural disasters.   
In 1992 FEMA was once again tested when Hurricane Andrew overwhelmed southern 
Florida (Gresham, 1994).  Hurricane Andrew left more than 160,000 people homeless as FEMA, 
state, and local governments were unable to organize and coordinate response efforts together 
(Coyne et al., 2009).  Criticism abounded, causing the US government to initiate a 
comprehensive study of the FEMA’s ability to plan for and respond to natural disasters.  The 
National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) – a nonprofit, nonpartisan, congressionally 
chartered think-tank was hired to examine the federal, state, and local levels of emergency 
preparedness and response (Gresham, 1994).  NAPA provided FEMA with numerous criticisms 
and suggestions for improvement.   
The number one suggestion for improvement, from both the NAPA and several senators 
following Hurricane Andrew, was the adoption of an all-hazards-preparedness response 
framework (Gresham, 1994).  As Bill Clinton was elected into office, changes were instituted 
throughout FEMA and the emergency preparedness processes of the government.  Aiming at a 
dramatic systems change, Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as the new head of FEMA (Witt & 
Morgan, 2002).  Witt was not only the first director of FEMA to have emergency management 
experience; he was also the first to stop staffing the agency with political appointees (O'Brien & 
Mileti, 2003; Witt & Morgan, 2002).  In doing this, Witt removed layers of bureaucracy and 
allowed the agency more maneuverability in emergency preparedness and response.  Ultimately, 
Witt strove to instill every person working in FEMA with a spirit of preparedness, dedication, 
and service for the customer and a willingness to listen to ideas from all levels of government to 
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make the emergency preparedness and response system work together better (Witt & Morgan, 
2002).    
Under Witt’s leadership, FEMA handled 373 major disasters, ranging from tornados and 
hurricanes to a terrorist bombing (Witt & Morgan, 2002).  With Witt as director, FEMA was able 
to establish a reputation for delivering solid and reliable emergency management services.  
Despite demonstrated success in emergency preparedness and response, in 2003 FEMA lost its 
independent agency status and was merged into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
where it is still housed today (Coyne et al., 2009).  While FEMA continues to provide emergency 
management services, the onus of preparedness planning remains with local and state 
organizations and agencies.  All disasters occur locally, so the first line of preparedness and 
response stands with the local community. 
 Recent Events: Hurricane Katrina.  On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made 
landfall along the Gulf Coast, initiating what quickly became one of the worst natural disasters in 
the history of the United States (Eikenberry, Arroyave, & Cooper, 2007; Forgette, Dettrey, Van 
Boening, & Swanson, 2009; Johnson & Rainey, 2007; Kutner, 2007; Schneider, 2008).  In total, 
the disaster covered an area of 90,000 square miles, displaced approximately 780,000 people 
from their homes, claimed over 1,800 lives, and caused an estimated $80 billion in economic loss 
(Forgette et al., 2009; Johnson & Rainey, 2007; Schneider, 2008). 
Many of the immediate public health consequences of Katrina stemmed directly from 
extreme flooding and structural damage; hundreds of thousands of individuals lacked access to 
basic human needs such as shelter, food, and clean water (Johnson & Rainey, 2007).  In addition, 
many people became stranded among the nearly 22 million tons of debris, thus exposing them to 
contaminants in the flood waters such as waste, fuel, pesticides, metals, and other toxic 
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chemicals (Johnson & Rainey, 2007).  Perhaps most significantly, the destruction caused by 
Hurricane Katrina both exposed and reinforced existing health disparities, particularly in terms 
of poverty and racism (Johnson & Rainey, 2007; Kutner, 2007).  Uninsured and underinsured 
individuals were unable to receive medical care, especially because the majority of clinics, 
hospitals, and other health care facilities were either destroyed or closed down due to inadequate 
numbers of physicians and nurses (Kutner, 2007).  A disproportionate number of Katrina-related 
deaths occurred among poor, elderly African Americans due not only to lack of access to 
medical care but also to lack of transportation and limited social support (Johnson & Rainey, 
2007; Kutner, 2007).  Among survivors, long-term health consequences include physical injuries 
as well as mental health problems including posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and 
depression (Johnson & Rainey, 2007; Kutner, 2007). 
Although some of these public health issues may have been inevitable consequences of 
the disaster, other issues are clearly attributable to underlying social inequalities, and others may 
have been preventable if the intergovernmental response had been executed as originally 
planned. The general perception of Hurricane Katrina as an administrative failure stems from the 
discrepancies between the government’s response policies and the way in which these policies 
were actually implemented (Eikenberry et al., 2007; Schneider, 2008).  While local and state 
emergency preparedness plans and procedures had been created, those plans and procedures had 
not been practiced through exercises or drills (Schneider, 2008).  Without practicing and 
engaging in emergency preparedness drills, the local and state emergency response managers 
missed identifying the greatest weakness to a unified and successful disaster response– the 
malfunction of necessary emergency structures (levee and flood wall failures).  Emergency 
preparedness planning alone is not enough; any type of preparedness program must also include 
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regularly scheduled practice and drills to ensure that preparedness plans are updated and current 
with both personnel and technology.   
Recent Events: South Pacific Tsunami.  On September 29, 2009, a devastating tsunami 
swept over the small islands of American Samoa, a US territory located in the South Central 
Pacific Ocean.  This local, or near-field, tsunami was generated by an 8.1-magnitude submarine 
earthquake that occurred at 6:58am (local time) that morning in the Samoan Islands region.  The 
earthquake’s epicenter was a mere 200 km south of the Samoan Islands and 350 km northeast of 
the main islands of Tonga (Okal et al., 2010).  The ensuing tsunami was recorded as arriving on 
the shoreline of the hardest hit villages between 15-20 minutes after of the earthquake (Okal et 
al., 2010).   
In total, this local tsunami directly affected Tonga, Samoa, and American Samoa; 
resulting in injury, death, and widespread loss of property and public services.  The physical 
damage and economic costs caused by the tsunami to this region are estimated to exceed $200 
million (Okal et al., 2010).  A total of 189 individuals lost their life during this tsunami, with 9 
individuals claimed in Tonga, 146 in Samoa, and 34 in American Samoa (Lay et al., 2010; Okal 
et al., 2010).  During this event American Samoa suffered the highest tsunami death toll on US 
soil since 1964 (Fritz et al., 2011).  
Choudhary et al. (2012) conducted a Community Needs Assessment for Public Health 
Emergency Response (CASPER) in American Samoa 5 days immediately following the 2009 
tsunami, and again 3 weeks after the tsunami as a follow-up.  Due to island location and 
topography in relation to the earthquake’s epicenter, the capital city of Pago Pago and the 
western coast of Tutuila Island were the areas most affected in American Samoa by the tsunami.  
As the waves rushed inland, public utilities buildings and infrastructure were severely damaged, 
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resulting in immediate and wide-spread loss of electricity, water, and sanitation services 
throughout the island (Choudhary et al., 2012).   
Many of the households in the affected areas (estimated to be roughly 600 households) 
were forced to evacuate for at least one night, many for several days and up to weeks, because of 
tsunami damage (Choudhary et al., 2012).  While families were force to leave their homes, this 
evacuation was relatively successful with low mortality.  Both the initial and follow-up CASPER 
demonstrated a significant portion of residence-related safety concerns, with a significant need 
for tarpaulins and other temporary sheltering materials.  A significant portion of the population 
reported using relief agency-provided bottled water as a sole source of potable water and a 
severe need for clothing.  The most common health symptoms and conditions immediately 
following the tsunami included: respiratory conditions, stress and/or sleep disturbances, stomach 
ache or diarrhea, lacerations, bruises, contusions, impalement or puncture wounds, and strains, 
sprains, or dislocations (Choudhary et al., 2012).  Roughly 40% of those surveyed identified 
barriers preventing them from obtaining necessary medical care or supplies.  These barriers 
ranged from lacking household financial resources to a strong fear of traveling after the tsunami 
(Choudhary et al., 2012).  Adding to these barriers to health care access was the limited amount 
of medical resources available in American Samoa prior to the tsunami.  This small US territory 
has a single 128-bed, hospital facility that was quickly overrun in the wake of the tsunami 
(Choudhary et al., 2012).         
One significant reason cited for the mostly successful coastal evacuation and significantly 
low numbers of deaths caused by this local tsunami is the precedence of tsunami emergency 
preparedness planning, education, and drilling within this region (Choudhary et al., 2012; Fritz et 
al., 2011; Leong-Nowell et al., 2012).  Many Samoans, American Samoans, and Tongans have 
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been educated and taught to immediately move to high ground after experiencing an earthquake.  
These islands within the South Pacific have prioritized education and evacuation exercises, with 
the island of Samoa participating in one such evacuation drill in the year preceding this 
earthquake and tsunami (Fritz et al., 2011).  Local and regional emergency response teams were 
previously identified, trained, and drilled so that they could begin response activities throughout 
the islands of the South Pacific immediately after the tsunami (Leong-Nowell et al., 2012).  
Additionally, the CASPER assessments conducted in American Samoa helped identify health 
and safety priorities while also providing community member links to services both immediately 
after the tsunami and 3 weeks later during recovery efforts (Choudhary et al., 2012).  While there 
is still room for improvement, without this regional dedication to tsunami preparedness planning, 
education, and drilling, the mortality and morbidity due to the 2009 tsunami event may have 
been much greater. 
Learning from the Past: The Importance of Preparedness 
The relatively recent events of both Hurricane Katrina and the South Pacific tsunami 
demonstrate the continued importance of comprehensive emergency preparedness.  Over the 
course of our history as a nation, emergency preparedness has come to be recognized as a vital 
part of maintaining the safety and well-being of our country.  Various agencies like the NWS 
have developed the technology and knowledge to forecast or predict some disasters before they 
occur.  This allows emergency management to alert and warn communities and individuals of 
imminent threat so that mitigation and response activities may be initiated.  Not all disasters can 
be predicted, some disasters can strike quickly providing little or no time for a warning to be 
issued.  Emergency preparedness planning is vital for both of these types of disasters so that 
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communities in danger can react constructively and respond to the disaster quickly to minimize 
negative health and safety impacts.   
Emergency preparedness should include a full range of prevention, mitigation, and 
recovery activities, rather than focusing solely on activities designed to enable the response to a 
disaster.  Engaging in emergency preparedness planning is not a one-time action producing a 
single response plan; rather it is a process requiring continuing refinement, improvement, and 
adaptation.  Emergency response plans are living documents, they must grow and change as 
communities grow and change over time.  The threats facing a community change and 
technology systems for detecting and responding to those threats also change and must be 
accounted for in the community’s emergency preparedness plan.  Preparedness plans should be 
tested regularly through drills and exercises engaging all major community stakeholders.  If any 
corrective actions or needs are identified through the drills or exercises, those needs must be 
addressed immediately and updated in the preparedness plan.   
Natural Hazards 
 A natural hazard is most easily defined as a threat of some naturally occurring event (e.g. 
earthquake, tsunami, etc.) that may cause damage to the environment and/or individuals during 
and/or after the event (Perry & Lindell, 2003).  A natural hazard is not the same as a natural 
disaster, though many use the terms interchangeably.  Wisner et al (2004) explain that a natural 
hazard can only develop into a natural disaster when an event exceeds and overwhelms the 
affected community or population and supporting emergency services.  This in turn leaves the 
social system unable to function or recover without external assistance (Wisner, 2004).   
Natural disasters have substantially increased over the last several decades, causing 
significant losses of life and property.  Much of this increase may be attributed to increasing 
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populations, changes in land usage, urbanization, and possibly global warming.  During the 
course of the last decade, close to one million people world-wide have been killed and nearly 2.6 
billion people affected by a natural disaster (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction, 2005). The most common disasters are severe storms, droughts, floods, and 
earthquakes.  While other disasters, like tsunamis, are less common, they have the potential to 
cause significant damage, death, and injury to communities and individuals.    
Natural Hazards Research 
 Research on the social implications of large-scale disasters (man-made or natural) was 
not seriously undertaken until the United States Army began investigating bombing effectiveness 
during World War II (Smith, 1977).  Building on these initial studies and a fear of nuclear attack, 
in the 1950s the US government funded the construction of an early-warning system that was 
largely based on social science research (Fritz & Marks, 1954; Fritz & Mathewson, 1957; 
Moore, Bates, Layman, & Parenton, 1963; O'Brien & Mileti, 2003).  As fear of nuclear war 
receded, the modern subfield of disaster social science research began to shift focus to natural 
disasters like earthquake, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, mud slides, fires, etc. (Fritz & Marks, 
1954; Fritz & Mathewson, 1957; Moore et al., 1963).  The researchers studying these disasters 
used social science research methods to identify and understand the social dynamics before, 
during, and after a disaster.  As research methods and theories have continued to develop so too 
has the depth and scope of natural hazards behavioral research.      
Early Warning Systems. The creation of early warning systems is considered a hazard 
mitigation action against the effects of natural hazards.  Hazard mitigation occurs when the risk 
posed by natural hazards is reduced through the institution and implementation of projects or 
procedures that reduce or prevent future damages (Wisner, 2004).  Warning systems are 
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instituted to detect approaching and imminent disaster and provide information to individuals at 
risk, thus enabling those who are in danger to make appropriate decisions and take action (Mileti 
& Peek, 2000; Sorensen, 2000).  While this definition may make warning systems sound simple, 
they are complex.  Even small warning systems require the coordination and linking of multiple 
fields – science, technology, engineering, government, the media, and the public (Mileti & Peek, 
2000; Sorensen, 2000; Wisner, 2004).  There are three basic components, or subsystems, to any 
early warning system: emergency management, detection, and public response.  The most 
successful early warning systems integrate all of these elements through the melding of scientific 
and technology monitoring and detection with an emergency management organization that can 
then disseminate an alert and notification message to the public (Mileti & Peek, 2000; Sorensen, 
2000; Wisner, 2004).      
Good communication, leading to good warning systems, does not rely on hardware and 
technology alone.  Rather, an equal focus is placed on the linkages between people in the system 
and standard operating procedures for who will produce and share messages.  Another good 
predictor of the warning system is the successful implementation of exercises.  Early warning 
systems and the communication structure through which the emergency warnings are delivered 
to a community also play a significant role in how individuals define and perceive their 
individual risk (Mileti & Peek, 2000).  Natural hazards and risk communication have been the 
focus of much previous research, with the development of both process and theoretical models to 
help improve risk warnings and communications.    
Tsunami Early Warning Systems.  An effective tsunami early warning system must 
include not only the scientific technologies that may accurately forecast or detect a tsunami but 
must also include a strong public notification system that allows the population at risk to receive 
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warning notification in a timely manner.  The main function of a tsunami early warning system is 
to provide enough time for the population at risk to evacuate from a hazardous zone.  Therefore, 
in addition to scientific technology and a communications system, a well-functioning tsunami 
early warning system relies on local tsunami disaster education and training.  This requires 
collaboration between scientists, government, and local communities to ensure that those 
communities at risk are prepared and capable to respond appropriately should a tsunami occur. 
There are several elements that comprise the “scientific technologies” described above.  
The technological elements within a tsunami warning system include: a seismographic network 
to monitor earthquake activity, a Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) 
buoy and tide gauge network, computer modeling and analysis, all reporting to and working 
through a designated warning center (Jin & Lin, 2011).  Working in the designated warning 
center are on-site scientists who interpret the data collected via those instruments described.  It is 
the function of these scientists to determine if a tsunami has been generated and issue a warning 
to the country or countries that may be affected.  It is common practice for a center to issue an 
assessment of any tsunami potential quickly after a significant earthquake and update that 
assessment as more information becomes available (Jin & Lin, 2011).   
Short-term Response to Warnings.  Some of the earlier natural hazards research 
focused on hazard warnings to the public and risk communication theory regarding how the 
public responds to those warnings (Mileti & O'Brien, 1992, 1993; Quarantelli, 1990).  Mileti et 
al. (1992, 1993) describe the process, or stages, that individuals will most typically go through as 
they hear and internalize a warning of risk.  Modeled as a sequence, the process includes these 
six stages: hearing – confirming – understanding – believing – personalizing – responding.  To 
elaborate, the process begins with an individual hearing (or seeing) risk information that is being 
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communicated.  People will then seek information to corroborate or confirm the warning 
message, either through conversations with other individuals or through seeking information 
from another source.  Once the warning has been confirmed, a person will then develop an 
understanding of the risk.  Next, a person will begin to believe and personalize the warning 
information, allowing that individual to begin forming a behavior or response action to take.   
While this sequence is described in a linear fashion, Mileti et al. (1992, 1993) describe 
how the sequencing may vary between individuals.  Personal characteristics can affect how one 
hears and comprehends risk communications, and the various stages of the sequence may also be 
directly affected by an individual’s age, gender, level of education, etc.  Additionally, individuals 
may skip some stages or move back into previous stages depending on the results of their 
processing (i.e. an individual has confirmed a warning, but is unable to move into understanding 
without additional confirmation and explanation of the risk).     
After reviewing the research examining personal characteristics of people receiving 
warnings, Mileti et al. (1992, 1993) synthesized the most salient characteristics into a theory of 
public perception and response to risk information as shown below in Figure 2.    
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Figure 2.  Theory of Public Perception and Response to Risk Information.  Figure created by 
author based on Mileti & O’Brien’s (1992, 1993). 
 
According to this model a response to communicated risk information is directly affected 
by three factors, 1) the quality and quantity of warning information received, 2) the personal 
characteristics of the individual receiving the warning message, and 3) the individual’s perceived 
risk.  Of note, an individual’s perceived risk is indirectly affected by both the warning message 
itself and personal characteristics.  It is important for emergency managers and planners to 
understand this flow of information driving a response decision when preparing warning 
messages. 
Lindell and Perry (1992, 2004, 2012) have contributed to this field with the development 
of the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM).  This model, shown below in Figure 3, 
provides a framework for understanding how many different factors influence and inform an 
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individual’s warning response and protective action decision making.  This particular theoretical 
framework has been used to examine several different hazard and disaster situations including: 
flood, hurricane, toxic chemical release, environmental hazards and disasters, hurricane 
evacuation decision making, and hurricane re-entry decision making (Huang, Lindell, Prater, 
Wu, & Siebeneck, 2012; Lindell & Hwang, 2008; Siebeneck, Lindell, Prater, Wu, & Huang, 
2013).   
 
 
Figure 3.  The Protective Action Decision Model (Lindell & Perry, 2012). 
 
 Lindell and Perry (2012) describe how the PADM is broken down into stages that 
characterize the process “typical” individuals will go through as they make the decision to adopt 
an action or behavior that will protect them against an environmental hazard.  While this model 
is staged, the authors note that not everyone will go through all of the stages, or conversely, they 
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may cycle back and forth through different stages multiple times before making a final decision.  
Some individuals may even jump straight to making a protective action.  The decision-making 
process is initiated by the interaction of a set of precursor variables: social and environmental 
cues, informational sources, channel access and preference, warning messages, and receiver 
characteristics.  These precursor variables in turn begin to elicit three core perceptions: 
environmental threat perceptions about whether the hazard will cause them harm or injury or 
damage property; protective action perceptions regarding potential actions to increase safety (e.g. 
evacuation), and stakeholder perceptions regarding the media or authorities and the degree of 
influence they hold over an individual’s protective behavior.  These three perceptions together 
form the basis for an individual’s decision making about how to respond to an imminent threat.   
 Thus, Lindell and Perry (1992, 2004, 2012) have highlighted the flow of an individual’s 
behavioral response that is initiated through the perception of an environmental threat.  The 
PADM model can help guide the emergency planning process by accounting for and providing 
training or education regarding appropriate behavioral responses and actions.  Additionally, 
emergency managers should take into account the precursor variables and predecisional 
processes as warning messages are crafted and disseminated to the public.   
 Long-term Preparedness.  Paton (2003) wanted to better understand why levels of 
disaster preparedness remain low when considerable effort and resources have been spent on 
public hazard education.  Through expanding and building on previous natural hazards research 
and including health behavior research and theory, he created a social cognitive model of disaster 
preparedness.  Paton’s model explains the process through which a person reaches the decision 
to prepare for a hazard as seen below in Figure 4.  The model begins with precursor variables by 
identifying the motivators that encourage people to prepare including: a critical awareness of the 
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hazard, personal perception of the hazard, and hazard-related anxiety.  The next phase of the 
model moves into intention formation and those constructs that help facilitate creation of an 
intention.  This phase allows that once individuals are motivated to think about a hazard, they 
will begin to make judgments about personal actions that can be taken to mitigate the effects of 
the hazard.  These judgments, combined with the motivators, help lead an individual to 
developing an intention.  Finally, there are several variables Paton identifies that may influence, 
or moderate, a person’s ultimate intentions to engage in preparedness activities including: 
perceived responsibility, timing of the hazard activity, sense of community, and response 
efficacy.  These variables may be used to explain why some people, despite having favorable 
preparedness intentions, fail to act.  For example, if a person has developed the intention to 
prepare for a hazard, the link to preparedness may be broken because that person lacks the 
resources necessary to make the action (low response efficacy).        
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. An Adapted Social-Cognitive Preparation Model (Johnston et al., 2005; Patton, 2003). 
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Paton’s (2003) original model has since been successfully adapted to examine how 
people interpret their environment, understand and assign meaning to a hazard (volcano hazard, 
earthquake and flood hazard, heat-waves, household disaster preparedness, and tsunami hazard), 
and ultimately make a decision regarding preparedness actions (Becker, Paton, Johnston, & 
Ronan, 2012; McIvor, Paton, & Johnston, 2009; Mishra, Suar, & Paton, 2009; Paton, Frandsen, 
& Johnston, 2010; Paton et al., 2008; Paton et al., 2009).  This model may also be applied to 
interventions and preparedness education programs.  Paton’s model implies that the intervention 
or education program should follow the same progression shown here: motivate people to 
prepare (precursor variables), assist with and facilitate the formation of intentions (intention 
formation variables), and then help individuals convert intentions into actions (moderator 
variables).   
Community Emergency Preparedness 
There are three critical components of community emergency preparedness for natural 
disasters: planning, training, and writing plans (Perry & Lindell, 2003).  Defining a community 
as “prepared” for the event of a disaster implies a state of readiness to respond to environmental 
threats or natural hazards.  To create this state of preparedness, a community must undergo a 
process of examination, assessment, and planning.  First, a community must conduct a 
vulnerability analysis by assessing its susceptibility to a wide-range of environmental or natural 
hazards.  It is only through examination of vulnerability that emergency planners can fully 
understand both the factors that will increase the vulnerability of a community as opposed to 
those factors that will increase the resilience (building adaptive capacity) of that same 
community (Paton, 2005).  Second, community assets and resources (human, environmental, and 
material) available to manage these threats must be identified.  And finally, the community must 
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delineate and define those organizations and local infrastructures through which a coordinated 
response will be made (O'Brien & Mileti, 2003; Perry & Lindell, 2003).  It is important to note 
that vulnerability, assets, resources, and organizations all change over time.  Without practice, 
performance skills and knowledge will decrease.  Because of both of these factors, planning and 
training must become a continual process in order to maintain and sustain community emergency 
preparedness (Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, & Paton, 2012).  Without continual reassessment and 
standard updating of a community plan, the emergency preparedness and planning exercises will 
quickly become outdated and outmoded.  
Emergency planning for natural hazards is driven by hazard assessment and risk 
reduction serving as the primary objectives for the community of interest (Perry & Lindell, 
2003).  As a community begins to identify potential threats and hazards, it is important for 
emergency planners to not only identify those threats previously experienced by the community.  
Rather, planners should incorporate new knowledge and technology that will help identify new 
or potential threats and hazards in addition to those hazards and threats known to have 
historically caused damage.  Once the potential and probable hazards have been identified, 
planners should begin an assessment of the associated risks (Perry & Lindell, 2003).  This 
process of identifying and assessing potential hazards and risks will require the collaboration and 
input of all the major community stakeholders.  This will include inter-governmental 
partnerships among local jurisdictions and higher governmental authorities who may provide 
technical assistance and resources (O'Brien & Mileti, 2003; Perry & Lindell, 2003).  This 
collaborative and iterative planning process is not only preparing a plan of action during an 
emergency, it is building relationships and capacity within a community that helps to strengthen 
that community’s overall resiliency (Paton, 2005; Sinclair et al., 2012).  Resiliency is the ability 
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of a person, community, or a society to absorb the impacts of a disaster and readily return to a 
predisaster state (Paton, 2005).  In essence, the aim of all emergency preparedness activities is to 
adopt and foster a resilient community.  This is especially true of community emergency 
preparedness programs and activities (like those described in the following sections). 
Risk reduction requires communities to examine the required actions that will decrease 
the expected or projected levels of danger associated with each identified hazard or threat (Perry 
& Lindell, 2003).  Risk reduction will also require planners to identify those resources that will 
be required for implementing the required actions.  It is often the case that the resources 
available are rarely equal to, or greater, than the hazard.  This inequality of available versus 
needed resources requires that all stakeholders examine the costs of mitigation and response.  
The resulting negotiation of resources versus required actions for a given risk among community 
planners defines the point at which the risk is considered to be acceptable for a community 
(Perry & Lindell, 2003).  Ultimately, the processes of hazard identification and assessment are 
processes through which community’s measure, monitor, and evaluate environmental hazards.  
Risk reduction encompasses the development and implementation of mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery activities (O'Brien & Mileti, 2003).          
 Organizational-based Programs. 
StormReady® Community Program.  The NWS recognizes that severe weather affects 
the entire nation, with drastic numbers of events devastating communities each year.  Both 
meteorologists and emergency managers across the country recognized there were inefficiencies 
and gaps in preparing both individual citizens and communities to respond to severe weather and 
the disasters severe weather may cause.  The NWS StormReady® Community program was born 
out of conversation between two meteorologists contemplating the potential of a severe weather 
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certification or recognition program for communities (Rothfusz, 2013).  Together with other 
emergency managers, NWS staff and other meteorologists, a program was conceptualized that 
provided a platform for communities to become more engaged and accountable for their severe 
weather preparedness.  The newly created recognition program provided a set of guidelines for 
communities (towns, counties, etc.) that were interested in increasing and improving emergency 
preparedness capacity and engagement.  These guidelines help lead communities through the 
emergency preparedness planning process, resulting in a final actionable community plan that 
responds to the threat of all types of severe weather (Rothfusz, 2013).  The StormReady® 
Community program provides direct advice to city leaders, emergency managers, and the local 
media that will improve local hazardous weather operations.  
To be officially recognized as StormReady®, interested communities must fulfill all of 
the requirements outlined in the program guidelines.  This includes: 1) establishing or identifying 
a 24-hour warning point and emergency operations center, 2) demonstrating multiple methods of 
receiving severe weather forecasts and warnings, 3) demonstrating more than one method for 
alerting the public of weather forecasts and warnings, 4) facilitating community readiness 
through seminars and education, and 5) the development of a formal hazardous weather plan that 
includes training for severe weather spotters and mandatory plan testing exercises (Franklin, 
2013).  Once those actions are complete, each community is assessed by NWS and pronounced 
StormReady®.  In 1999 Tulsa, OK was recognized as the first ever StormReady® community.  
Since then, over 2,000 more communities have successfully completed the guidelines to become 
officially recognized as StormReady®.  As of September 2013 there are 2,117 StormReady® 
communities located throughout the United States (Franklin, 2013). 
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TsunamiReady
TM
 Community Program.  The NWS, meteorologists, and emergency 
managers were excited by the ready adoption by communities of the StormReady® Community 
program.  Hoping to translate the success of the StormReady® Community program into a 
preparedness program specific to tsunami hazards, the NTHMP partnered with the NWS in early 
2000 to craft the TR Community program (Bernard, 2001, 2005; National Tsunami Hazard 
Mitigation Program, 2000).  The Director of the NWS Alaska Region, Richard Przywarty, 
initiated the process of converting the StormReady® Community program guidelines into an 
operational set of guidelines for tsunami preparedness (National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation 
Program, 2000).  These original TR Community Program guidelines may be found in Appendix 
A. 
To be designated as “Tsunami ReadyTM,” communities would need to meet a minimum 
standard level of tsunami education, awareness, and preparation activities.  The primary 
objectives of the program were defined as 1) promoting an active partnership between 
emergency management and the community of interest and 2) providing tsunami awareness 
education throughout the community (National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, 2000).  
The TR Community program achieved formalization and establishment as a federal program in 
2001with recognition of the program’s first official communities, Ocean Shores and Grays 
Harbor County, Washington (C. Maier, personal communication, July 24, 2013).  It was 
expected that the TR Community program would garner enthusiasm and community 
participation with the same speed as the StormReady® Community program, particularly in 
counties and communities along the Pacific coast in the western United States.  Unfortunately, 
the dissemination successes between the two programs have been drastically different.  In the 12 
years the TR Community program has been operating, 132 total communities have gained 
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official recognition (C. Maier, personal communication, July 24, 2013), while the StormReady® 
Community program has collected 2,117 total communities with official recognition (Franklin, 
2013).    The slow and unsteady growth of communities participating in the TR Community 
program may be seen below in Figure 5.   
 
         
Figure 5.  Number of Communities Achieving TR (TR) Recognition by Fiscal Year Budget (FY) 
(C. Maier, personal communication, July 24, 2013) 
 
Community-based Programs. 
Community Emergency Response Team.  The Community Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) model was piloted by the Los Angeles City Fire Department in California (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2012).  The pilot program trained 30 leaders in a local 
neighborhood watch organization.  These new CERT members were trained to perform basic fire 
suppression, light search and rescue, and first aid.  After successfully completing the training 
program, the CERT team was tested through drills, exercises, and demonstrations.  California 
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paved the way, demonstrating that training civilians to respond to their community’s immediate 
needs after a major disaster not only quickened response and recovery after a disaster but also 
improved citizens understanding their personal role in preparing for a disaster.  CERT training 
not only increased the volunteer’s ability to safely help themselves but also to help their friends 
and neighbors.  In 1993 FEMA picked up and expanded the CERT program to make it available 
to communities throughout the nation (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012).   
Medical Reserve Corps.  The devastating events of September 11, 2001, prompted 
spontaneous volunteers from across the country to stream into New York and attempt to provide 
aid and services for those individuals most affected by the destruction of the World Trade 
Center.  Many of these spontaneous volunteers were medical and public health professionals, 
who wanted to provide technical services for the medical and response infrastructures that were 
being strained by the disaster.  While most of these volunteers’ intentions were good, their 
presence and engagement in medical and public health services posed problems for local 
emergency management because the volunteers were unaffiliated.  Because of their unaffiliated 
status, spontaneous volunteers were unable to provide necessary documentation of technical or 
specialty credentialing and proof of liability coverage (Division of the Civilian Volunteer 
Medical Reserve Corps, 2013).  The Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) was created as a network of 
local community-based units that are housed within a local health or emergency management 
agency.  Each unit consists of both medical and nonmedical volunteers who work on local health 
initiatives and also provide supplemental support for local emergency responses.  The MRC units 
provide the structure necessary to preidentify, credential, train, and activate medical and public 
health volunteers (Division of the Civilian Volunteer Medical Reserve Corps, 2013).  The MRC 
53 
 
structure also allows these prequalified volunteers to be deployed and managed locally, 
regionally, and nationally. 
Disaster Action Team.  The American Red Cross trains community members in multiple 
facets of emergency preparedness and response.  Volunteers with the Red Cross provide 
immediate response to close to 700,000 natural and man-made disasters throughout the US over 
the course of 1 year (American Red Cross, 2013).  After receiving specific training, volunteers 
are coordinated into response teams for small and large-scale disasters ranging from fires to 
floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, transportation accidents, hazardous materials spills 
and explosions. As part of the Red Cross volunteer management system, many Red Cross 
chapters support a Disaster Action Team (DAT) that is composed of volunteers trained to 
provide local disaster response (American Red Cross, 2013).  Each DAT team is tasked with 
working directly with the victims of a disaster and meeting their immediate emergency needs as 
quickly and fully as possible.  Regardless of what caused the disaster, Red Cross will provide 
sheltering services, food preparation and delivery, and health services that address basic human 
needs.  These services allow the victims of an event to resume their normal daily activities as 
quickly as possible.  Also of note, the Red Cross includes emergency workers in its service 
provision plan.  All emergency workers providing emergency response during a disaster are 
provided with food, sheltering services, health and medical services if needed, emergency 
worker family inquiries from outside the disaster area, and access to other needed and available 
resources (American Red Cross, 2013).  
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Tsunamis 
The Mechanics 
 Originating from the Japanese word “tsu-nami,” the original definition of a tsunami 
described a “big wave in a harbor.”  Between 90% - 95% of all tsunamis are generated by large-
scale earthquakes (typically magnitude 7.5 or higher) occurring along a subduction zone (where 
one tectonic plate is being pushed or pulled under another plate) (Keim, 2006). Less frequently, 
the generation of a tsunami can be the result of landslides or volcanic eruptions (Keim, 2006; 
Wu, 1981).   
Tsunami are most often created by the rapid shifting of large portions of the ocean floor 
(from hundreds to thousands of square kilometers) and the subsequent displacement of seawater 
during large submarine earthquakes (Wu, 1981).  This displacement of seawater produces a wave 
that can travel at speeds up to hundreds of kilometers in the open ocean.  These speeds allow the 
tsunami wave to reach distant shores in relatively short timeframes.  Tsunamis are also known to 
have long wavelengths, with up to hundreds of kilometers between wave crests (Wu, 1981).  
This creates wave periods varying from just minutes to over 1 hour to reach those coastlines 
closest to the tsunami source.  As the tsunami approaches the shore, the wave slows allowing the 
wave height to increase as the water piles up (Wu, 1981).  Because of their speed and ability to 
travel inland, tsunamis have a significant capacity to destroy coastal infrastructure and buildings 
and erode the landscape.  While tsunamis are relatively infrequent events, this wide-spread 
destructive ability makes tsunamis a significant natural hazard in terms of morbidity, mortality, 
and economic loss for coastal communities.   
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As a Natural Hazard 
 Between 1980 and 2008, 18 tsunamis have occurred worldwide (EMDAT, 2008).  Over 
the course of these 18 years, 229,551 people were killed and another 2,481,879 individuals were 
recorded as being directly affected by one of those 18 tsunamis (EMDAT, 2008).  Tsunamis 
directly affect coastal areas, placing those communities situated near a shoreline at-risk for a 
tsunami hazard.  Prior to 2006 the NWS and NOAA prioritized US communities located along 
the Pacific coast, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the US Virgin Islands as having 
the highest risk for a tsunami.  After the passing of the TWEA legislation in December 2006, the 
hazard was expanded to include all US coastal regions (specifically including the Atlantic coast, 
the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea region) ("Tsunami Warning and Education Act," 
2005).      
Coastal communities at risk of tsunami have the potential of experiencing one of three 
categories of tsunamis.  These three categorizations of tsunamis are based on the time distance 
between the generation event (e.g. earthquake, landslide, etc.) of a tsunami and the community at 
risk, defined as a local, regional, or a distant tsunami.  A local (also called near-field) tsunami 
threat occurs when the first wave arrives within 30 minutes of a generation event (e.g. 
earthquake).  A regional (also called mid-field) tsunami threat occurs when the first wave arrives 
between 30 minutes and 2 hours after a generation event.  A distant (also called far-field) 
tsunami threat occurs when the first wave arrives several hours after a generation event (National 
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, 2013).  Regional and distant tsunamis usually generally 
allow advance warning in at-risk communities.  The most common advice provided in a tsunami 
warning message is directing individuals to evacuate the area expected to be inundated by the 
tsunami and move to areas of naturally occurring high ground. 
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According to the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commissions (2012), almost 90% of 
the 600,000 tsunami-related deaths that have ever been recorded worldwide are attributable to 
local tsunamis.  The greater risk posed to human life by local as compared to distant tsunamis is 
attributed to the close proximity of the tsunami-generating event (i.e. earthquake) and the short 
warning and response time available between the earthquake and the arrival of the tsunami wave 
(National Academy of Sciences, 2011).  Additionally, due to such close proximity of the 
earthquake generating a tsunami, communities will also have a delay in their ability to begin 
evacuating to safety because of the earthquake.  Complicating the evacuation process even more 
is the likelihood of infrastructure that is needed for community evacuation (roadways and 
bridges) being destroyed or damaged by the earthquake.  Communities at risk of local tsunamis 
may only have a matter of minutes to respond and evacuate a coastal area without ever receiving 
an official warning.  There are several communities in the United States at risk for one of these 
local tsunamis.  Facing the risk of a local earthquake generating a local tsunami are the states 
along the US Pacific coast including Washington, Oregon, and California; Alaska; the US Virgin 
Islands; Puerto Rico, and the US Pacific territories of Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern 
Marianas (Dunbar & Weaver, 2008). 
As the operating entity of the NOAA Tsunami Program, it is vital for the NWS to 
identify clear and translatable methods for educating US communities at risk of both local and 
distant tsunamis about both the risk they face and the available methods to mitigate a future 
tsunami.  The TR Community program was identified as a program to link communities with 
local emergency management to strengthen a community’s tsunami emergency preparedness 
ownership.  With required planning, mitigation, response, and community education elements, 
the TR Community program has great potential to reduce the potential damage, morbidity, and 
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mortality of a tsunami by increasing the preparedness and resiliency of the most at-risk 
communities in the US.  It is incumbent upon both the NWS and NOAA to ensure that the TR 
Community program guidelines and materials are current, relevant, and efficacious.      
As a Public Health Concern 
 Immediately following a tsunami, the earliest priority of any public health response is to 
provide immediate provisions for survivors including: adequate potable water, sanitation, 
clothing, food and nutrition, shelter, and medical care for injuries  (Guha-Sapir & van Panhuis, 
2009; Guha-Sapir, van Panhuis, & Lagoutte, 2007; Hayashi & Tomita, 2012; Ivers & Ryan, 
2006; Keim, 2006, 2011; Kouadio, Aljunid, Kamigaki, Hammad, & Oshitani, 2012; Llewellyn, 
2006; Wada et al., 2012)  For most tsunamis the majority of deaths occur immediately from 
drowning or complications causing drowning (e.g. blunt force trauma or penetrating injury that 
immobilizes or disables an individual).  Several studies have been conducted to assess the most 
common injuries following a tsunami, bone fractures; near-drowning, immersion, and aspiration 
induced respiratory infections; and soft tissue injuries (Guha-Sapir & van Panhuis, 2009; Ivers & 
Ryan, 2006; Keim, 2006, 2011; Kouadio et al., 2012).   
 It is important to remember that a tsunami is composed not only of seawater, rather it 
includes a significant amount of debris, sand, mud, and other foreign materials collected by the 
swiftly moving seawater.  Those individuals who are caught by the wave and survive are 
therefore exposed to injury from both the wave and the debris carried in the wave.  There are 
reported cases of severe sinus and/or lung infection where massive amounts of debris, sand, mud, 
and foreign matter was removed from survivors (Guha-Sapir & van Panhuis, 2009; Guha-Sapir, 
et al., 2007; Ivers & Ryan, 2006; Keim, 2006, 2011; Kouadio et al., 2012).  Additionally, 
complicating these lung and sinus infections are often unusual pathogens demonstrating high 
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antibiotic resistance.  Similarly, open wounds caused during the tsunami are also typically 
contaminated with debris, soil, and foreign matter.  Severe wound infections following a 
tsunami, and other natural disasters, are very common.  It has been noted in the research 
following the recent tsunamis in both Indonesia and Japan that tetanus was a major public health 
problem among survivors with infected wounds (Ivers & Ryan, 2006; Kouadio et al., 2012).   
 Psychological disturbances are also commonly observed immediately following natural 
disasters (Akiba, 2011; Hayashi & Tomita, 2012).  Due to the high mortality combined with 
missing persons during both the Indian Ocean and the Tohoku tsunamis, survivors were recorded 
as demonstrating immediate psychological symptoms.  In most cases this immediate reaction, 
called an acute stress disorder, will resolve and disappear once the individual’s immediate health 
and safety are stabilized.  As survivors from each of these tsunamis continue to recover and 
rebuild, it has been noted that many of the initial diagnosis’s of acute stress disorder are being 
converted to posttraumatic stress disorder to reflect continued psychological and mental health 
needs owing to the trauma of the tsunami (Hayashi & Tomita, 2012).  Behavioral and mental 
health effects have proven to be some of the most long-term and debilitating health outcomes 
after a tsunami.  
 Following a tsunami, the immediate medical needs of the survivors have been shown to 
overwhelm local medical and health systems.  As the local health system and infrastructure is 
overwhelmed, the disaster also causes disruption of routine local public health services that may 
lead to secondary adverse health effects developing among the disaster-affected population 
(Ivers & Ryan, 2006; Keim, 2006; Kouadio et al., 2012).  Particularly in less developed 
countries, the disruption of public health services may produce severe repercussions among the 
surviving population.  An overwhelmed health system may disrupt surveillance and health 
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provision services like immunization and tuberculosis (TB) care (Kouadio et al., 2012).  
Disruption of immunization campaigns and services may result in increasing numbers of 
vaccine-preventable illnesses (i.e. measles, meningitis, and influenza) following a tsunami.  
Disruption of TB treatment services may increase the prevalence rates of TB with an added 
danger of some patients developing resistant strains (Ivers & Ryan, 2006).          
Looking beyond the medical and public health needs immediately following a tsunami, 
care must be taken to ensure that the health of the public is protected during the protracted 
recovery and cleanup phase as well.  Wada et al. (2012) studied the sludge brought onshore 
following the Great East Japan or Tohoku earthquake and tsunami to assess the presence of 
potentially harmful pathogens for workers.  While Wada et al. found no presence of pathogens 
requiring governmental notification, several types of bacteria were identified that could cause 
infection in tsunami cleanup workers or individuals attempting to return to their homes.  
Frequent hand washing, particularly among immunocompromised individuals, and avoidance of 
unprotected close contact with the sludge were recommended to prevent infections among 
cleanup workers and the returning population.  
TsunamiReady
TM
 Community Program 
The Program 
 Modeled after the NWS StormReady® Community program, the TR Community 
program guidelines provide a guide for community emergency planners on how to apply the 
emergency preparedness planning process of hazard assessment and risk reduction specifically 
for tsunamis, to an individual community.  There are five identified program objectives for the 
TR Community program: 1) provide a set of guidelines that identify a minimum standard for 
adequate tsunami readiness at a community level, 2) increase and expand the public’s awareness 
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and understanding of the tsunami hazard, 3) encourage consistency across tsunami educational 
materials and response throughout the US and US territories, 4) improve community 
preparedness planning for tsunami disasters, and 5) create a formal recognition program for 
communities that have successfully adopted and implemented TR guidelines (Horan et al., 2010; 
Jonientz-Trisler et al., 2005).  Communities working towards earning and maintaining TR 
recognition receive support and assistance through local NWS offices and weather forecast 
officers (Dengler, 2005).    
TsunamiReady
TM
 Community Program Guidelines Evaluation Process 
  The evaluation of key components of the TR Community program guidelines is one 
piece of a larger grant titled ‘Incorporating Social Science into NOAA’s Tsunami Program.’  The 
purpose of this larger, grant-funded research is to provide program recommendations to improve 
specific components of NOAA’s Tsunami Program (including the TR Community program 
specifically) through the use of social science methods.  The social science methods proposed in 
this larger grant include community-based research eliciting feedback from end-users of the 
Tsunami Program.  The current research focuses on assessing the acceptability and usefulness of 
key components within a revised set of draft national guidelines for the TR Community program.  
This is the second stage in an evaluation process and will include research methodology from 
Public Health; Psychology; Political, Social and Physical Sciences and Evaluation with an aim to 
revise and refine the program guidelines in an effort to help better prepare communities to reduce 
their risk to tsunamis. 
The original TR Community program guidelines were implemented in 2001 with the 
recognition of the first two TR communities.  As the program moved forward, the NWS 
recognized that the guidelines would need to adapt and change as the program evolved.  Over the 
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course of several years, the NWS collaborated with the NTHMP to create a revised and modified 
set of guidelines.  These guidelines were presented to the original East Tennessee State 
University-led research team for inclusion in the ‘Incorporating Social Science into NOAA’s 
Tsunami Program’ research project.  The original research team reviewed the guidelines and 
conducted a first round of community-based focus group discussions to assess community 
perceptions and opinions of the proposed revisions.  To do this, the revised guidelines were taken 
to eight expert panels (from eight preselected community sites including: Alaska, Washington, 
Oregon, California, Hawaii, American Samoa, North Carolina, and the US Virgin Islands) for 
evaluation through focus groups.  The data from each of the eight community sites were 
analyzed individually and then included in a composite analysis.  The composite analysis was 
used to provide a set of recommendations for the NWS to consider as revisions for the 
guidelines.   
The original research team shared their findings with the NWS and NOAA by providing 
draft research reports (Gregg, Johnson, & Johnston, 2012a, 2012b; Gregg, Wood, Johnson, & 
Johnston, 2012, 2013).   The reporting and revision process were iterative through the following 
process:  original report was created and submitted to the NWS Tsunami Program Director in 
January 2012, with revisions made in June, August, and October 2012 and January 2013. The 
June (dated June 8, 2012) progress report contained a revised set of TR Community program 
guidelines developed by the original research team. The revised guidelines then underwent an 
iterative revision process by the NWS and the research team.  The revision process also included 
presentation of the suggested guidelines and telecom calls with the NTHMP and its Mitigation 
and Education Subcommittee, Executive Committee (NTHMP MES-EC) (e.g., Revised by the 
research team August 24, 2012; presented to NTHMP MES-EC: August 27, 2012; Revised by 
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NWS Tsunami Program: September 20, 2012; Presented to NTHMP-MES-EC: October-
November, 2012); and revised by the research team a final time on January 28, 2013.  This 
version of the guidelines was presented at the annual meeting of the NTHMP in Portland, 
Oregon in January 2013.  The TR Community program guidelines revised in January 2013 
provided the current draft of the TR Community guidelines used in this dissertation research 
(Appendix B).  This evaluation is focused on collecting and elaborating local community 
perceptions regarding key components that are being considered for inclusion in the proposed 
revised guidelines. 
Proposed Draft TsunamiReady
TM
 Community Program Guidelines 
The proposed draft TR Community program guidelines currently distinguish required 
actions based upon community vulnerability to local versus distant tsunami hazard.  With this 
newly proposed subdivision it may be assumed that all coastal communities have a distant 
tsunami threat and are thus expected to meet a base standard set of required actions to receive 
recognition.  For those communities that are exposed to both a distant and a local tsunami threat, 
they must complete additional protective actions to gain recognition.  This distinction between 
the base standard set of required actions and those additional actions required for communities 
identified as having a local tsunami hazard is identified throughout the guidelines document.  
This distinction can also be seen in a checklist that was prepared by the research team to 
facilitate the review of a community’s completion of required actions for TR recognition (see 
Table 1 below).   
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Table 1:  
Draft Checklist for Determining Completion of TsunamiReady
TM
 Recognition 
Community Name:      Reviewer Name & Date: 
 Code Action Short Name Applicability Achieved Reviewer Notes 
Mit-1 Tsunami-hazard zones have been mapped All 
    
Mit-2 
Tsunami hazard and vulnerability are 
addressed in FEMA-approved Local Multi-
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
All 
    
Mit-3 
Designated tsunami hazard areas, evacuation 
routes, safe zones, and assembly areas 
All 
  
Mit-4 
Signage to identify tsunami hazard areas, 
evacuation routes, safe zones, and assembly 
areas 
All 
  
Mit-5 
Availability of natural high ground and inland 
locations has been identified for at-risk 
populations. Or, (see Mit-4) 
local threats 
only 
    
Mit-6 
A plan for vertical-evacuation strategies has 
been established (e.g., berms, structures)  
local threats 
only 
    
Prep-1 
Tsunami exercise at least every three years, 
such as a tabletop, functional or full-scale  
All 
    
Prep-2 
Initial Responder training that includes 
tsunami hazard, warning and evacuation 
protocols  
All 
    
Prep-3 
Evacuation maps of tsunami hazard areas, 
evacuation routes, safe zones, and assembly 
areas 
All 
    
Prep-4 
Written materials that include tsunami 
information, hazard maps, evacuation routes, 
safety tips, and response protocols  
All 
    
Prep-5 
Events (at least 1 per year) to educate all 
citizens on local tsunami hazards, evacuation 
routes, safety and response 
All 
    
Prep-6 
Annual presentations to schools in tsunami-
hazard zones 
All 
    
Prep-7 
Participation in NOAA/NWS Tsunami 
Warning Center communication tests 
All 
    
Prep-8 
Tsunami evacuation exercise for schools in 
the inundation zone 
local threats 
only     
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Table 1: (Continued) 
Prep-9 
Annual training, outreach or education that 
targets owners and staff for high-occupancy 
businesses  
local threats 
only 
    
Prep-
10 
Annual training, outreach  or education that 
targets residents living or working in tsunami-
hazard zones  
local threats 
only 
    
Resp-
1 
Tsunami hazard addressed in Emergency 
Operations Plan 
All 
    
Resp-
2 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)  All 
    
Resp-
3 
Redundant and reliable means for 
Communication/Dispatch Center and/or EOC 
to receive official messages 
All 
    
Resp-
4 
Redundant and reliable means for 
Communication/Dispatch Center and/or EOC 
to disseminate official messages 
All 
    
Resp-
5 
Public Alert Certified* NOAA Weather 
Radio receivers in critical facilities and public 
venues 
All 
    
Rec-1 
Plan for continuity of operations plan and/or 
continuity of government   
All 
    
Rec-2 Plan for management of debris  All 
    
Mit = mitigation, Prep = preparedness, Resp = response, Rec = Recovery 
 
The Need for Additional Community Input.  While most of the elements in the 
existing draft guidelines have been discussed between the original research team, NWS, and the 
NTHMP; community level input has not been collected.  This dissertation research is a collection 
of information regarding community stakeholder perceptions and opinions of the acceptability 
and usefulness of each of the key elements listed in the draft guidelines. This will provide 
additional community-based support for either inclusion or exclusion of particular elements in 
the revised TR Community program guidelines.   
Subdivision of Communities by Vulnerability.  The current TR Community program 
guidelines, instituted in 2001, require that the actions a community must take to achieve TR 
recognition are based on the community’s population size – that is, the larger a community’s 
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population, the more it has to do.  There are four categories of community population identified 
in the current NWS guidelines: 1) populations of less than 2,500, 2) populations between 2,500 
and 14,999, 3) populations between 15,000 and 40,000, and 4) populations of more than 40,000 
(Current NWS TR Community program guidelines).  This subdivision aspect of the TR 
Community program guidelines was discussed during the initial 2011 NOAA TR
 
focus group 
discussions.  Community members from all research sites agreed that this subdivision was not 
useful or equitable for all at-risk communities.  Rather, community members preferred the idea 
of subdividing guidelines and required actions by some aspect of community vulnerability to 
tsunamis.     
As the original research team drafted the revised TR Community program guidelines, 
consideration was given to how community vulnerability to a tsunami hazard could be assessed.  
It was determined to subdivide the guidelines based upon vulnerability to a local versus only a 
distant tsunami.  In the revised guidelines, all coastal communities are assumed to have a distant 
tsunami hazard and as such must complete a standard set of required actions to receive TR 
recognition.  For those communities determined to also have risk of a local tsunami, additional 
actions would be required for those communities to receive TR recognition.  As an example, 
communities in the US Pacific Northwest would most likely need to fulfill the requirements for 
both distant and local tsunami hazards, while communities along the US East and Gulf Coast 
would likely have to fulfill the requirements for a distant tsunami hazard only.       
As these definitions and subdivisions have not been previously used or shared widely 
with communities seeking or maintaining TR recognition, additional information regarding the 
acceptability and usefulness is needed from US communities.  Because communities determined 
to reside in a higher-hazard zone would be required to complete additional mandatory 
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requirements before receiving TR recognition, it is important to gather community perceptions 
and opinions from both high-hazard (local tsunami hazard) and generally lower-hazard (distant 
tsunami hazard) community classifications.  Gathering these data will help researchers 
understand perception and opinion differences between communities with varying tsunami 
hazard threats. 
Proportion of Population to be Protected.  While there is a dearth of literature currently 
available relating to quantifying the proportion of a population that should be protected through 
emergency preparedness and mitigation actions, the topic is highly relevant when discussing 
preparedness recognition programs like the TR Community program.   Currently, completing 
inundation modeling is a mandatory action for communities seeking TR recognition.  This 
mapping denotes only the area expected to be covered by flood water from a tsunami.  While this 
mapping technique identifies those areas of a community most at risk to a tsunami, it does not 
quantify the number of individuals residing within the inundation area who must be provided 
protection through the planned mitigation and response efforts of the community.  In fact, there 
are no specific regulations or guidelines for successfully providing timely warning to individuals 
residing in identified inundation zones. 
Despite this lack of conceptual guidance, there are regulations for providing both 
communication and protective action in other disaster situations that may potentially be adapted 
to a tsunami.  FEMA, in coordination with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), has 
provided the NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 guidance regulation for the development of 
radiological emergency plans, aiming to improve emergency preparedness and ensure the safety 
of populations living within a certain range of a nuclear plant (US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 1986, 1996).  Similar to inundation modeling for tsunami hazards, nuclear plants 
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are required to model “plume exposure pathways” depicting the potential flow of hazardous 
materials should a breach occur at a nuclear plant.  These modeled pathways, referred to as 
emergency planning zones (EPZ), are used to quantify required timing of notifications and 
warnings to be provided to populations residing within the EPZ.  The minimum community 
warning standards according to the NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 are: 
 
a. Capability for providing both an alert signal and an 
informational or instructional message to the population on 
an area wide basis throughout the 10 mile EPZ, within 15 
minutes. 
 
b. The initial notification system will assure direct coverage 
of essential 100% of the population within 5 miles of the 
site. 
 
c. Special arrangements will be made to assure 100% 
coverage within 45 minutes of the population who may not 
have received notification within the entire plume exposure 
EPZ. 
 
(US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1986, 1996) 
 
In addition to these timing of notification regulations, the NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 
regulations also provide guidance for a siren alert system.  “For rural areas (2000 people or less 
per square mile), the sirens must provide sound level coverage of a minimum of 60 decibels, or 
10 decibels above ambient noise levels, whichever is higher” (US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 1986, 1996).  The sound level coverage required of nuclear plants is the same 
regardless of day or night status of activation.  Used in conjunction with the sirens, are tone alert 
(TA) radios.  By integrating two notification sources, nuclear plants are able to reach over 95% 
or essential 100% of the at-risk population (Sorensen, 1992).   
While both a nuclear plant disaster and a tsunami could equally benefit from similar 
notification and warning communications systems, a warning system alone does not provide 
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protection to populations at-risk to a tsunami.  Once individuals are warned, they need to identify 
or know of evacuation methods and strategies to move out of the inundation zone and to a safe 
location.  If an at-risk community is also closely located to a subduction zone, it is reasonable to 
expect that the tsunami-generating earthquake would cause extensive damage and destruction to 
local infrastructure and buildings.  The damage caused by the earthquake will most likely slow 
an individual’s response; reducing the amount of time that individual will have to evacuate the 
inundation zone to safety.  Roadways may also be rendered unusable due to damage or debris 
from the earthquake.  This may force the majority of individuals in the inundation zone to 
evacuate on foot.   
Emergency managers and planners must understand the potential need for individuals 
residing within the inundation zone to evacuate on foot and plan for safe evacuation routes and 
structures.  Four communities in Pacific County, Washington that were involved in Project Safe 
Haven used standardized and published walking speeds (LaPlante & Kaeser, 2007) to determine 
how many people would reach a constructed vertical evacuation structure.  Two walking-radius 
circles were created and overlaid at the community identified site to build the constructed 
vertical evacuation structure.  One circle represented a radius of 3,600 feet with the constructed 
vertical evacuation point in the exact center.  This is the distance an individual traveling at 
average walking speed might be expected to cover in 15 minutes (calculated at four feet per 
second, 3,600 feet in 15 minutes) (LaPlante & Kaeser, 2007; "Project Safe Haven," 2011).  The 
second circle represented a radius of 2,700 feet with the constructed vertical evacuation point in 
the exact center.  This is the distance an individual traveling at less than average walking speed 
might be expected to cover in 15 minutes (calculated at three feet per second, 2,700 feet in 15 
minutes) (LaPlante & Kaeser, 2007; "Project Safe Haven," 2011).  This method of calculating 
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individual transit time during an evacuation allows emergency managers and planners to identify 
the proportion of a population that could reach a safe location before the tsunami arrives.  These 
calculations will also help communities identify the potential need for creating safe evacuation 
sites closer to certain areas of need within the community.  Because these methods have not been 
tested, additional information regarding the acceptability and usefulness of these types of actions 
is needed from US communities facing a local tsunami hazard. 
Vertical Evacuation.  When a community with a local tsunami hazard lacks horizontal 
evacuation access to naturally occurring high or inland ground above or beyond the inundation 
zone, emergency planners and managers are challenged to find alternative evacuation 
recommendations ("Project Safe Haven," 2011).  In several at-risk communities, researchers and 
emergency managers have been investigating alternative evacuation methods including the 
potential for creating a vertical evacuation strategy.  A vertical evacuation strategy requires 
vertical evacuation structures.  A vertical evacuation structure is an area of man-made high 
ground made by creating a berm (an appropriately reinforced earthen mound) or a building that 
allows individuals to evacuate above the level of tsunami inundation (Applied Technology 
Council, 2012).  Designated vertical evacuation structures must be built to resist the forces of 
large-scale earthquakes and tsunamis.  FEMA together with NOAA have produced the FEMA P-
646 guidance document for communities interested in creating safe vertical evacuation structures 
within their communities (Applied Technology Council, 2012).  The FEMA P-646 provides 
detailed background information on tsunami hazard and risk, rational for considering a vertical 
evacuation structure, the decision making and design process, and methods of construction.  The 
FEMA P-646 provides construction and building guidance for vertical evacuation structures that 
is unavailable anywhere else, including building and fire codes.    
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Insight into the effectiveness of alternative tsunami evacuation strategies, specifically the 
use of vertical evacuation using existing buildings, may be gained by reviewing the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake and tsunami.  Fraser et al. (2012) conducted a reconnaissance-level analysis of 
evacuation preparedness and actions taken in response to the tsunami.  While the data collection 
included tsunami awareness, official warning times and dynamics, evacuation timing, mechanics 
and other issues related to evacuation, it also included questions regarding observations and 
response to natural and informal warnings and vertical evacuation (Fraser et al., 2012).  Fraser et 
al.’s study identified and visited 37 buildings used for vertical evacuation (some officially 
designated as vertical evacuation sites and some not) during the tsunami, which provide refuge to 
5,428 people from the six cities included in the study.  It is estimated that roughly 260 officially, 
and unofficially, recognized buildings were used during the tsunami; offering protection to 
around 50,000 individuals (Fraser et al., 2012).   
While there were many lessons learned about local Japanese vertical evacuation during 
the Tohoku tsunami, some of the most notable lessons are valuable for other communities 
considering vertical evacuation as well, including: 1) the importance of inundation mapping 
providing a scientific basis for required building height for structures serving as vertical 
evacuation sites, 2) clear and accurate signage and community education about vertical 
evacuation sites, 3) clear memoranda of understanding (MOU) with building owners regarding 
necessary use of buildings as vertical evacuation sites, and 4) the consideration of night-time 
lighting to help indicate evacuation routes to and within vertical evacuation buildings (Fraser et 
al., 2012).  Overall, the community engagement in identifying vertical evacuation structures, and 
the extensive community education surrounding the tsunami hazard and evacuation procedures 
provided a strong platform for community protective actions.  This model of community 
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emergency preparedness was found to be successful as demonstrated by a 96% survival rate of 
those living within the inundated regions of the cities included in Fraser et al.’s (2012) study. 
Other countries around the globe have also shown interest in vertical evacuation for 
tsunamis.  Following the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Indian Ocean Tsunami, researchers from 
India intensified their research and evaluation of vertical evacuation structures (Patel, Patel, & 
Singh, 2011).  In their study Patel et al. (2011) looked specifically at those concrete-reinforced 
buildings that survived the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.  They then translated their 
understanding of those buildings to Dwarka, West Gujarat, India.  Their research continues, with 
the hope of providing viable and reliable tsunami preparedness efforts for one of the cities in 
India with the highest risk of tsunami (Patel et al. 2011).   
The use of alternative evacuation methods, specifically vertical evacuation, for 
emergency planning for tsunamis is currently very low or almost nonexistent within the US.  One 
potential reason for this low use of vertical evacuation planning is a lack of appropriately 
constructed buildings or structures in communities with a local tsunami hazard.  Colloquially, 
people believe that building a tsunami-resistant structure would be cost-prohibitive to 
communities, and thus unacceptable as a mitigation activity.  Four coastal communities in 
Pacific County, Washington are leading the way in proving these colloquial misgivings wrong 
and demonstrating a need for vertical evacuation education in at-risk communities 
The Safe Haven team worked with the towns of Long Beach, Ilwaco/Seaview, Ocean 
Park, and Tokeland/North Cove each located in Pacific County to initiate a community 
empowerment and engagement project to discuss each city’s tsunami risk and the options 
available for vertical evacuation planning.  Each of these communities was specifically selected 
because of local geography with little or no natural high ground and the level of risk associated 
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with a tsunami hazard.  The project was organized using a six-phased community engagement 
methodology: 1) selection of a community steering committee, 2) site survey and development of 
approach, 3) identification of preferred strategies with some alternatives, 4) community mulling 
process and acceptance of preferred strategy, 5) reassessment of preferred strategy, and 6) 
community design charrettes ("Project Safe Haven," 2011).  The first discussion in each 
community used a case-study analyzing the effects of a worst-case scenario tsunami tailored to 
demonstrate the effects on each of the communities included in the project.  In reviewing these 
scenarios, the concept of vertical evacuation was included and explained, thus initiating 
conversations around developing and constructing man-made structures for providing a safe 
haven to those unable to effectively evacuate in other ways.   
After several months of community discussions and debates, each of the four 
communities identified the location and type of vertical evacuation structures that would be 
constructed as a part of their tsunami preparedness plans.  Ultimately, Pacific County has 
identified the need to protect 6,300 high-risk residents from a tsunami through the construction 
of 13 berms, 5 towers, and 2 parking garages, all estimated to cost roughly $11 million ("Project 
Safe Haven," 2011).  While these structures have not been built yet, these communities are in the 
process of identifying and allocating the required funds to begin the construction process. 
The current draft TR Community program guidelines require that communities with a 
local tsunami threat establish a plan for vertical evacuation strategy in areas where no natural 
high or inland ground exists.  This action, identified as a “Mitigation” (Mit-6) activity in the 
guidelines, includes several actions: 1) designating vertical evacuation structures or potential 
locations,  2) identification of the at-risk populations these structures would serve, 3) 
identification of funding considerations and sources, 4) researching and identifying land use 
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considerations, and 5) a proposed timeline for implementation (Revised TR Community program 
guidelines, January 2013).  While the vertical evacuation data gathered from the Tohoku 
tsunami, continued research like that occurring in India, and the county-level adoption of a 
vertical evacuation plan in Pacific County provide evidence of the efficacy and acceptability of 
nontraditional tsunami evacuation strategies in local communities; the inclusion of mandatory 
vertical evacuation planning in the TR Community program guidelines remains controversial.  
Additional information regarding the acceptability and usefulness of these actions is needed from 
US communities facing a tsunami hazard. 
Evacuation Drills. With encouragement from the NTHMP, the state of Oregon passed 
the 1995 Oregon State Senate Bill 378 mandating that all Oregon schools that were located in 
potential inundation zones must teach all students grades kindergarten through eighth about 
tsunamis with the added requirement of evacuation drills (Dengler, 2005).  While the timing and 
number of school evacuation drills are not described in the bill, mandating required evacuation 
drills is a strong platform for creating tsunami prepared communities along the Oregon coast.  
After Oregon received an Award in Excellence for the tsunami school education program from 
the Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC) in 1999, Washington State began working 
on an adaptation to implement in Washington schools.  After developing a two-booklet 
curriculum set, Washington State was also recognized with a WSSPC Award in Excellence 
(Dengler, 2005).  Both Oregon and Washington states have identified mandatory evacuation 
drills as important local tsunami hazard mitigation practices.   
While there are no readily available data describing state-wide adherence or efficacy for 
either the Oregon Senate Bill or the educational curriculums and the school evacuation drills, the 
creation of these programs provides support for the TR Community program inclusion of 
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mandatory annual evacuation drills for all schools located within an inundation zone for a local 
tsunami threat.  Before the proposed guidelines can be adopted, additional information regarding 
the acceptability and usefulness of these mandatory evacuation drills is needed from US 
communities facing a local tsunami hazard. 
Theoretical Framework for Evaluation 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) has been successfully used as a framework for 
understanding attitude formation and change with regard to products and services (Bitner  & 
Obermiller, 1985). The ELM has also been adapted and applied in various industry settings via 
survey methodologies and focus group approaches to measure attitudes toward and preferences 
for specific products and services (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979).  This theoretical framework lends 
itself well to the evaluation of the key components of the NWS TR Community program 
guidelines.  In the context of this model, the NWS is providing the guidelines as a community 
product and the recognition as a service for communities that successfully complete the actions 
laid out in the guidelines. For this evaluation research, prediscussion and focus group questions 
were created to evaluate both peripheral and central perceptions regarding the revised TR
 
Community program guidelines and additional key concepts, as described in the conceptual 
framework in Figure 6.   
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Figure 6: Adapted by the author from the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Bitner  & Obermiller, 
1985) 
 
 Peripheral perceptions are formed and changed without formal thought, rather through 
the association of the product or service with positive or negative cues.  Prediscussion survey 
questions were created to tap into participant perceptions prior to group discussions.  Through 
asking certain questions before the formal focus group discussion, it is hoped that personal 
associations and perceptions about the TR
 
Community program and the revised guidelines will 
be collected.  These perceptions and opinions will give insight into how participants individually 
digest tsunami program information and associate that information to their own community 
investment and use of the TR
 
Community program.  This will allow researchers to draw 
conclusions on how well individual-level distribution of program information is accepted, 
understood, and used by expert community stakeholders. 
Central perceptions are formed and changed through consideration and integration of 
information relevant to the product or service through discussion and interaction with others.  
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Group participatory processes are very important in the development or the changing of an 
individual’s central perceptions about a product or service.  Focus group questions were created 
with the aim of generating discussion and colearning among focus group participants.  The 
perceptions and opinions observed during the discussion process will give insight into how 
expert community stakeholders collectively integrate tsunami program information and 
incorporate new information perspectives to their own community investment and use of the TR
 
Community program.  This will allow researchers to draw conclusions on how well group-level 
distribution and discussion of program information is accepted, understood, and used by expert 
community stakeholders.  Data from both central and peripheral perceptions will be analyzed 
regarding the acceptability and usefulness of the revised TR
 
Community program guidelines and 
potential key elements to be added.   
Group Participatory Process.  The Central route of the ELM framework relies on 
interaction and discussion between individuals.  This reliance on collaboration provides an 
avenue for the blending qualitative research methods together with group participatory processes 
as a potentially useful research framework.  The group participatory processes can be adapted 
from the basic principles of Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR).  The following 
definition of CBPR was originally developed and adapted based upon the article by Israel et al 
(1998) by the WK Kellogg Foundation Community Health Scholars Program.  The program 
defines CBPR as:  
“A collaborative approach to research that equitably involves 
partners in the research process and recognizes the unique 
strengths that each brings.  CBPR begins with a research topic of 
importance to the community and has the aim of combining 
knowledge with action and achieving social change...” 
 
- Community Health Scholars Program (Israel, 1998; Kellogg 
Health Scholars, 2003)   
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  The terms and phrases of most importance within this definition are: collaborative, 
equitably, partners, combining knowledge with action, and achieving social change.  The 
primary purpose of CBPR is to transform the research process from researcher’s conducting 
research on a community to answer a research question, to one where researchers work and 
collaborate with community members throughout the research process.  The group participatory 
processes will be facilitated through the application of as many of the nine key principles of 
CBPR as possible as the expert panels explore the most debatable elements of the current draft 
TR
 
Community program guidelines and the potential elements for inclusion in the 
guidelines. The nine key principles of CBPR include: 
1) recognize community as a unit of identity, 
2) build on strengths and resources within the community,  
3) facilitate collaborative, equitable partnership in all research phases and 
involves an empowering and power-sharing process that attends to social 
inequalities,  
4) promote co-learning and capacity building among all partners,  
5) integrate and achieve a balance between research and action for the mutual 
benefit of all partners,  
6) emphasize public health problems of local relevance and also ecological 
perspectives that recognize and attend to the multiple determinants of health 
and disease,  
7) involve systems development through a cyclical and iterative process,  
8) disseminate findings and knowledge gained to all partners and involves all 
partners in the dissemination process, and  
9) require a long-term process and commitment to sustainability.  
(Minkler & Wallerstein, 2008, p. 49-52) 
 
 
Conclusion 
The face of emergency management in the US has changed considerably since the first 
conception of emergency response.  As science and technology advance, so too does the 
capability of advance preparedness and warning for many natural hazards.  As all disaster 
situations affect a local population first, emergency managers are moving towards requiring that 
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community’s at risk be educated and involved in hazard mitigation and preparedness activities.  
The TR Community program was created to improve public safety and resiliency, specifically 
for community response and action during tsunami emergencies.  In principle, when a 
community receives TR recognition, both the community and wider-public can be assured that 
when a tsunami warning is issued for that community, they will get the warning and know what 
to do and how to take appropriate protective action to save lives.  However, there is debate 
between researchers and practitioners alike as to how well the implementation of the actual TR 
Community program is accomplishing these aims through the current guidelines.  Just as the 
emergency management and planning cycle requires practice, testing, and revisions, so too does 
emergency preparedness policy and programs like the TR Community program.  It is imperative 
that programs like the TR Community program undergo program evaluation and integrate 
science and technological advances with local community input to ensure a strong and relevant 
community preparedness program that meets its aims of community preparedness.   
Research Questions 
 The following research questions were developed to guide the evaluation research of 
specific key components of the proposed revised set of TR Community program guidelines.   
 
Question 1:  How should the requirements for TR recognition be subdivided to account for 
differences in tsunami risk between individual communities (specifically examining local versus 
distant definitions of tsunami hazard)?  
 
Question 2:  What would an effective evacuation strategy need to look like for a community to 
be considered TR?  
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Question 3:  What are the perceptions of a vertical evacuation strategy for tsunamis when no 
natural high, inland ground or vertical evacuation structures exist as a requirement for TR 
recognition?  
 
Question 4:  What proportion of a community population (e.g. resident, seasonal worker, visitor) 
needs to be provided with evacuation sheltering (e.g. inland to high ground or vertical 
evacuation) and thus considered protected by the preparedness planning to achieve TR 
recognition?  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Study Design 
 This study evaluated the acceptability and usefulness of selective components of a 
proposed revised set of TR Community program guidelines that contributed data and 
recommendations to be presented to the NWS and the NTHMP for use in possible program 
revisions and updates.  Data for this study were qualitative in nature.  Two qualitative research 
methods, specifically 1) prediscussion questions and 2) focus group discussion protocols, were 
used in tandem with group participatory processes to elicit qualitative data from expert panels of 
participants from each study site.  Qualitative data allowed participants to share perceptions and 
opinions of key concepts and questions with the researchers.  This allowed the researcher to 
evaluate the acceptability and usefulness of a set of revised national guidelines for the TR 
Community program directly from a community of expert stakeholders within each of the study 
sites.    
 Qualitative research methods can be used to understand the attitudes, perceptions, and 
culture of a research topic in a way that quantitative research methods alone cannot.  In 
particular, qualitative research is particularly suited to understanding research questions that ask 
“how” and “why”.  Qualitative research methods can provide insight and understanding of 
people’s personal experiences (i.e., the emic or insider’s viewpoint).  Qualitative data can also 
describe phenomena and experiences in rich detail as they are situated and embedded in local 
community and organizational contexts (Patton, 1990; Ulin, Robinson, & Tolley, 2005).  
Specifically, in the case of this research, qualitative focus group data provides a rich context 
explaining why or why not expert stakeholders believe certain TR Community program 
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guidelines are acceptable or useful in their particular community.  Qualitative data delves further 
into the “why” than the dichotomized yes/no quantitative research question; providing for more 
in-depth descriptions and a clearer understanding of the broader community factors influencing 
the “yes” or “no” response.  
Sample Selection 
Initial 2011 Project Sample 
Only coastal communities of the US and its Territories were included in this study 
because tsunamis directly affect coastal areas.  The communities identified for inclusion in this 
research were selected to provide a mix of recognized and nonrecognized as TR communities.  
Additionally, communities were selected because of their locations within identified tsunami 
hazard zones, ranging from high to moderate to low tsunami hazard risk (Table 2).  The eight 
selected communities provide a cross-section of coastal and/or island communities within the 
U.S. with representation of both TR recognized and nonrecognized communities.  
Table 2:  
Names of 2011 Communities, TsunamiReady
TM
 Recognition Status, and Degree of Hazard 
Exposure 
 
#  Community State/Territory Tsunami 
Ready
TM
  
Degree of 
Tsunami Hazard 
1 Ocean Shores Washington Yes High 
2 Seaside Oregon Yes High 
3 Kodiak Alaska Yes High 
4 Coronado California No Intermediate 
5 Kauai County Hawaii Yes High 
6 New Hanover County North Carolina Yes Low 
7 Leone, Vailoatai, Maleloa Itulagi, Maleloa 
Ituau, Taputimu, Amaluia, Asili, Afao, Seetaga, 
Agugulu, Amanave, Poloa, Fagali’l, Maloata, 
Fagamalo, Fagasa, Tula 
American Samoa No High 
8 Frederiksted, St Croix, Charlotte Amalie, St 
Thomas 
US Virgin Islands No High 
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The initial NOAA TR focus groups were conducted between May and October 2011 at a 
central location within each individual site: Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California, 
North Carolina, American Samoa, and the US Virgin Islands.  However, the turn out for focus 
groups in both American Samoa and the US Virgin Islands was very low.  Focus group 
participants were selected using a nonprobability, purposive or criterion-based approach to 
ensure representation from a variety of perspectives within each community (LeCompte & 
Preissle, 1993; Patton, 1990). Invitation to participate was based on a variety of factors including 
but not limited to an individual’s role as a formal or informal community leader (e.g., in 
business, government, civic organizations), or their organization or agency affiliation working in 
emergency management.  Participants were primarily local city and county government 
employees but also included some state and federal partners.  The following table (Table 3) 
provides a sample distribution of people and agency representatives invited to participate in the 
TR focus group discussions. 
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Table 3:  
Sample Distribution of People and Agency Representatives Invited to Participate in 
TsunamiReady
TM
 Focus Groups 
 
  Agency 
1 Coast Guard Commanding Office 
2 State Emergency Management (State Tsunami Program Coordinator) 
3 State Park Ranger 
4 City and County Emergency Management Director 
5 City or County Public Works 
6 City or County Planner 
7 City or County Police 
8 City or County Fire Chief 
9 Chamber of Commerce Rep 
10 Port Manager 
11 Harbor Master 
12 Industry Rep 
13 School Superintendent 
14 Mayor's Office Rep 
15 Convention Visitor's Bureau Rep 
16 Tribal 
17 One other at determination of lead Emergency Management contact 
 
Current 2013 Project Sample 
The primary sampling frame for this research consisted of the list of original participants 
from six of the original eight 2011 NOAA TR focus group discussions as identified in Table 4 
below. This research included six sites rather than the original eight due to budget restrictions 
and travel costs associated with data collection. The original research team was consulted 
regarding potential site exclusion and identified the priority sites for inclusion.  It was 
determined that all of the original distant tsunami hazard sites would be included: North 
Carolina, California, and Hawaii.  To keep an equal representation of tsunami hazard, it was 
determined to include three local tsunami hazard sites as well:  US Virgin Islands, Alaska, and 
Oregon.  Additional participants were recruited at each site to overcome any attrition or inability 
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to reach prior participants. All additional participants were also recruited through a 
nonprobability, purposive or criterion-based approach using the methods described for the 
original 2011 NOAA TR focus group discussions.  This involved both secondary recruitment 
through 2011 NOAA TR participants and contacting current expert community stakeholders to 
obtain contact information for new employees who replaced the unreachable prior participants. 
These additional participants were included to satisfy additional sample size requirements to 
produce robust qualitative data (the gold standard focus group size is between 8-10 participants 
(Patton, 1990)).  Once participants confirmed their attendance at their site’s focus group 
discussion, they were then included in the prediscussion survey invitation list as well.  
Table 4:  
Names of 2013 Communities, TsunamiReady
TM
 Recognition Status, and Degree of Hazard 
Exposure  
 
#  Community State/Territory Tsunami 
Ready
TM
  
Degree of Tsunami 
Hazard 
1 Seaside Oregon Yes High 
2 Kodiak Alaska Yes High 
3 Coronado* California No Intermediate 
4 Kauai County Hawaii Yes High 
5 New Hanover County North Carolina Yes Low 
6 Frederiksted, St Croix, Charlotte 
Amalie, St Thomas 
US Virgin Islands No High 
* This community announced TR recognition status during the course of the grant project 
Research Measures and Tools 
Draft TsunamiReady
TM
 Guidelines 
 A revised current draft TR Community program guidelines document was created after 
the conclusion of the 2011 NOAA focus group discussions.  All of the original focus group data 
were transcribed and rigorously analyzed, providing vital feedback for content, structure, and 
format of the revised guidelines.  The revised document (Appendix B) used for this research was 
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finalized in January 2013 after multiple iterations and reviews from the NWS Tsunami Program, 
NWS Weather Forecasting Officers, and the Mitigation and Education Subcommittee, Executive 
Committee (MES-EC) of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP).    
Prediscussion Survey 
A qualitative prediscussion survey was created adapting the ELM (Bitner  & Obermiller, 
1985; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979) as a framework for question development (Appendix C).  The 
survey questions focused on eliciting information, perceptions, and attitudes from participants 
through the peripheral route of the ELM.  Peripheral perceptions are formed and changed 
without formal thought or discussion rather through the association of the product or service with 
positive or negative cues (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979).  This allowed the researcher to better 
understand the preconceptions and understanding of individual participants regarding the TR 
Community program prior to the focus group discussions.  Gathering this prediscussion data also 
allowed the researcher to better understand misconceptions and/or misunderstandings of the 
revised proposed TR Community program guidelines.  The prediscussion survey specifically 
explored beliefs regarding six topics formed through observations and personal experiences with 
tsunami hazards and the NWS TR
 
Community program, including: 1) the requirement of 
additional actions for those communities with a local tsunami hazard, 2) the appropriateness of 
subdividing the TR Community program guidelines based on the local versus distant tsunami 
hazard of a community, 3) vertical evacuation requirements, 4) annual tsunami evacuation 
exercises for schools located within a tsunami inundation zone, 5) annual training for local 
business owners and staff, and 6) annual training and education for residents living within a 
tsunami inundation zone.  The themes found within these topics provided guidance for the 
researchers to help facilitate and guide the focus group discussions of the topics.  
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Focus Group Guide 
 The focus group guide (Appendix D) and discussion agenda (Appendix E) were created 
by adapting the ELM (Bitner  & Obermiller, 1985; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979) as a framework for 
question and probe creation.  Using this framework, the focus group discussion guide was 
centered on creating an interactive discussion between participants.  The primary objective of 
each focus group discussion was to evaluate the acceptability and usefulness of the revised 
TsunamiReady™ guidelines for community recognition by the NWS.  Each focus group 
discussion explored six main topics related to the TR Community program guidelines and 
tsunami emergency preparedness at the community level: 1) effective community evacuation 
strategies, 2) vertical evacuation strategies and requirements, 3) potential for a required 
proportion of a population to be protected through evacuation measures, 4) annual tsunami 
evacuation drilling for schools, 5) annual education and training for businesses and staff located 
or working within a tsunami inundation zone, and 6) annual education and training for residents 
(owners, renters, seasonal, military, etc.) within a tsunami inundation zone. 
Group Participatory Process 
 For this research the community of interest was composed of both informal and formal 
community leaders (e.g., in business, government, civic organizations) currently working or 
engaged in the emergency management field.  Community members were invited from a variety 
of agencies and organizations, representing local, state, and federal levels of interest in tsunami 
hazard preparedness within the selected communities.  While state and federal partners were 
invited, the vast majority of participants were local community members.  As with any 
community, relationships and resources shared between individual stakeholders are vital for 
programs.  Each sampled community may have had some prior experience working with and 
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interacting with each other, which allowed the current research to build and elaborate on those 
previous experiences to evaluate the revised TR Community program guidelines and the addition 
of potential program elements.  All of the emergency management community expert 
stakeholders participating within each of the selected communities provided information and 
aspirations supporting and potentially expanding their local tsunami emergency preparedness 
infrastructure.   
 Using the ELM as a framework for evaluating the revised TR Community program 
guidelines, the researchers aimed at facilitating colearning among participants using Community 
Based Participatory Research (CBPR) methods and group participatory processes.  The 
prediscussion surveys provided peripheral route information regarding the understanding and 
perceptions of the TR Community program guidelines by individual participants. The survey 
results also provided the researchers with information to prepare for each individual focus group 
discussion.  Some general information derived from all prediscussion surveys included the need 
to provide more in-depth background discussion and definitions of terms used in the proposed 
changes to the TR Community program guidelines.   Using this finding, researchers opened the 
focus group discussions with detailed background and definitions to allow all participants to 
begin the conversation on the same page.  Participants were encouraged to ask questions, and 
researchers encouraged colearning among participants throughout the discussion. 
Each focus group discussion began with an introduction by the researchers and a self-
introduction by each participant.  All participants were provided with a name and agency 
identifier, allowing participants to address comments or questions directly to other participants 
by name.  During self-introductions, participants were encouraged to share both their 
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professional connection to tsunamis and their personal interest in emergency preparedness; 
setting the groundwork for colearning from professional counterparts.   
The focus group discussions provided a platform for shared discussion of key questions 
between participants.  Each individual stakeholder had both something to teach and something to 
learn from the wider emergency management community as they discussed the proposed 
guidelines.  Some of the group participatory processes used by the researchers included tailored 
focus group facilitation skills, reflective listening, and consensus building methods to guide the 
flow of each focus group discussion and elicit feedback from all participants.  Together, the 
researchers worked with the expert stakeholders to assess the proposed guidelines. Findings will 
be translated into recommendations for the NWS to use to develop stronger guidelines that 
strengthen TR recognized communities more so than the existing population-based guidelines.  
Given the extensive involvement of community stakeholders with the development of these 
guidelines, it is hoped they will be found to be acceptable and useful at the community level. 
Data Collection 
Recruitment 
 It was important that focus group participants were representative of a broad range of 
community, state, and federal stakeholders who may be impacted by the TR Community 
program guidelines revision. Participants included, but were not limited to, local emergency 
responders (fire, police, military, etc.), local and regional Emergency Management, local and 
regional NOAA and/or NWS, and local Emergency Communications Management.  By ensuring 
the inclusion of a broad range of community, state, and federal stakeholders, this research would 
have less chance of undue qualitative influence due to over representation of one particular office 
or occupation.  Additionally, using a wide range of community, state, and federal stakeholders 
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allowed for better representation of the potential stakeholders from other communities who are 
also at risk to tsunamis and may benefit from participation in the TR Community program.    
A local emergency manager was identified within each of the study sites and contacted to 
confirm contact information for participants from the initial 2011 NOAA TR focus groups. Once 
the contact information was verified, potential participants were first contacted via email to 
introduce the current research, confirm and update contact information, and elicit participation in 
the second round of focus group discussions. For those participants who did not respond within 1 
week of the initial email, a second email was sent, followed by a phone call the next week from 
the researcher. If the original participants were unreachable by either the two emails or the 
telephone call, they were removed from the sampling frame. The recruitment and participant 
commitment breakdown can be seen below in Table 5.  
Table 5:  
Recruitment Breakdown by Study Site 
 
#  Study Site Individuals 
Contacted 
Confirmed 
Participants  
Attended Focus 
Group Discussion 
1 Kodiak, Alaska 18 8 8 
2 Coronado, California 21 9 13 
3 Seaside, Oregon 17 9 7 
4 Kauai County, Hawaii 20 9 9 
5 New Hanover County, North 
Carolina 
15 8 8 
6 US Virgin Islands 11 4 5 
 
Data collection was scheduled to take place between October and early December 2013. The 
study site and focus group discussion date breakdown can be seen below in Table 6. 
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Table 6:  
Study Site and Focus Group Discussion Date 
 
Study Area Date of Focus Group  
Kodiak, Alaska October 15, 2013 
Coronado, California October 28, 2013 
Seaside, Oregon October 30, 2013 
Kauai, Hawaii November 8, 2013 
New Hanover County, North Carolina November 14, 2013 
US Virgin Islands December 4, 2013 
 
Prediscussion Surveys 
The prediscussion surveys were administered through the Survey Monkey website. The 
survey link was emailed to all confirmed participants 1 week prior to each scheduled focus group 
discussion. A reminder email with the survey link was emailed to each confirmed participant 3 
days prior to each focus group discussion. Surveys were composed of seven open-ended 
qualitative questions concerning participants’ perceptions and attitudes regarding the TR 
Community program guidelines and one multiple choice question identifying in which state or 
territory the participant currently works.  Survey responses were collected through the Survey 
Monkey website, allowing the researcher to review responses and conduct initial analyses prior 
to conducting each of the focus group discussions. 
Focus Group Discussions 
 Focus group discussions were held at a central meeting location within each of the 
identified communities.  Each focus group discussion was led by either the researcher with 
assistance from the original research team primary investigator (Alaska, California, Oregon, 
Hawaii) or by a trained member of the original research team (North Carolina, US Virgin 
Islands) with a note-taker present.  The focus group facilitator used a semistructured discussion 
guide to identify key concepts and questions for participants to discuss.  The facilitator aimed to 
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encourage equal contribution among participants to ensure all stakeholder voices were heard.  
Discussion notes were recorded both manually by the note-taker throughout the focus group and 
by digital audio recorder.  Both the discussion notes and the audio recording were created and 
used for transcription, quality checks, and analysis.  Focus groups ranged in length between 1.25 
hours and 2.25 hours. 
Data Analysis 
Prediscussion Surveys 
Prediscussion surveys were initially reviewed and analyzed by the researcher to help 
facilitate the focus group discussions.  After completing the focus group discussion, the 
researcher fully analyzed the prediscussion surveys by focusing primarily on creating a theme 
analysis and dichotomizing agreement or disagreement with each question (Patton, 1990; Ulin, 
Robinson, & Tolley, 2012). Consistencies and idiosyncrasies between participants regarding the 
specific concepts related to the TR Community program guidelines were identified by topic 
(which can also be referred to as a question or closely aligned set of questions). A series of 
response matrixes were created to help the researcher visualize and enumerate the acceptability 
and usefulness of specific program elements more clearly both within and across survey sites.  In 
using the matrix format for this analysis, characteristics within and between surveys were more 
easily identified for use in isolating important concepts and themes (Patton, 1990).  A final 
integrated results matrix was created by coding site-specific participant responses into concern 
categories or a coding tree of participant concerns as seen in Figure 7 below. 
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Should communities with a local-tsunami threat take more actions to protect human life? 
*Implementation concerns 
*Planning 
*Standardization 
Would sub-dividing community vulnerability by local versus distant tsunami hazard be appropriate in 
your community? 
 *New subdivision 
Local hazard community 
*Planning 
*Unnecessary complexity 
*Implementation concerns 
Should communities be required to identify natural high or inland ground for at-risk persons to use for 
self-evacuation? 
 *Planning 
*Helpful activity 
*Standardization 
*Implementation concerns 
*Training 
*Required 
Should communities be required to identify or build berms or other structures for evacuation? 
*Cost concerns 
*Planning 
*Implementation concerns 
*Helpful activity (identification, not building) 
*Required (identification) 
*Optional (building) 
*Restrict communities 
*Resident risk tolerance 
Should annual tsunami evacuation exercises be mandatory for schools located within an inundation 
zone? 
*Helpful activity 
*Required 
Should annual training, education, or outreach be mandatory for owners/staff of high-occupancy 
businesses located in a tsunami inundation zone? 
*Planning 
*Required 
*Inclusive 
*Implementation concerns 
*Helpful activity 
Should annual training, education, or outreach be mandatory for residents living in an inundation zone? 
*Required 
*Inclusive 
*Implementation concerns 
*Helpful activity 
*Cost concerns 
*Optional 
 
Figure 7: Prediscussion Survey Theme Tree by Survey Question 
Focus Group Discussions 
Audio recordings of focus group sessions were transcribed by a subcontractor trained in 
transcription. Transcripts were reviewed, quality checked, and edited by the researcher who 
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listened to each recorded focus group audio file while reading the electronic transcript to identify 
any discrepancies. Any necessary corrections were made during the quality review process to 
ensure overall accuracy of the final transcripts for analysis. A list of participants was maintained 
until the end of the study, allowing the researcher to recontact participants if a need for 
clarification or elaboration during the data analysis and report writing process arose. 
Focus group discussion transcripts were analyzed using the computer-based qualitative 
software package, ATLAS.ti. Analysis and coding of transcripts followed standard protocols for 
qualitative data analysis, using a coding process focused on topics specific to the program 
guidelines being evaluated (Auerbach & Silverstein, 2003; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006; Patton, 
1990).  Similar to the prediscussion survey analysis, focus group discussion data analysis were 
first conducted by location to determine site-specific opinions and reactions to the proposed 
guidelines.  Next, a between-site (integrated) analysis was conducted to provide the overall 
community-based input regarding the proposed TR Community program guidelines.   
Starting with a line-by-line analysis and coding process, the initial coding procedure was 
used to identify higher-level codes or topics determined by specific questions on the focus group 
discussion guide (Friese, 2012; Patton, 1990). As a second round of the initial coding process, 
the researcher conducted open and exhaustive coding of emergent themes and subcodes found 
within each topic.  Next, the researcher created code families for each of the topics.  Code 
families were used to filter subcodes, allowing the researcher to aggregate similar codes while 
expanding unique codes.  An integrated focus group coding tree containing five primary topics, 
three subtopics, and 40 data themes was created; as seen in Figure 7 below.   
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*EVACUATION 
   **DRILLS & EXERCISES 
other facilities  
schools  
state laws  
   **EVACUATION EFFECTIVENESS 
definition of evacuation 
delayed evacuation notice 
determining population to save 
effectiveness 
evacuation exercises 
evacuation plans 
evacuation signage 
evacuation time 
sub-populations 
transient seasonal population 
worst case scenario planning 
   **VERTICAL EVACUATION 
building vertical evacuation structures 
costs 
false sense of security 
risk acceptance 
vertical evacuation planning 
vertical evacuation requirement 
vertical evacuation signage 
               zoning issues 
*PROPOSED GUIDELINES 
additional mandatory actions 
implementation concerns 
local vs distant subdivision 
proposed new mitigation activity 
standard actions 
*TRAINING, EDUCATION & OUTREACH 
community engagement 
defining mandatory 
education 
inundation mapping 
proposed mandatory education 
TR business 
warning communication 
*UPDATED FORMAT 
TR checklist  
useful 
*TR PROGRAM 
TR benefits 
TR maintaining recognition 
TR purpose 
TR tiered recognition 
 
Figure 8: Focus Group Discussion Code Tree 
The integrated focus group coding tree was used to describe the site specific focus group 
results.  A final round of thematic analysis was conducted reviewing each of the site specific 
topic descriptions to consolidate and finalize the coding tree above into an integrated matrix 
depicting major topics and their associated supporting or opposing themes.  This process 
provided a final parsimonious coding system describing the qualitative focus group data (Friese, 
2012; Patton, 1990).   
To protect the identities of participants, names and other identifiers were removed from 
any written reports or presentations of findings. Based upon final analysis, recommendations 
have been drafted and will be used in conjunction with other information to provide the NWS 
Tsunami Program Director. 
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Ethical Considerations 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval 
  IRB approval was granted through the East Tennessee State University Office for the 
Protection of Human Research Subjects IRB (Appendix F).  
Human Subjects Protections.  The participant recruitment process began 1 month prior 
to focus group discussions.  Each participant was provided with an official invitation email 
(Appendix G) and an informed consent document (Appendix H) during recruitment.  Informed 
consent was obtained immediately before the beginning of each focus group discussion.  The 
researcher houses the signed informed consent documents in a locked cabinet in the PIs office in 
Ross Hall, on the ETSU campus. 
Summary 
 Prediscussion surveys and focus group discussions were initiated after IRB approval was 
granted.  Data collection began on October 15, 2013 and concluded on December 4, 2013.  
Prediscussion survey data and focus group audio files were transcribed concurrently as additional 
focus group discussions were conducted to streamline the data collection and analysis phases of 
this research.  Prediscussion survey data provided the researcher with a set of concerns identified 
by expert community stakeholders at each study site location.  Having identified these concerns 
prior to the focus group discussions allowed the researcher to provide more in-depth explanation 
of additional actions and terms related to the proposed TR Community program guidelines for 
the discussion. More in-depth analysis of the prediscussion survey data was conducted after the 
completion of all focus group discussions.  All focus group transcripts were first quality-checked 
against both the notes taken during each focus group discussion and the audio file, initiating the 
analysis segment of this research.  Data analysis of the focus group transcripts was conducted 
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first by individual study site with a final integrated analysis between sites using the ATLAS.ti 
qualitative analysis computer software program.   
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 Qualitative prediscussion survey data and focus group discussion data were collected and 
analyzed to produce the following results.  The prediscussion survey data are discussed first, 
followed by the focus group discussion data.   
Prediscussion Surveys 
 Prediscussion surveys were used to explore participant beliefs formed through 
observations and personal experiences with tsunami hazards and the NWS TR
 
Community 
program using the peripheral route of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM).  These 
individual perceptions were collected after providing all participants with the TR Community 
program revised guidelines to review and consider on their own without consulting others.   
For all study sites, an email inviting the confirmed focus group discussion participants to 
complete a prediscussion survey administered through the Survey Monkey website was sent 1 
week prior to the scheduled focus group discussion.  Due to a low initial response rate, an 
additional reminder to complete the prediscussion survey email was sent to all confirmed 
participants 3 days prior to the scheduled focus group discussion.   
 An initial analysis of site-specific prediscussion survey data was used to help facilitate 
and guide each focus group discussion.  After the completion of each site’s focus group 
discussion, a more in-depth analysis was conducted for presentation here.  The following 
subsections describe an individual level analysis of each study site followed by final integrated 
summary between sites.   
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Site Specific Findings 
Kodiak, Alaska.  Of the eight prediscussion survey invitations sent, four responses were 
logged in the Survey Monkey system.  This provided a prediscussion survey response rate of 
50% for the Kodiak, Alaska study site.  Each of the four surveys was completed in its entirety, 
no questions were skipped by any participants.   
Three participants agreed that communities with a local tsunami hazard should be 
required to take more actions to protect human life.  One participant was undecided, identifying 
concerns that small communities with high tsunami hazard might be prevented from achieving 
TR recognition because of “unnecessary mandatory actions.”  In Kodiak 100% of respondents 
agreed that the proposed subdivision of the guidelines by community vulnerability would be 
appropriate in their community.  Three of the participants described how Kodiak would be 
considered vulnerable to both local and distant tsunami threats, requiring them to adhere to the 
more stringent guidelines for the communities with a local tsunami hazard.  All respondents 
agreed that communities should be required by the TR Community program guidelines to 
identify high or inland ground where at-risk persons could self-evacuate.  Two participants also 
stated that the identification of high or inland ground for self-evacuation should be a part of local 
planning and included in the Emergency Operations Plan.  The vertical evacuation question 
received a mixed response, with no participants in complete agreement with the proposed 
actions.  One participant began their response to this question by stating, “All of the necessary 
steps must be taken to protect the population.”  Three participants agreed that the identification 
of berms or potential evacuation structures should be identified by communities; though each 
couched their responses by describing the costs of building such structures would be cost-
prohibitive for communities.  One participant described the cost restrictions, offering that grants 
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could be identified to help fund the construction of vertical evacuation structures if the 
community had a hazard mitigation plan.  One participant was against communities being 
required to do anything related to vertical evacuation, citing that it would be “more cost effective 
if local residents assisted at-risk populations instead.”  Requiring annual evacuation exercises for 
all schools located within an inundation zone was supported by 100% of Kodiak respondents.  
One participant furthered the requirement by stating, “Once a year is the minimum that should be 
required.”  Similarly, 100% of participants agreed that the TR Community program guidelines 
should require annual training, education, or outreach targeting owners and staff of high-
occupancy businesses located in the hazard zones for local tsunamis.  Though two respondents 
questioned how this would be accomplished and tracked both at a local level and by the NWS.  
Finally, 100% of respondents agreed that requiring annual training, education, or outreach 
targeting residents living in the inundation zone would be good for communities, but two added 
concern that it may be an unrealistic requirement to actually attain.  See Appendix I1 for the 
Kodiak, Alaska final survey response matrix organized in tabular format.       
Coronado, California.  Of the nine prediscussion survey invitations sent, three responses 
were logged in the Survey Monkey system.  This provided a prediscussion survey response rate 
of 33%.  Additionally, one of the three respondents opted not to respond to the first two 
questions of the survey and another opted not to respond to the last two questions of the survey. 
One participant (50% of the participants who responded to this question) disagreed that 
communities vulnerable to local tsunamis should have to take additional actions to protect 
human life, stating “the standards should be the same for all tsunami prone areas.”   One 
participant responded that whether a community is required to take additional actions to protect 
human life should depend on the geography of the community.  Of those participants who 
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responded, 100% agreed that subdividing the TR Community program guidelines by 
vulnerability to local tsunamis would be appropriate in the Coronado, California community.  
Three participants responded favorably to requiring communities to identify natural high or 
inland ground for at-risk persons to use for self-evacuation.  Respondents noted, “all tsunami 
vulnerable areas should identify evacuation routes to higher elevations and inland safe areas,” 
and “city government has the responsibility to provide a written plan identifying areas of risk and 
areas of safe evacuation.”  All respondents agreed that communities should be required to 
identify berms or other structures available to serve as vertical evacuation sites.  While 100% of 
participants agreed with the identification of berms and structures, two provided reservations 
with adding this requirement to the TR Community program guidelines.  One participant cited 
that construction of such evacuation structures is not always feasible, while the second added 
that requiring communities to “construct vertical evacuation structures relies on many variables 
that may not be affordable in small communities.”  All participants responded favorably to the 
recommended requirement of annual tsunami evacuation exercises for schools located within an 
inundation zone.  Two of the respondents felt that this requirement could even be expanded by 
sharing, “all jurisdictions (first and emergency responders, schools, and public works) located in 
tsunami vulnerable areas should exercise emergency plans at least once a year similar to the 
Great Southern California Shakeout exercise coordinated by the Earthquake Country Alliance 
and other California and Federal stakeholders,” and “tsunami evacuation exercises for schools in 
inundation zones should be held at least twice per year.”  Of the two participants who responded, 
one respondent felt that annual training, education, and outreach for owners and staff of high 
occupancy business located within an inundation zone would be a good requirement.  The 
second respondent noted that “public outreach and education workshops should be available to 
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the entire community – including residents and businesses located both in and outside the 
inundation zone annually.” Finally, while both of the participants who responded agreed 
generally with requiring annual training, education, and outreach for residents living in an 
inundation zone one offered that “training all residents would be quite difficult to both 
administer and track.”  The second respondent also added to this by stating, “public outreach and 
education workshops should be available to the entire community – including residents and 
businesses located both in and outside the inundation zone.” See Appendix I2 for the Coronado, 
California final survey response matrix organized in tabular format.        
Seaside, Oregon.  Of the nine prediscussion survey invitations sent, four responses were 
logged in the Survey Monkey system.  This provided a prediscussion survey response rate of 
44%.  No questions were skipped by any participants. 
Two participants agreed that communities vulnerable to local tsunami hazards should be 
required to take more actions than those communities that are vulnerable to only a distant 
tsunami hazard.  One participant noted, “Not taking those extra actions places human life in 
potentially more jeopardy.”  Conversely, two participants disagreed with the proposed 
subdivision between local and distant tsunami hazards.  Of those who disagreed with the new 
subdivision, one participant explained “the threat may be slightly different, but both local and 
distant tsunami hazards can cause significant impacts.”  This respondent continued to explain 
how preparedness, education, and outreach are essential activities for either hazard.  When asked 
if subdividing community vulnerability by local versus distant tsunami hazards would be 
appropriate in the Seaside, Oregon community, two respondents strongly disagreed.  One of the 
respondents explained that, “the division is useful for inundation mapping only.”  Alternately, 
one participant (25% of Seaside survey respondents) agreed that the subdivision would be 
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appropriate.  Of the participants who responded to the prediscussion survey, 100% agreed that 
requiring communities to identify natural high or inland ground for at-risk persons to evacuate to 
would be a good requirement for TR recognition.  While agreeing this was a good requirement, 
one participant did question how this requirement would be monitored and enforced.  Three of 
the participants agreed that communities should be required to identify or build berms or other 
structures for vertical evacuation, though 100% of these respondents also added that 
communities should not be required to build or create these structures if they are not currently 
present.  One respondent disagreed completely with vertical evacuation structures, stating instead 
that “building or identifying structures for vertical evacuation stops people from thinking about 
how best to save their lives, they rely on a building which most likely will fail and not be safe.”  
Two respondents agreed that schools located within an inundation zone should be required to 
conduct annual tsunami evacuation exercises.  The other 50% of respondents explained that the 
State of Oregon already requires all schools located in tsunami inundation zones to conduct these 
annual drills.  One of these respondents added that “[he] prefers the idea of moving schools out 
of inundation zones completely.”  When asked about annual training, education, or outreach for 
high-occupancy businesses located within the inundation zone, two respondents agreed with 
making it a formal requirement.  Another respondent likes the idea of this requirement but does 
not want to see it as a “required” element of the TR Community program guidelines.  Similarly, 
100% of respondents liked the idea of requiring annual training, education, or outreach for 
residents living within the inundation zone but questioned how realistic it would be on the 
ground.  One participant added, “I prefer to keep the requirement more generic to the entire 
community who lives, works, shops, recreates, and visits a tsunami hazard zone.”  See Appendix 
I3 for the Seaside, Oregon final survey response matrix organized in tabular format. 
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Kauai, Hawaii.  Of the nine prediscussion survey invitations sent, two responses were 
logged in the Survey Monkey system.  This provided a prediscussion survey response rate of 
22%.  No questions were skipped by any participants.   
One participant (50% of Kauai respondents) agreed that communities with a local 
tsunami threat should be required to take additional actions to protect human life.  One 
participant disagreed that communities should have any additional actions, saying “the 
requirements should be the same – a tsunami is a disaster regardless of the source.”  When asked 
if subdividing community vulnerability to local versus distant tsunami hazards would be 
appropriate in Kauai, 100% of participants agreed.  Both respondents noted that Kauai is 
vulnerable to both local and distant tsunami hazards.  Requiring communities to identify natural 
high or inland ground for at-risk persons to use for self-evacuation was supported by both 
participants, but one participant identified some complications to this requirement by stating 
“private ownership of land make[s] access by the public difficult.”  Respondents were split when 
asked if communities should be required to identify or build berms or other structures for vertical 
evacuation.  One agreed that there should be a plan in place to identify these safe locations, while 
the second participant shared that “constructing unnatural berms for an ‘unlikely’ tsunami event 
seems wrong.”  Requiring annual tsunami evacuation exercises for schools located within 
inundation zones was supported by 100% of respondents, noting that “Hawaii has been doing 
this for all schools for many years.”  Similarly, 100% of respondents agreed that there should be 
a requirement for annual training, education, or outreach for owners and staff of high occupancy 
businesses and residents located within the inundation zone.  See Appendix I4 for the Kauai, 
Hawaii final survey response matrix organized in tabular format.   
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New Hanover County, North Carolina.  Of the eight prediscussion survey invitations 
sent, five responses were logged in the Survey Monkey system.  This provided a prediscussion 
survey response rate of 63%.  No questions were skipped by any participants.  
Four respondents (80% of New Hanover County participants) agreed that communities 
with a local tsunami threat should be required to take more actions to protect human life.  One 
participant added that, “each community should be recognized as TR if they are prepared for the 
expected impact to their specific community.”  Conversely, one respondent (20% of participants) 
disagreed, explaining “common sense tells me any community at risk should be equally 
prepared.”  When asked if subdividing the TR Community program guidelines by community 
vulnerability to local versus distant tsunami hazards would be appropriate in the New Hanover 
County, North Carolina community, three respondents said no.  Two respondents were unsure 
explaining, “how a community perceives risk determines how well it prepares – I’m not sure our 
community would understand the concept of being ‘a little prepared’ as opposed to ‘fully 
prepared.’”  Four respondents supported requiring communities to identify natural high or inland 
ground for at-risk persons to use for self-evacuation.  One respondent was unsure about making 
this action a requirement, sharing “identifying tsunami shelters or tsunami free zones might 
prove difficult in coastal areas where elevation changes are slight and gradual.”  While three 
respondents agreed that communities should be required to identify berms or other structures for 
vertical evacuation, 50% were concerned with the costs associated with requiring communities to 
build those structures.  One participant explained, “vertical evacuation is a good idea when 
structures are available.  The cost to build a structure for vertical evacuation for an event that 
might never occur would be cost prohibitive and politically unpopular – a waste of funds.”  All 
participants, 100% of respondents, agreed that requiring annual tsunami evacuation exercises for 
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schools located within a tsunami inundation zone was a good addition to the recommended 
program guidelines.  One participant reasoned, “I think this is a reasonable requirement, we do 
fire and lockdown (active shooter) exercises, so why not tsunami evacuation exercises??”  
Finally, all respondents unanimously agreed that annual training, education, or outreach for 
owners and staff of high-occupancy businesses and residents located within a tsunami inundation 
zone would be good requirements for the TR Community program.  See Appendix I5 for the 
New Hanover County, North Carolina final survey response matrix organized in tabular format.          
US Virgin Islands.  Of the four prediscussion survey invitations sent, only one response 
was logged in the Survey Monkey system.  This provided a prediscussion survey response rate of 
25% for the US Virgin Islands study site.  No questions were skipped.  
The respondent agreed that those communities having a local tsunami threat should be 
required to take more actions in order to protect human life.  This respondent noted that in the 
US Virgin Islands, the main concern is a regional earthquake generating a local tsunami.  This 
local tsunami would arrive on the shore within minutes, leaving little or no time for an official 
alert to those people within the inundation zone.  When asked about requiring communities to 
identify natural high or inland ground for at-risk persons self-evacuation, this respondent agreed.  
Building on the previous answer, the respondent also agreed that communities should identify or 
build berms or vertical evacuation structures for individuals.  However, this respondent noted 
that building these berms or structures would be very expensive and potential cost prohibitive for 
communities.  This participant agreed that any school located within an inundation zone should 
be required to conduct annual tsunami evacuation exercises, expanding the requirement to 
include an evaluation of each drill or exercise conducted.  The recommendation to require annual 
training, education, or outreach to both high occupancy businesses and residents located within 
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the inundation zone was also favorable to this respondent.  While agreeing with the general 
requirement, the respondent added that these types of activities may be costly both in time and 
money.  Additionally, each community should ideally have a comprehensive plan accounting the 
training, education, or outreach of all community businesses and persons.  See Appendix I6 for 
the US Virgin Islands final survey response matrix organized in tabular format.   
Integrated Summary 
 Across the six study sites, all confirmed focus group participants were invited to 
participate in the prediscussion survey component of the research study.  This resulted 47 
prediscussion survey invitations being sent via email 1 week prior to each scheduled focus group 
discussion.  Reminder emails were sent to all participants 3 days prior to each scheduled focus 
group discussion.  Twenty individuals completed the prediscussion survey through the online 
Survey Monkey system.  This provided an overall prediscussion survey response rate of 43% for 
the entire study. 
Prior to conducting each focus group discussion, the researcher conducted a preliminary 
review of each set of prediscussion survey responses.  This review provided insight into the 
depth and scope of understanding demonstrated by the participants who assessed the newly 
proposed TR Community program guidelines and responded to the survey.  Across all sites, it 
was evident from prediscussion survey data that a full review of definitions (local, regional, and 
distant tsunami, etc.) and a programmatic background of the development of the TR Community 
program guidelines evaluation would be necessary to ensure all participants had a clear 
understanding of the concepts being discussed during the focus groups.  The prediscussion 
survey data also allowed the researcher to prepare for site-specific questions regarding the 
program, while also guiding the discussion to include both site-specific and national 
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programmatic aspects of the proposed guidelines.  Overall, the prediscussion survey data 
provided insight into individual perceptions and beliefs regarding the TR Community program, 
which provided the researcher with a starting point to encourage discussion and colearning 
between participants for the focus group discussions.   
 When asked if communities with a local tsunami threat should be required to take more 
actions to protect human life than those communities with only a distant tsunami threat, slightly 
more than half  (55%) of all participants agreed.  Twenty-five percent of all participants were 
unsure this was a necessary requirement; leaving 20% who disagreed outright.  Overall, 
regardless of agreement status, the largest concern among participants was how this subdivision 
would be implemented by communities and the TR Community program.  Participants also 
described their desire for a standardized set of requirements, sharing frustration or dissatisfaction 
with adding unnecessary complexity to the program. 
 Similarly, only 50% of participants agreed that subdividing community vulnerability to 
local versus distant tsunami hazards would be appropriate in their community of residence.  The 
remaining participants were evenly split with 25% disagreeing and 25% unsure or providing no 
response to the question.  While the majority of participants identified whether their community 
would be easy to classify through the proposed subdivision, many were concerned with how 
their community would be required to plan for the specific hazard type.  Again, participants 
shared their concerns regarding unknown implementation aspects of the proposed subdivision. 
 Ninety percent of all participants strongly supported the proposed requirement for 
communities to identify natural high or inland ground for at-risk persons to use for self-
evacuation.  Across all six study sites, participants recognized that this activity would be very 
helpful in the planning process.  While the majority of participants supported this requirement, 
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there was concern expressed regarding private versus public ownership of land.  One site brought 
up very specific concerns because the government would not be able to require private 
landowners to “donate” their land for public evacuation usage.   
 When asked to consider a new requirement for communities to identify or build berms or 
other structures for use in vertical evacuation, participants had a split response.  Seventy-five 
percent of participants felt that the identification of berms or other structures would be a helpful 
activity for communities but did not agree with requiring communities to build such structures.  
Across all sites, participants were very concerned about the cost implications of such a 
requirement, and how lacking resources would prohibit many communities from engaging in the 
TR Community program.  Two of the study sites felt that recommending this activity, rather than 
requiring mandatory action, would be better received and more conducive to community 
participation in the program.      
 The newly proposed requirement for annual tsunami evacuation exercises for schools 
located within an inundation zone of a community with a local tsunami hazard was well received 
by participants, with 95% supporting this requirement.  Participants in all sites agreed that this 
type of activity would be very useful for schools.  Participants in two study sites even asserted 
that the once a year requirement should be the minimum level requirement.  Participants at one 
site also added that an evaluation of this mandatory evacuation exercise would be a useful 
addition to the required action for TR
 
recognized communities. 
 Across all sites, requiring annual training, education, or outreach for owners and staff of 
high-occupancy businesses located within an inundation zone was also favorably received with 
85% of participants supporting this activity.  While participants from all sites agreed that this 
type of required action would be very helpful in communities, several participants also 
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questioned how such a requirement would be mandated or implemented by the NWS Tsunami 
Program.  Participants at one site agreed with some kind of annual training, education, or 
outreach activity but added that it should be a comprehensive plan.  Participants from another 
site were concerned that all businesses, not just those located within an inundation zone, should 
be included in all education and outreach activities. 
 Similarly, 85% of participants supported the proposed requirement of annual training, 
education, or outreach for those residents living within an inundation zone.  Again, several 
participants shared their concern regarding how this type of mandatory action would be 
implemented and monitored by the NWS Tsunami Program.  Participants also shared their 
concern regarding the cost requirements of engaging in these types of outreach programs.  
Finally, participants from two sites reemphasized that any training, education, or outreach 
activities should be community inclusive, providing information to all community residents.  The 
final prediscussion survey integrated response matrix (Table 7) organizes the described data into 
tabular format below.        
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Table 7:    
Integrated prediscussion survey results matrix 
 
Kodiak, Alaska
H
 
(n=4) 
Coronado, California
I
 
(n=4) Seaside, Oregon
H
 (n=4) Kauai, Hawaii
H
 (n=2) 
New Hanover County, 
North Carolina
L
 (n=5) 
US Virgin Islands
H
 
(n=1) 
Should 
communities 
with a local-
tsunami 
threat take 
more actions 
to protect 
human life? 
 Yes (3) 
 Depends (1) 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 Planning 
 No (1) 
 Depends (1) 
 N/A (2) 
 
 Standardization 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 Yes (2) 
 No (2) 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 
 Planning 
 Standardization 
 “worst case 
scenario” 
 Yes (1) 
 “Different levels 
of threat = 
different levels of 
response” 
 Implementation 
 No (1) 
 Standardization 
 Yes (4) 
 Planning 
 Unsure (1) 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 
 “Community risk 
should equal 
community 
preparation” 
 Yes (1) 
 Planning 
 “Regional local 
earthquake and 
tsunamis are our 
main concern” 
Would 
subdividing 
community 
vulnerability 
to local versus 
distant 
tsunami 
hazards be 
appropriate? 
 Yes (4) 
 New subdivision 
 Local hazard 
community 
 Yes (2) 
 New subdivision 
 Local hazard 
community 
 Planning 
 N/A (2) 
 Yes (1) 
 New subdivision 
 Local hazard 
community 
 No (2) 
 Planning 
 N/A (1) 
 Standardization 
 Yes (2) 
 New subdivision 
 Local hazard 
community 
 No (3) 
 Unnecessary 
complexity 
 Unsure (2) 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 Yes (1) 
 New subdivision 
 Local hazard 
community 
Thoughts 
about 
requiring 
communities 
to identify 
natural high 
or inland 
ground for at-
risk persons  
 Yes (4) 
 Planning 
 Helpful activity 
 
 Yes (3) 
 Planning  
 Training 
 Required 
 N/A (1) 
 
 Yes (4) 
 Helpful activity 
 Planning  
 Implementation 
concerns 
 Yes (2) 
 Requirement 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 “Private 
ownership of 
land = 
difficulties” 
 Yes (4) 
 Planning 
 Helpful activity 
 Requirement 
 Unsure (1) 
 Cost concerns 
 Implementation 
 
 Yes (1) 
 Planning 
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Table 7: (Continued) 
Thoughts 
about 
communities 
being 
required to 
identify or 
build berms 
or other 
structures for 
vertical 
evacuation 
 Yes (3) 
 Helpful activity 
 Cost concerns 
 Unsure (1) 
 Optional  
 Building 
structures 
 
 Yes (3) 
 Requirement for 
identification 
 N/A (1) 
 
 Cost concerns  
 Optional  
 Building 
structures 
 Yes (3) 
 Identification yes, 
building no 
 No (1) 
 Cost concerns 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 Resident risk 
tolerance 
 Yes (2) 
 Planning 
 Cost concerns 
 “Constructing 
unnatural 
berms for an 
“unlikely event 
seems wrong” 
 
 Yes (3) 
 Helpful activity 
 Unsure (1) 
 Cost concerns 
 Restrict 
communities 
 N/A (1) 
 Yes (1) 
 Cost concerns 
Thoughts 
about 
requiring 
annual 
tsunami 
evacuation 
exercises for 
schools 
located within 
the 
inundation 
zone 
 
 Yes (4) 
 Requirement 
 Helpful activity 
 “Once a year is 
the minimum 
that should be 
required” 
 
 Yes (3) 
 Requirement 
 Helpful activity 
 “Tsunami 
evacuation 
exercises for 
schools in 
inundation zones 
should be held at 
least twice per 
year” 
 N/A (1) 
 Yes (2) 
 Requirement 
 Helpful activity 
 Oregon already 
does this (2) 
 State law 
 Yes (2) 
 Requirement 
 Helpful activity 
 Hawaii has 
been doing this 
for all schools 
 Yes (5) 
 Requirement 
 Helpful activity 
 “we do fire and 
lockdown (active 
shooter) exercises, 
so why not 
tsunami 
evacuation 
exercises??” 
 Yes (1) 
 “There should also 
be an evaluation of 
the drill or exercise” 
Thoughts 
about 
requiring 
annual 
training, 
education, 
outreach for 
owners/staff 
of high-
occupancy 
businesses in 
the zone 
 Yes (4) 
 Helpful activity 
 Requirement 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 
 Yes (2) 
 Helpful activity 
 Requirement 
 N/A (2) 
 
 Inclusive 
 All businesses – 
not just those in 
inundation zone 
 
 Yes (3) 
 Helpful activity 
 Optional 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 N/A (1) 
 Yes (2) 
 Requirement  
 Yes (5) 
 Helpful activity 
 Requirement 
 
 Yes (1) 
 Planning 
 
 Inclusive 
 “Should have a 
comprehensive 
plan” 
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Table 7: (Continued) 
 
Thoughts 
about 
requiring 
annual 
training, 
education, 
outreach for 
residents 
living in the 
inundation 
zone 
 Yes (4) 
 Helpful activity 
 Requirement 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 
 
 Yes (2) 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 N/A (2)  
 
 Inclusive 
 All residents – not 
just those in 
inundation zone 
 Yes (3) 
 Helpful activity 
 Optional 
 “Cannot be 
mandated or 
required” 
 No (1) 
 Implementation 
concerns 
 
 Inclusive 
 All residents – not 
just those in 
inundation zone 
 
 Yes (2) 
 Requirement 
 Yes (5) 
 Helpful activity 
 Requirement 
 
 
 
 Yes (1) 
 Cost concerns 
The number in parentheses indicates the number of individual respondents providing a particular response  
H Indicates communities with a high degree of tsunami hazard exposure 
I Indicates communities with an intermediate degree of tsunami hazard exposure 
L Indicates communities with a low degree of tsunami hazard exposure
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 The above matrix (Table 7) was used to quantify the acceptability of the various proposed 
TR Community program guidelines recommendations by all survey participants, as seen below 
in Table 8.  While the unsure or N/A category is the smallest response category of acceptability, 
it stands to reason that these participants were unsure or failed to answer individual questions 
because they did not have enough information to form an opinion.  The unsure or N/A category 
appears to demonstrate a need for providing more information and background at the beginning 
of each focus group session so that those unsure participants may form or develop opinions 
regarding the proposed guidelines over the course of the discussion. 
Table 8:    
Acceptability of Proposed TsunamiReady
TM
 Community Program Guidelines Changes 
 Yes (%) No (%) Unsure or 
N/A(%) 
Should communities with a local-tsunami threat take more 
actions to protect human life? 
 
11 (55) 4 (20) 5 (25) 
Would subdividing community vulnerability to local versus 
distant tsunami hazards be appropriate? 
 
10 (50) 5 (25) 5 (25) 
Requiring communities to identify natural high or inland 
ground for at-risk persons self-evacuation  
 
18 (90) 0 (0) 2 (10) 
Requiring communities to identify berms or other structures 
for vertical evacuation 
 
15 (75) 1 (5) 4 (20) 
Requiring annual tsunami evacuation exercises for schools 
located within the inundation zone 
 
19 (95) 0 (0) 1 (5) 
Requiring annual training, education, outreach for owners/staff 
of high-occupancy businesses in the zone 
 
17 (85) 0 (0) 3 (15) 
Requiring annual training, education, outreach for residents 
living in the inundation zone 
17 (85) 1 (5) 2 (10) 
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Focus Group Discussions 
Focus group discussions were used to explore participant beliefs formed through 
discussion, debate, and colearning among peers regarding tsunami hazards and the TR
 
Community program using the central route of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM).  
Central perceptions are formed and changed through consideration and integration of 
information relevant to the product or service gained through discussion and interaction with 
others (Cacioppo & Petty, 1979).  Participant perceptions and beliefs were collected through 
focus group discussions which encouraged participant colearning and sharing of information 
regarding the revised guidelines for the TR Community program.  The following subsections 
describe an individual level analysis of each study site followed by the final integrated summary 
between sites.  Information for each site is described by topic and the associated theme(s) 
identified in the analyses. 
Site Specific Findings 
Kodiak, Alaska.  Eighteen individuals were contacted to participate in the Kodiak, 
Alaska TR focus group discussion.  Of those invited, eight individuals confirmed their 
participation.  Eight individuals attended and participated in the focus group discussion held in 
October 2013.  This provided a focus group discussion participation rate of 100% for the Kodiak, 
Alaska study site.       
Topic: Subdivision of communities by vulnerability. Theme: Prioritize local event for 
activities:  In reviewing the proposed guidelines, Kodiak participants compared the new 
subdivision of guidelines by community vulnerability to the tsunami hazard directly with the old 
guidelines based on population.  One participant explained, “I believe that the population of an 
area shouldn’t have anything to do with its readiness – it should be the local threat that they are 
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exposed to…I think you are going in the right direction.”  Participants unanimously agreed that it 
is necessary for a national program like the TR Community program to subdivide required 
guidelines.  Summing up the discussion, participants agreed that the proposed subdivision 
separating those communities with a local threat, communities requiring preparation for 
immediate action to save lives, makes sense when some communities are only at risk to a distant 
tsunami with more time to respond.   
Subtopic: Four standard actions. Theme: essential:  When Kodiak participants were 
asked to consider the proposed four standard actions to be required of all communities, 
regardless of tsunami hazard distinction, all participants agreed with the described actions.  One 
participant likened the four standard actions to a “formula” or process of creating a preparedness 
plan for the various communities located within Kodiak Island.  This same participant continued 
to describe how one could use the “formula” as a performance measure of the TR Community 
program.   
Topic: Guidelines document.  Theme: NIMS formatting: When asked to discuss the 
updated format of the TR Community program guidelines, all participants unanimously agreed it 
was greatly improved.  In following the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
formatting propagated by FEMA, the TR Community program guidelines follow a standardized 
format.  Participants agreed that using this format makes the guidelines more understandable and 
translatable across emergency management professionals.  One participant summed it up saying, 
“This is a pretty common format these days.  It matches our emergency response plans.”  
Topic: Evacuation: As a currently recognized TR community, Kodiak has an existing 
evacuation strategy, evacuation signage, and identified and accessible evacuation routes.  All 
participants agreed that even though there is a current plan in place, continued evaluation of the 
116 
 
plan has provided for the creation of improved maps with updated information.  All current 
planning is based off of a “worst case scenario” that was created using six or seven different 
local tsunami scenarios with the inundation zone based on the 1964 earthquake and tsunami 
which greatly impacted Kodiak.   
Topic: School evacuation drills or exercises. Themes: Useful and necessary: Emergency 
drills and exercises are currently used in preparation against various threats throughout the 
Kodiak community.  Community-wide testing of the tsunami warning sirens takes place every 
Wednesday afternoon at 2pm.  While this test is done weekly, it was acknowledged by all 
participants that no community-wide tsunami evacuation drill has ever been conducted and is 
probably needed.   
 The proposed addition of mandatory annual school evacuation exercise was well received 
by the Kodiak participants.  All participants agreed that this type of required action would be 
very appropriate, particularly for communities with a local tsunami hazard and schools located 
within an inundation zone.  One participant even felt that annual evacuation exercises would help 
with population turnover saying, “…it’s educating kids, it’s a start, they will carry that home 
with them…”  Consensus among participants was that one mandatory evacuation drill per year 
would be very achievable and very useful as a required community preparedness activity.  
Participants indicated that communities with a distant tsunami hazard should not be required to 
have a full-scale exercise annually.  Rather, those communities should focus on having an 
evacuation plan in place and include an annual discussion or table-top exercise.   
Topic: Vertical evacuation. Theme: Missing step or action: In considering the various 
additional requirements for those communities who would be designated as having a local 
tsunami hazard, the Kodiak participants felt there was potentially one missing action in the 
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Mitigation section of the guidelines.  Participants thought that before communities began 
planning and building vertical evacuation structures, they should first allocate resources to 
ensuring that evacuation routes were clear and structurally sound.  Most participants agreed that 
priority should be placed on providing secure and clear evacuation routes before trying to build 
additional structures. 
Theme: Need education: Participants were interested in learning more about vertical 
evacuation and other TR recognized communities that were engaged in preparing for a vertical 
evacuation strategy.  All participants agreed that they don’t know much about other 
communities’ experience in seeking or earning TR recognition.  Generally, participants agreed 
that while in some cases building vertical evacuation structures might provide needed areas of 
safe refuge for community members, the construction would also raise additional concerns and 
issues.  One significant concern would be the structural integrity of the building or structure.  All 
participants agreed that the resources needed to build and maintain such vertical evacuation 
structures could be significantly cost prohibitive and restrict some communities from ever 
engaging in the TR Community program. 
Theme: Costs: Over the course of the vertical evacuation discussion, participants 
continuously offered potential alternatives to building vertical evacuation structures.  
Unanimously, all participants agreed that money would be better spent strengthening current 
evacuation routes and providing additional evacuation signage and education.   
Theme: Protection of human life: Participants generally agreed that regardless of any 
other concerns, requiring communities to build vertical evacuation should be reserved for only 
those communities that have no other options for providing safe evacuation for their population 
as a last resort.  However, only one participant was willing to answer the direct question 
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regarding a community’s ability to provide safe evacuation for all of its people by saying, “I 
would have to say if you don’t have the means to evacuate your people to safety, you can’t be 
TR.”    
Topic: Evacuation effectiveness. Themes: Testing plan elements and evaluation: As the 
discussion shifted into how a community could determine evacuation effectiveness, participants 
referenced the recommended four standard actions as “benchmarks” for effectiveness.  One 
participant even shared, “[the four standard actions are] in our operations plan, it’s a formula in 
our evacuation plan to determine how long it will take to evacuate downtown Kodiak for 
example.”  Participants generally agreed that communities could apply the recommended four 
standard actions to determine the timeframe and the route and then evaluate actual evacuation 
exercises against the expected outcome.  If a community were able to achieve the minimum 
requirements identified by the four standard actions, that community’s evacuation plan could be 
considered effective.   
 Additional discussion regarding evacuation effectiveness centered on the local canneries 
in Kodiak and plant safety operations plans and exercises.  All participants agreed that the 
canneries have a need to evacuate, not just for tsunamis but for hazardous materials releases and 
fires too.  Therefore, all canneries engage in evacuation exercises that are observed by local 
emergency management.  Though, it was noted by several participants that the canneries 
typically conduct evacuation exercises during the “off season” when the transient or seasonal 
fishing population are not working at the canneries and the evacuation exercise only moves 
employees out of the cannery building itself and not out of the tsunami evacuation zone.    
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Theme: Communication flows: Further discussion shared that evacuation effectiveness is 
based on coordination throughout the emergency management operations sector of a given 
community.   
Topic: Proportion of the population to be protected. Theme: Seasonality: All participants 
agreed that the number of people at risk to a tsunami in Kodiak changes seasonally.  The largest 
numbers of staff or workers at the canneries (located in the inundation zone) is during the 
production season.  Additionally, there are seasonal fluctuations of tourists, hunters, and 
fishermen resulting in higher population numbers during the summer and fall months.   
 Theme: 100% of population unrealistic: All participants agreed that expecting to save 100% 
of the population from a local tsunami would be unrealistic.  One participant explained, “I don’t 
think 100% is realistic.  Not under any circumstances.  I’m speaking from practical experience – 
from hurricanes.  There are people who won’t leave the village bar – they’ll say no, I’m not 
going anywhere.”   
Theme: No mandatory state evacuation law: There is no state law providing for a 
mandatory evacuation, so expert community stakeholders in Kodiak hope to educate the 
community as best as possible so that they will self-evacuate when necessary.   
Theme: 100% of at-risk population: Participants agreed that evacuations should be 
prioritized, with greater time spent helping special needs populations that are unable to help 
themselves.  Special needs populations were described as school children, daycare or nursery 
facilities, and nursing home or elder care facilities. 
Topic: Education. Themes: Useful and necessary: Participants acknowledged that, 
collectively, expert community stakeholders  in Kodiak “could do a better job with preparedness 
outreach – with regards to evacuation outreach, with regards to preparedness kits, everything 
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across the board.”  One particular participant recommended that as a group they “should be 
looking towards homeland security grants that could aid [them] in that education…”  Overall, the 
discussion supported general education recommendations.   
Topic: Education of businesses. Theme: Lack of cooperation: Conversely, participants 
were wary of the proposed requirement for mandatory annual training or education of high 
occupancy or high volume businesses located within the inundation zone.  The overall sentiment 
was best summed up, “I think you are going to be hard-pressed to get buy-in from the business 
community also with regards to the cost association with that…we have got a lot of small 
businesses here that are on the edge and just to include more government bureaucracy or 
whatever you want to call it with regards to tracking this training and reporting and paying staff 
for the training – I just don’t think you’d get buy-in from the local community.”  Participants did 
not want to be required to conduct activities that ultimately they are not responsible for 
implementing (businesses can say no and refuse to conduct trainings).  Throughout the course of 
this discussion, participants focused on all local businesses rather than on the specification of 
high occupancy or high volume businesses. 
Topic: Education of residents. Themes: Useful and necessary: The proposed mandatory 
annual education of residents living within the inundation zone was better received by the 
participants.  One participant shared, “I think [education] is important because one of the metrics 
we always hear in the hurricane part of the country was that 90% of the population that lives in a 
hurricane vulnerable zone has never experienced a hurricane in their life.  And that’s probably 
more true of tsunamis.  Probably higher.  So education is important because people do forget.”  
Additionally, residential turn-over and transient or seasonal populations within Kodiak are 
currently a significant concern for tsunami education efforts.  A matrix depicting the Kodiak, 
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Alaska discussion topics with their supporting and opposing themes can be seen below in Table 
9. 
Table 9:    
Kodiak, Alaska Discussion Topics with Supporting and Opposing Themes 
Major Topics Supporting Themes Opposing Themes 
Subdivision of communities by 
vulnerability [subtopic: Four 
standard actions] 
 Prioritize local event for 
activities  
 
Proportion of the population to 
be protected 
 100% of at-risk population   100% of population unrealistic  
 No mandatory evacuation laws  
Education of residents  Useful  
 Necessary  
 
 
Education of businesses  Useful  
 Necessary  
 Lack of cooperation 
 Private businesses  
Evacuation effectiveness 
 
 
 
 Communication flows 
 Testing plan elements  
 Four standard actions  
 Evaluation  
 Seasonality  
 
School evacuation drills or 
exercises 
 Useful  
 Necessary  
 
Vertical evacuation  Protection of human life  
 
 Missing a “step” or action  
 Secure & clear evacuation 
routes first  
 Costs 
 Time & money  
 Limitations 
 Need education  
Guidelines document  NIMS formatting  
 
Coronado, California.  Twenty-one individuals were contacted to participate in the 
Coronado, California TR focus group discussion.  Of those invited, nine confirmed their 
participation.  Thirteen individuals attended and participated in the focus group discussion held 
in October 2013.  This provided a participation rate of 144%.  Four participants attended even 
though they did not confirm their participation.   
Topic: Subdivision of communities by vulnerability.  Theme: Prioritize local event for 
activities:  The newly revised TR Community guidelines document was examined in great detail, 
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focusing on the most notable differences in required actions based on the proposed subdivision 
between community vulnerability to tsunami hazard.  Coronado participants agreed that tsunami 
hazard would be different between communities and that those communities with a higher hazard 
should engage in additional activities to protect the people.  One participant described the 
subdivision, “I like the way it’s framed.  We [Coronado] are going to do them both [local and 
distant tsunami activities].”  General consensus among the group indicated that the subdivision 
was easy to understand and that Coronado as a community would probably be classified as 
having both a local and a distant tsunami hazard.  This classification would require emergency 
management to undertake the actions stipulated for both local and distant tsunami activities.     
Theme: Four standard actions: One participant also noted that delineation between local 
and distant tsunami hazard identification should include more than just the expected inundation 
level. This supports the inclusion of a set of standard actions required by all communities, 
regardless of a community’s tsunami hazard classification.  Several participants agreed that it 
would be a reasonable requirement for all communities located along a coastline to determine the 
four standard actions proposed by the research team.  While most participants were in favor of 
these additional actions, one noted that if the program made “the criteria hard and fast, 
[communities] may not be able to achieve it.”   
Topic: Guidelines document.  Theme: NIMS formatting: After reviewing the TR 
Community guidelines document, Coronado participants unanimously agreed the changes in 
formatting were well made and followed “emergency management standards to deal with an all-
hazards approach, including tsunami.”   
Themes: Checklist and definitions: All participants scrutinized the formatting, and 
pointed out the benefits of a checklist to facilitate tracking of completion of program 
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requirements.  Concern was expressed by several participants that activities could only be 
identified as “planned” and not “in progress” in the current draft of the checklist.  One 
participant summed up the conversation saying, “I think in general all the work that you’ve done, 
all the work that you are doing, and – I know more about tsunamis now than I did two years ago 
and the community is better prepared today than they were two years ago and so if we can keep 
moving forward and including people and getting things more like this NIMS compliant with 
standardization – I think we are heading in a good direction.” 
Topic: Evacuation.  Theme: Communication flows: Expert community stakeholders in 
Coronado have spent considerable time creating evacuation maps and providing outreach and 
education to their community.  One participant described the benefits of pursuing TR recognition 
regarding evacuation planning, “…it encourages you to achieve the best possible solution that 
you can achieve…we are continuously looking to better what we have and we educate the public, 
we drill with our disaster preparedness folks and we outreach to our community…”   It was also 
noted by participants that it would be useful and helpful to hear about other communities’ 
experiences working with the TR Community program.   
Topic: Evacuation effectiveness.  Theme: Full-scale test unrealistic: To date, no full-
scale drill has been conducted of the entire tsunami evacuation plan in Coronado.  Participants 
identified multiple barriers to conducting a full-scale evacuation exercise, acknowledging that 
the second best alternative would be testing as many of the plan elements as possible.  Several 
tests have been, and continue to be, conducted throughout the community.  Emergency 
communications tests have been run in San Diego, evacuation modeling has been conducted, and 
the siren system is tested at least twice per year.   
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Theme: Signage: The Navy base has also conducted a “reduction of population exercise,” 
similar to an evacuation drill.  Several local communities reside along the beach, both on 
Coronado Island and along the San Diego coast.  Discussion concerning creating effective 
evacuation strategies focused on coordinated efforts between these communities.  To do that 
expert community stakeholders are working to ensure a common language and symbology for all 
cities and communities.  All evacuation maps and educational material use the same language 
and symbols so that tourists, visitors, or residents are not confused when moving from one beach 
to another. 
 Theme: Testing of plan elements: Participants discussed the importance of public 
education and notification triggers in creating an effective tsunami evacuation plan.  During the 
course of this discussion, some participants referenced the four standard actions described above 
as potential “criteria” for evaluating the effectiveness of a community’s plan.  If a community 
has adequately addressed each of the four standard actions, that community’s plan might be 
considered effective through testing.  One participant also discussed the importance of signage, 
“I am a strong believer in the signage and I think that’s a…form of effectiveness.”  Consistent 
signage also provides an outreach and education tool for tourists and visitors to the community.  
It is vital that signage is provided from the beach all the way along the evacuation route.    
 Topic: School evacuation drills or exercises. Theme: Useful:  Over the course of the 
discussion, several types of drills and exercises were discussed.  Particularly regarding the 
proposed requirement for annual evacuation drills for schools located within an inundation zone, 
the discussion focused on the potential for table-top exercises.  When pressed to discuss the 
potential for full-scale evacuation exercises, participants argued amongst themselves regarding 
bussing needs, parent reactions, and comparability between an exercise and a real event.  When 
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the discussion returned to the community plan of moving people “inward and upward,” most 
participants agreed that the definition of evacuation needed to be clarified within the guidelines 
between long-term evacuation and housing and immediate evacuation to a safe location from the 
hazard.  Ultimately, participants agreed that due to various events across the country in the last 
few years, school systems are placing more emphasis on emergency drills and exercises.  While 
no one present at this particular discussion could speak directly for the school system, 
participants all agreed that “the school district has…changed their dynamics to push for a lot of 
drills…today they’ll play a lot more than they ever have, they will continue to do that.”  
Topic: Vertical evacuation.  Theme: Protection of human life: Due to the infrastructure 
within the community of Coronado, collectively the community is currently operating with a 
vertical evacuation strategy in the event of a locally-generated tsunami.  With only two-lane 
roads leaving the island in two locations, emergency management has decided to focus on 
strategies to move people “inward and upward.”  Evacuation maps have been distributed to the 
local resident community, and evacuation route maps are currently being created to be placed 
along all beach fronts.  While all people, whether residents, tourists, or seasonal workers, are 
advised to move to a higher structure with multiple stories in the event of a tsunami, no 
designated or approved structures are officially identified as vertical evacuation points.    
Participants did describe how most one-story homes have been torn down and rebuilt in 
accordance with recommendations providing for a second-story for vertical evacuation purposes.  
The Coronado community was described as “highly engaged in preparedness.”   
 Theme: Costs: When asked to discuss the proposed requirement for communities with a 
local-tsunami hazard to build vertical evacuation structures if they are unable to get people into a 
safe area located in natural high or inland ground, participants became quiet.  All participants 
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agreed that requiring communities to build such structures would be unrealistic.  When pressed if 
communities with no natural high or inland ground should be required to build vertical 
evacuation structures in order to earn TR recognition, one participant emphatically responded 
“no.”  This same participant continued, “…this community wouldn’t build – if the elevation was 
really like 40 feet, and our island was coated with water – this community wouldn’t tolerate 
building a football stadium in the center that is 60 feet high for something that may or may not 
occur…you can keep your signs, we’ll do other stuff.”  Consensus among participants agreed 
that requiring communities to build vertical evacuation structures would be cost-prohibitive and 
“a lot of places aren’t going to become TR” with such a requirement. 
Topic: Proportion of the population to be protected.  Theme: 100% of population 
unrealistic: When discussing how to determine the population that would need to be provided 
protection in the event of a tsunami, the Navy described how they evaluate its jurisdiction and 
the population residing within the inundation zone.  Currently, the plan is to house the Navy 
population from the inundation zone up in what they identified as “North Island.”  Knowing the 
population on-base who would require housing, the Navy base also recognizes that they would 
open their doors to provide safe haven to the civilian community as well (with room for up to 
7,000 individuals, but not everyone who would need refuge) – providing rudimentary care and 
shelter until after the tsunami.   
Theme: 100% of at-risk population: Discussion regarding the civilian population needing 
protection revolved around area hotels with multiple stories who could “be a good neighbor” in 
the case of a tsunami and allow tourists or visitors to seek refuge within the upper floors of the 
hotel.  Priority would be placed on moving tourists and visitors to safe refuge because they are 
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some of the most at-risk people during a tsunami. The majority of residential homes are two-
stories, which will hopefully provide vertical evacuation for the resident population.   
Theme: Seasonality: Currently, the greatest concern rests on providing protection for the 
drastically fluctuating tourist population dependent upon the season.   
Topic: Education of businesses and residents.  Theme: Useful: Participants all agreed that 
the community of Coronado is very engaged and interested in preparedness education and 
activities.  Overall, the community supports all activities aimed at increasing preparedness 
response, including tsunami education.  Discussion regarding the proposed requirements for 
providing annual training, education, or outreach to both high occupancy businesses and 
residents located within the inundation zone were determined to be beneficial activities.  Despite 
the value of said education activities, participants unanimously agreed that making such 
activities mandatory or required for earning TR recognition would not be beneficial.  Rather, it 
was discussed that these activities could prevent communities from earning recognition because 
private businesses may not agree to receive or provide annual trainings.  All participants support 
making these training, education, and outreach activities optional or recommended but not 
mandatory.  A matrix depicting the Coronado, California discussion topics with their supporting 
and opposing themes can be seen below in Table 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
Table 10:    
Coronado, California Discussion Topics with Supporting and Opposing Themes 
Major Topics Supporting Themes Opposing Themes 
Subdivision of communities by 
vulnerability 
 Four standard actions  
 Prioritize local event for 
activities  
 Need education  
 Implementation questions  
 
Proportion of the population to 
be protected 
 100% of at-risk population  
 
 100% of population unrealistic  
Education of residents  Useful   Seasonality  
Education of businesses  Useful   
Evacuation effectiveness 
 
 
 
 Communication flows  
 Signage 
 Testing plan elements  
 Four standard actions  
 Full-scale test unrealistic  
 Seasonality  
 
School evacuation drills or 
exercises 
 Useful   
Vertical evacuation  Protection of human life  
 
 Costs 
 Time & money  
Guidelines document  Checklist 
 NIMS formatting 
 Definitions  
 
Seaside, Oregon.  Seventeen individuals were contacted to participate in the Seaside, 
Oregon TR focus group discussion.  Of those invited, nine individuals confirmed their 
participation.  Seven individuals attended and participated in the focus group discussion held in 
October 2013.  This provided a participation rate of 78%.   
Topic: Subdivision of communities by vulnerability.  Theme: Prioritize local event for 
activities:  When discussing the proposed subdivision of guidelines based upon community 
vulnerability to a tsunami hazard, participants generally agreed that it would make sense to 
divide communities into one of two categories because the preparation and planning for a local 
tsunami would be very different from preparation and planning for a distant tsunami.  Several 
participants were concerned regarding a community designation of being vulnerable to both a 
local and a distant tsunami.  Discussion regarding the classification of various Oregon coastal 
communities focused around how each community might be required to plan for both a local and 
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a distant event – requiring different inundation maps, different evacuation route planning and 
signage, and different educational programs.  Despite agreeing that the subdivision would be 
useful at a national level for the TR Community program, participants continued to share their 
desire for greater consideration within the program for the local tsunami rather than the distant 
event.  Particular attention was directed at separating out a Cascadia subduction zone-generated 
event from all other local-source tsunami events as well.  All participants agreed that the tsunami 
hazard is greatly amplified by the potential of a Cascadia earthquake. 
Theme: Four standard actions: When asked to respond to the four standard actions 
proposed for all communities regardless of tsunami hazard classifications, the discussion 
between participants became more heated.  Being situated along a coastline facing the Cascadia 
subduction zone, participants shared concern regarding the size of the event for which they 
should plan.  The response to the four standard actions would vary greatly depending on both the 
size of the earthquake generating a local tsunami and the season of the year for many Oregon 
beach communities.  Participants shared their concern for adding these four standard actions to 
the TR Community program, saying that providing those answers would be very hard for 
communities in the Pacific Northwest.    
Over the course of the discussion a few participants discussed how political influence 
within a community could bolster or suppress tsunami activities.  In discussing political sway, 
one participant said “…we are all bound by our elected officials as far as policy is 
concerned…these guys are only in office for four years…”  This participant explained how many 
of these elected officials do not engage in any tsunami programming because their term is too 
short to see tangible benefits within the community before the next election.  This lack of local 
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political and governmental support can “hamstring” a community’s efforts to achieve TR 
recognition. 
Topic: Guidelines document.  Theme: NIMS formatting: All participants agreed that in 
revising the format of the TR Community program guidelines, making it more aligned with the 
FEMA required Hazard Mitigation Plans the language has become more standardized and useful.   
Themes: Checklist and definitions: Participants also agreed that the checklist was a useful 
tool in the planning and implementation process but were concerned with only having an option 
to identify activities once they were achieved.  Several participants discussed how a community 
engaging in longer-term projects or activities, such as a tsunami exercise every 3 years for 
example, allowed the community to only denote “when” that 3-year activity was “achieved” and 
not “planned”.  It was recommended that a column be added to the checklist to denote when an 
activity was “planned” in addition to the “completed” column. 
Topic Evacuation.  Participant discussion regarding evacuation plans and drills focused 
on the perceived challenges faced by communities that would be designated as having both a 
local and a distant tsunami hazard.  Several participants agreed that currently, Seaside and other 
coastal Oregon communities have been preparing separate evacuation plans, routes, and signs for 
either a local or a distant tsunami.  Local events are designated by yellow inundation maps while 
distant events are designated by orange inundation maps.  Frustrations were shared among 
participants concerning this practice.  It was felt by all participants that it would be more 
effective for both expert community stakeholders and community members if only the worst-
case scenario was used for planning and education purposes.  One participant explained, “I 
would rather just stick with the yellow.  It is less confusing and if you are prepared for the 
yellow, you sure as hell are going to be prepared for the orange." 
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Topic: School evacuation drills or exercises.  Themes: Useful and necessary: Current 
Oregon state law requires all schools to conduct an evacuation exercise at least once per year.  In 
addition to the required exercise, there is also a certain amount of core school curriculum 
dedicated to earthquake and tsunami preparedness.  Participants shared that these requirements 
seem to be upheld at all schools.  One participant shared, “What really helps is that state law also 
requires all public schools in the state of Oregon to do monthly fire drills so students and staff 
are already queued up to getting out of a building quickly, so the next piece is just getting them 
to high ground.”   
Participants agreed that even in states where no law exists, including the newly proposed 
mandatory annual evacuation exercise for schools located in an inundation zone would be a good 
mandatory action for those communities with a local tsunami hazard.  Additionally, participants 
all agreed that consideration should be given to requiring other care facilities located within an 
inundation zone (hospitals, residential care facilities, day cares, etc.) to engage in similar annual 
evacuation exercises.  It was noted that those schools located within an inundation zone of a 
distant tsunami hazard community should at minimum have a plan, and ideally have a regularly 
scheduled table-top exercise too.   
Topic: Vertical evacuation.  Theme: Costs: A significant proportion of time was spent 
discussing vertical evacuation and the newly proposed actions for communities identified as 
having a local tsunami hazard.  All participants agreed that building vertical evacuation 
structures would be a misuse of community resources.  Some of the activities preferred to 
building vertical evacuation structures included: evaluating evacuation routes and infrastructure 
integrity (roadways, bridges, etc.), strengthening or “hardening” evacuation routes and 
infrastructure (roadways, bridges, etc.), and evaluating already existing structures as potential 
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vertical evacuation structures.  All participants agreed that if any requirement to build vertical 
evacuation structures was added to the TR Community program, then commensurate resources 
would also need to be provided.   
Theme: Zoning laws: One final concern regarding vertical evacuation centered on zoning 
laws and regulations.  All participants agreed that zoning restrictions could pose another 
significant barrier to communities building vertical evacuation structures and achieving TR 
recognition.      
Theme: Missing a “step” or action: During the review of the additional actions that 
would be required by communities identified as having a local-tsunami hazard, Seaside 
participants agreed that one significant action and use of resources was missing from the 
Mitigation section of the guidelines.  A lengthy discussion was devoted to the addition of a new 
Mitigation activity that was recommended to be placed before the required action of planning for 
vertical evacuation.  All participants agreed that communities should first dedicate resources to 
evaluating evacuation routes for reliability and strengthening or “hardening” those routes as 
indicated by the evaluation.  Consensus among participants was that once evacuation routes were 
evaluated, upgraded, and strengthened; only then should communities begin looking at vertical 
evacuation strategies and building structures. 
 Theme: False sense of security: One participant mentioned an “unofficial vertical 
evacuation” message that is discussed during some outreach and education activities in Seaside: 
“If you are in the downtown quarter and you are injured [from the earthquake] and you know 
you can’t make it to high ground…look around at any concrete reinforced structure that is 
available and try to get as high as you can…”  While this is an unofficial message, Seaside 
participants were very concerned that promoting vertical evacuation would give people a false 
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sense of security.  It was surmised that community members would prioritize vertical evacuation 
(into potentially structurally unsound buildings) over following evacuation routes during a local 
tsunami.   
 Topic: Evacuation effectiveness. Themes: Testing of plan elements and evaluation: In 
order to evaluate evacuation effectiveness, Seaside assessed levels of community awareness and 
knowledge of the tsunami hazard.  Seaside participated in early research activities that focused 
on these issues.  Information gained from that research has provided detail for current and future 
community education and outreach activities.  Additional means for assessing evacuation 
effectiveness included drills and the review of prior evacuations.  By testing plans and evaluating 
previous evacuations, participants all agreed that future plans could be modified to correct for 
any mishaps experienced and ultimately make the plan more effective. 
Theme: Seasonality: Several participants noted the significant challenges posed to 
evacuation planning and education in communities with significant seasonal and transient 
populations like Seaside and other coastal Oregon communities.  One participant explained, 
“…if you just look at average summer populations, more than 50% of our homes in this town are 
second homes and so those second homes get a disproportionate amount of use in the summer 
months and yeah, the population instead of being 6,500 people is well over 10,000 on 
average…”  One concern is that regardless of base population and seasonality, the municipalities 
never receive any increased funding to support regular public safety much less funding to expand 
tsunami education, outreach, and emergency service activities.   
Topic: Proportion of the population to be protected.  Themes: 100% of population 
unrealistic and no mandatory evacuation laws: As participants discussed the populations most at 
risk of a tsunami, those people who would be located within the inundation zone, the 
134 
 
conversation intensity increased.  All participants agreed that creating an evacuation plan that 
was accessible and useful to 100% of the population was ideal, though several participants 
emphasized that there is no mandatory evacuation law in Oregon, and it is unrealistic to expect 
the current plan to save 100% of the people.  Participants unanimously agreed that the purpose of 
the TR Community program is to educate community members and help them understand and 
plan for self-evacuation in case of a tsunami.   
Theme: 100% of at-risk population: Understanding this perception, participants agreed 
that striving to protect 100% of the community population was best, but in actuality 100% would 
never be expected to self-evacuate.  Though, it could be expected that 100% of certain 
vulnerable populations could be protected.  All participants agreed that students, young children, 
and other care facilities should be prioritized for evacuation support. 
Topic: Education of residents.  Themes: Useful: One participant acknowledged that 
current expert community stakeholders  have never asked the Seaside community residents what 
their plans would be if there was a tsunami.  He proposed conducting an outreach activity to 
better understand how many community members actually intend to evacuate, particularly in the 
case of a local tsunami. 
Theme: Seasonality: In discussing annual mandatory training, education, or outreach 
activities for those residents located within the inundation zone, participants unanimously agreed 
that this requirement would be largely unachievable.  A significant proportion of the homes 
located within the inundation zone and throughout the Seaside community are second homes for 
people living in other areas for the majority of the year.  Expert community stakeholders never 
know when these second home owners will be in-residence in Seaside (as compared with renters 
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or standing empty), so conducting any kind of outreach specifically to these homes would result 
in a substantial waste of both time and money.    
Topic: Education of businesses.  Themes: Useful and necessary: Conversely, participants 
were highly supportive of adding mandatory annual training, education, or outreach activities for 
high occupancy business owners and staff located within an inundation zone.  Currently, the City 
of Seaside is working on creating a “Business Ready” program for businesses based on the TR 
Community program.  As this program has been developed, it would be focused on providing a 
set of guidelines listing tsunami preparedness activities businesses could voluntarily engage in to 
earn community recognition as being a tsunami ready business.  There has been some discussion 
of passing legislation to include language requiring businesses to engage in this program, but as 
of the focus group discussion date no laws had been formally drafted or considered.  The main 
goal of the “Business Ready” program is to educate businesses in ways they can make tsunami 
awareness and education a positive aspect of their business management.  A matrix depicting the 
Seaside, Oregon discussion topics with their supporting and opposing themes can be seen below 
in Table 11. 
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Table 11:    
Seaside, Oregon Discussion Topics with Supporting and Opposing Themes 
Major Topics Supporting Themes Opposing Themes 
Subdivision of communities by 
vulnerability 
 Prioritize local event for 
activities  
 Need education  
 Implementation questions  
Proportion of the population to 
be protected 
 100% of at-risk population 
 
 
 100% of population unrealistic  
 No mandatory evacuation laws  
Education of residents  Useful   Seasonality  
Education of businesses  Useful  
 Necessary  
 
Evacuation effectiveness 
 
 
 
 Testing plan elements 
 Evaluation  
 Signage  
 Seasonality  
 
School evacuation drills or 
exercises 
 Useful  
 Necessary  
 
Vertical evacuation   Missing a “step” or action  
 Secure & clear evacuation 
routes first  
 Costs 
 Time & money  
 Zoning laws  
 False sense of security  
Guidelines document  Checklist 
 NIMS formatting 
 Definitions  
 
Kauai, Hawaii.  Twenty individuals were contacted to participate in the Kauai, Hawaii 
TR focus group discussion.  Of those invited, nine individuals confirmed their participation.  
Nine individuals attended and participated in the focus group discussion held in November 2013.  
This provided a participation rate of 100%.   
Subdivision of communities by vulnerability.  Theme: Prioritize local event for activities:  
Participants began by discussing the applicability of the newly proposed subdivision of the TR 
Community program guidelines to communities on the Island of Kauai.  Participants discussed 
the most likely hazard classification that would apply to Kauai and agreed that they would be 
vulnerable to both local and distant tsunamis.  As the discussion continued, participants 
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unanimously established that this type of programmatic subdivision would be both useful and 
appropriate for the communities in Kauai.  All participants agreed that those communities with a 
local tsunami hazard should do more to prepare for a tsunami but added the caveat “I wouldn’t 
want the federal government to require us to build the high structure [for vertical evacuation].”    
Theme: Four standard actions: Next, participants discussed the proposed four standard 
actions for all communities regardless of hazard classification.  It was noted that the community 
of Hanalei along the Kauai coast may take longer to evacuate than a tsunami wave arrival would 
allow for a locally generated event.  General consensus showed that asking all communities to 
identify the answers to the four standard actions would help communities to be better prepared 
for a tsunami.  Additionally, it was mentioned that the Kauai school district currently uses 
actions similar to the described four standard actions to help plan local school evacuations from 
tsunamis.   
Topic: Guidelines document.  Theme: NIMS formatting: Kauai participants unanimously 
agreed that the updated NIMS format of the TR Community program guidelines was a good 
modification.  Discussion focused on how the newly proposed guidelines follow the same 
language and format of the incident command system used by both police and fire departments.  
One participant stated, “We are getting a logic that actually plug and plays in different localities 
so it’s modular and affected, expands and contracts – we are getting used to that play book... It’s 
very useful and standardization across the board, it should be maintained.”   
Topic: Evacuation.  Theme: Communication flows: Participants spent a significant 
portion of time discussing warning notification and evacuation complexities for the island.  All 
participants agreed that classifying a community’s tsunami hazard by vulnerability has some 
inherent limitations.  The largest concern was in regards to notification time of an impending 
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tsunami and the subsequent time needed to alert the Kauai community.  Participants discussed 
the erosion of warning time through the notification system. For example, 1) the time it takes the 
PTWC to confirm a local tsunami after the generating event before notifying Hawaii Civil 
Defense, and 2) the time between a receiving a PTWC notification and the local Kauai Civil 
Defense activating local notification systems (i.e. the Blackboard system).  Several participants 
asked if other TR recognized communities shared this concern. 
Topic: School evacuation drills or exercises.  Themes: Useful and necessary: As a state, 
Hawaii currently mandates that all schools located in a tsunami inundation zone must engage in 
annual tsunami evacuation exercises.  This aligns well with the proposed action requiring all 
schools located in the inundation zone to conduct annual tsunami evacuation exercises.  Several 
participants discussed the various local school evacuation exercises (one was conducted the day 
prior to the Kauai focus group discussion at Hanalei) and the different routes and strategies in 
place.  Generally, participants agreed that all schools assess the recommended four standard 
actions as part of their planning process for each individual school.  Based on the answers to 
those questions, the schools most often practice for a regionally-generated tsunami but also have 
plans in-place for local and distant events as well.   
Topic: Vertical evacuation.  Themes: Need education and zoning laws: While there is no 
current strategy for vertical evacuation using buildings in Kauai, discussion involved the 
potential for using the standard operating procedures currently in place in Honolulu.  There is 
only one hotel over four stories high on the entire island of Kauai, so those particular standards 
in Honolulu would be unenforceable in Kauai.  Additionally, there are specific zoning laws in-
place to protect the natural beauty of the various beaches in Kauai.  Those laws would prohibit 
the construction of very high buildings for use in vertical evacuation. 
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Theme: Costs: There has been prior discussion of integrating vertical evacuation within 
various communities on Kauai Island, but participants agreed those discussions were terminated 
because of the “astronomical costs” associated with building the necessary vertical evacuation 
structures.  After much discussion regarding the costs versus benefits of vertical evacuation 
structures, all participants agreed that Kauai has enough natural high ground that building a 
structure would never be needed.   
Theme: Protection of human life: All participants expressed concern for those 
communities that would be excluded from the TR Community program if they were unable to 
fund the building of such structures.  It was preferred that other options be put forward for 
communities to engage in as a means of providing safe evacuation to people, particularly for 
smaller communities who would not have the necessary resources to build vertical evacuation 
structures.   
Theme: False sense of security: The final comment regarding community perceptions of 
vertical evacuation included concern for the false sense of security people may feel by having 
structures identified for evacuation during a tsunami and those structures are not guaranteed to 
withstand a tsunami. 
Topic: Evacuation effectiveness.  Themes: Communication flows and evaluation: Kauai 
participants agreed that multiple means of notification are necessary for ensuring evacuation 
effectiveness.  Additionally, participants supported learning from previous evacuations as a 
means of improving current evacuation strategy and planning efforts.  For example, the last two 
events (the Japan and the Chile earthquakes and subsequent tsunamis) occurred at night.  These 
events allowed the expert community stakeholders in Kauai to initiate and run through their 
entire evacuation plan successfully within 3 hours.  All participants agreed that those two 
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evacuations were successful, admitting that there was still plenty of fine-tuning needed.  
Ultimately, participants unanimously agreed that having a strategy in place to evacuate a given 
population within the given timeframe of wave arrival (while accounting for special populations) 
would ensure a community’s evacuation effectiveness – using the recommended four standard 
actions as a baseline.   
Topic: Proportion of the population to be protected. Theme: Seasonality: Participants 
discussed the seasonality of tourism in Kauai, describing both the family vacationers and the 
“snow birds.”  It was agreed that there is a dual peak season in Kauai, with family tourists 
visiting during summer and winter vacations from school.  “Snow birds” also add to the winter 
peak preferring to travel to Kauai during the coldest months at home.  Expert community 
stakeholders currently use estimates of the tourist population based on the number of rental cars 
in use and the hotel maximum bed capacity figures.  For planning purposes, this puts between 
20-22,000 tourists on the island at the height of the two peak seasons.  Additionally, calculations 
of at-risk persons are reached by using census track data and the current inundation zone.  These 
estimations identify those people and populations in most need of education and protection in the 
event of a tsunami.   
 Theme: 100% of population unrealistic: When asked what percentage of the population 
should be assured safe evacuation for a community to be considered TR recognized, participants 
agreed that 100% would be a very unrealistic ideal.  Unanimously, all participants agreed that 
not all people will evacuate in the event of a tsunami and emergency services cannot force 
anyone to evacuate.  Additionally, participants agreed that they would not want to put a specific 
number on the required amount of people to be saved.  By citing a required percentage of people 
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to be saved as a requirement for TR recognition, participants felt that the community would feel 
hurt and question how important their individual life is to city government.   
Theme: 100% of at-risk population: Participants did agree however, that 100% of school 
and hospital populations located within an inundation zone should always be saved. 
Topic: Education.  A significant proportion of the discussion regarding education was 
directed towards focusing educational efforts on a local tsunami.  Participants recognized that 
both tourists and community members needed to receive education to help them understand the 
difference between a local and a distant tsunami, and that in a locally-generated tsunami they 
would be on their own to respond quickly.  Warning time and warning communication routes 
dominated this discussion, with participants agreeing that a clear communication plan is the 
backbone of a strong tsunami education program.  It was also noted that the community of Kauai 
is very strong and closely bonded with community-wide education efforts, “as a community 
neighborhood [residents] talk about [tsunamis], plan for [tsunamis] and talk about [tsunamis] 
every year and so on and so that it is refreshed in their minds in case it happens.”   
 Topic: Education of businesses and residents.  Themes: Useful and necessary: When 
asked to discuss the proposed mandatory annual training, education, or outreach to both 
businesses and residents located within the inundation zone; participants strongly supported the 
need for wide-scale education efforts.  “You need education and outreach to communities, 
businesses and the hotel industry in addition to all branches of government, primary non-
governmental partners – wide sector dissemination!”  The Kauai community is already working 
closely with the hotel associations and the security guard organizations from every hotel to create 
and organize tsunami response plans.  Participants unanimously agreed, “That sort of procedure 
would be very useful for a short notice locally-generated event.  A good requirement for your 
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TsunamiReady
TM
 program.”  A matrix depicting the Kauai, Hawaii discussion topics with their 
supporting and opposing themes can be seen below in Table 12. 
Table 12:    
Kauai, Hawaii Discussion Topics with Supporting and Opposing Themes 
Major Topics Supporting Themes Opposing Themes 
Subdivision of communities by 
vulnerability 
 Four standard actions  
 Prioritize local event for 
activities  
 
Proportion of the population to 
be protected 
 100% of at-risk population  
 
 100% of population unrealistic  
Education of residents  Useful  
 Necessary  
 Seasonality  
 
Education of businesses  Useful  
 Necessary  
 
Evacuation effectiveness 
 
 Communication flows  
 Evaluation  
 Seasonality  
School evacuation drills or 
exercises 
 Useful  
 Necessary 
 
Vertical evacuation  Protection of human life  Costs 
 Time & money  
 Zoning laws  
 Limitations 
 Need education  
 False sense of security  
Guidelines document  NIMS formatting  
 
New Hanover County, North Carolina.  Fifteen individuals were contacted to 
participate in the New Hanover County, North Carolina TR focus group discussion.  Of those 
invited, eight individuals confirmed their participation and attended the focus group discussion 
held in November 2013.  This provided a participation rate of 100%.   
Topic: Subdivision of communities by vulnerability.  Themes: Prioritizing local event for 
activities and need education: Participants described having a distant-tsunami hazard only.  As 
such, they discussed the applicability of the newly proposed subdivision of the TR Community 
program guidelines.  All participants agreed that moving to a more risk-based type of criteria for 
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required actions was a good idea.  One participant described, “I think that risk-based makes 
sense because it is certain warning mechanisms and response procedures are going to have to be 
different based on whether it’s a local or distant [tsunami].”  Another participant described the 
major differences between population based guidelines and the new hazard vulnerability 
guidelines, “…doing it by population, if there’s not a real perceived risk then people aren’t likely 
to make any preparations for it, take it seriously.  There has to be some element of risk before 
anyone pays any attention to it.”  Several participants questioned how these changes would affect 
a community like New Hanover County, which would have only a distant hazard. 
Topic: Guidelines document. Theme: NIMS formatting: All participants agreed that the 
NIMS format makes sense.  The new format is easy to follow and understand. 
Topic: Evacuation.  New Hanover County is currently considered to have a low tsunami 
hazard.  As a low hazard community, the current inundation maps indicate that evacuation is 
required only beyond the beachfront.  Once people are evacuated back behind the sand dunes, 
the elevation is enough to have removed them from the inundation zone.  All participants agreed 
that they are comfortable with the agreed upon wording for evacuation messaging and education. 
Topic: School evacuation drills or exercises.  Themes: Useful and necessary: Generally, 
participants agreed that schools that are located within an inundation zone should undergo some 
type of training or preparation for a tsunami.  Supporting the recommended action, participants 
stated “A school residing inside a threat zone – certainly they should be prepared just like a 
tornado, hurricane or any other weather event.  How can you say you are TR and not do at least 
that?”  Reference was also made to American Samoa and the utility of school evacuation drilling 
and education saving lives.  Another participant agreed, stating “…they [schools] do all sorts of 
other drills – hurricane drills, tornado drills – what’s one more?”  All participants agreed that for 
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those communities with a distant tsunami hazard only, the exercise does not need to be physical; 
rather it could be a table-top exercise or a discussion detailing the evacuation plan. 
Topic: Vertical evacuation. Themes: Costs and need education: All participants agreed 
that those communities who are determined to have only a distant tsunami threat should not be 
required to include vertical evacuation in their tsunami evacuation plan.  Discussion surrounded 
how communities could try to make multipurpose buildings that could serve as vertical 
evacuation points for some communities but agreed that cost would be the limiting factor.  One 
participant explained community perception of such a mandatory requirement by saying, “The 
taxpayer certainly would not support it, building a structure that is going to sit on the beach – 
vacant – for the rest of my life!” Participants were curious how other TR communities felt about 
the proposed vertical evacuation requirements and if there were other activity options available.  
Ultimately, all participants agreed that they could support the recommendation for communities 
to have a vertical evacuation plan and identify vertical evacuation structures but they could not 
support requiring communities to build such structures.   
Topic: Evacuation effectiveness. Theme: Testing plan elements: New Hanover County 
participants only briefly discussed the concept of evacuation effectiveness, mostly focusing on 
the idea of drills or exercises.  All participants agreed that for a community to ensure the 
effectiveness of their evacuation plan, testing of that plan should occur – whether table-top or 
full-scale exercises.  Generally, those communities with a distant-tsunami threat should only be 
required to provide a plan and a table-top type exercise. 
Theme: Seasonality: Participants agreed that there is an appreciable influx of tourists in 
the warmer months to the beach, increasing the general population of the county.  This influx 
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would increase the number of people who would need to be provided with information and 
assisted with evacuation should there be a tsunami.   
 Topic: Proportion of the population to be protected. Themes: 100% of population 
unrealistic and 100% of at-risk population: Discussion regarding how a community could 
quantify the number of people requiring protection was focused on subpopulations requiring the 
most assistance with evacuation.  All participants adamantly agreed that there would be no way 
any community could guarantee 100% of the population would be safe in the event of a tsunami. 
Topic: Education.  Theme: Useful: As a community expecting only a distant tsunami 
hazard, New Hanover County participants acknowledged that the mandatory annual education 
requirements would not be necessary in their community.  Participants agreed that tsunami 
education provided in the school setting has been very beneficial for getting information 
dispersed to both children and parents.  Several participants highlighted the effectiveness of 
using videos (referencing YouTube) as an educational tool regarding tsunamis and youth.  
Emphasis was placed on the content of educational messages, like natural cues and 
recommended actions to take in case of a tsunami.  All participants were supportive of tailoring 
educational materials and messages to the local conditions and settings but agreed there should 
be some generally standardized terminology and language across the entire TR Community 
program.  A matrix depicting the New Hanover County, North Carolina discussion topics with 
their supporting and opposing themes can be seen below in Table 13. 
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Table 13:    
New Hanover County, North Carolina Discussion Topics with Supporting and Opposing Themes 
Major Topics Supporting Themes Opposing Themes 
Subdivision of communities by 
vulnerability 
 Prioritize local event for 
activities  
 Need education  
 Implementation questions  
 
Proportion of the population to 
be protected 
 100% of at-risk population  
 
 100% of population unrealistic  
 
Education of residents  Useful   
Education of businesses  Useful   
Evacuation effectiveness  Testing plan elements   Seasonality  
School evacuation drills or 
exercises 
 Useful  
 Necessary  
 
Vertical evacuation   Costs 
 Time & money  
 Limitations 
 Need education  
Guidelines document  NIMS formatting  
 
US Virgin Islands.  Eleven individuals were contacted to participate in the US Virgin 
Islands TR focus group discussion.  Of those invited, four individuals confirmed their 
participation.  Five expert community stakeholders attended and participated in the focus group 
discussion held in December 2013.  This provided a participation rate of 125%.   
Topic: Subdivision of communities by vulnerability.  Themes: Prioritizing local event for 
activities and need education: As participants in the US Virgin Islands are currently working 
towards an application for TR recognition, much of the discussion centered on definitions and 
the significant changes between the prior guidelines and the newly proposed guidelines. Several 
participants questioned where a regional tsunami hazard would fall within the new guidelines 
with adding to the required actions communities must take to earn recognition.  Generally, the 
participants agreed that all of the Caribbean would be determined to have a local tsunami hazard.  
This would require all communities to conform to the new guidelines specific to planning for a 
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local tsunami hazard, raising the concern that smaller communities would be restricted from 
engaging in the program due to limited resources.  Another significant concern was shared, 
questioning if US Virgin Island communities would be required to prepare separate plans 
(evacuation routes, signage, and education) for both the local and the distant tsunami hazard 
scenarios.  These concerns were raised by citing the current practices of planning for both local 
and distant events within the TR recognized communities of the Pacific Northwest.  Participants 
asked how other communities handled the dual-hazard distinction and discussed the utility of 
sharing information between communities that are currently seeking program recognition. 
Theme: Four standard actions: All participants accepted that communities should answer 
the questions posed in the four standard actions that would be required of all communities 
regardless of hazard status, but questioned the incentives for communities to engage in a 
program with such stringent program guidelines.  One participant stated, “There are a lot of 
requirements here, when you start reading them…there’s particular things here that could make it 
somewhat challenging…what’s reasonable and what is important for survival…?”  The largest 
concern participants shared was that the added, more stringent required actions (i.e. required 
construction of vertical evacuation structures) might “disinterest people from even attempting to 
make application.”   
Topic: Guidelines document.  Themes: NIMS formatting and definitions: Participants 
agreed that the updated format for the TR
 
Community program guidelines was useful.  There 
were no objections to the changes proposed, with several participants sharing their support for 
the shift to NIMS formatting.  One particular participant clarified the importance of the format 
shift, “…in fact that is what we are advocating and we are forcing all agencies or anybody in 
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emergency preparedness to abide by that one [NIMS]…not only is it a really good framework, 
but it’s also – it becomes a lot of money if you don’t do it.  It will cost you funding not to do it.” 
Topic: Evacuation.  As a community currently working towards achieving TR 
recognition, the US Virgin Islands participants explained that the greatest challenges for 
communities attempting to join the program are monetary.  There is a significant financial 
investment required to meet the current TR Community program guidelines – primarily 
administrative support, purchasing and placing appropriate signage, and procuring and 
reproducing accurate inundation and evacuation maps.  [Note: The comment regarding the costs 
associated with the purchase of TR Community program signage indicates a misunderstanding, 
as the TR Community program provides signs for free.  The only costs to the community are 
associated with placing those signs]. One significant concern is that with all the additional 
mandatory actions, the costs of participation may have increased enough to de-incentivize the 
program for many communities. 
 Topic: School evacuation drills or exercises. Themes: Useful and necessary: In 
discussing evacuation exercises, participants supported the proposed requirement for annual 
tsunami evacuation exercises for schools located in the inundation zone of communities 
determined to have a local tsunami hazard.  One participant described the situation of a local 
school which should be required to conduct a tsunami evacuation exercise, “…[high ground] is 
extremely close and the kids at those schools, what I would require of them is exercises...”  
Another participant acknowledged that some schools are already engaging in tsunami evacuation 
exercises but was unsure how often these exercises occur.   
Theme: School buy-in: Concern was shared regarding the requirement and whether the 
requirement would apply to both private and public schools.  Participants agreed that it would 
149 
 
not be a problem to engage public schools, but this requirement would be a big issue for the 
numerous private schools operating in the US Virgin Islands.  It was generally agreed that the 
local government would be unable to oblige any private schools to comply and would therefore 
lose their ability to earn TR recognition.    
 Topic: Vertical evacuation.  Theme: Costs: All participants agreed that the newly 
proposed requirement for communities to build vertical evacuation structures if no natural high 
or inland ground is available is very extreme.  Construction costs money and participants shared 
their concern for the ability of communities to afford such costs.  Additionally, participants 
believe that the process of building vertical evacuation structures will be lengthy and time-
consuming.  These additional complications will add to general resource costs (evacuation 
assessments, modeling, labor, bureaucracy, etc.) to the already monetarily expensive requirement 
of building vertical evacuation structures.  Participants shared that if the government provides 
funding to assist with this type of programmatic requirement, then the requirement would be 
acceptable. 
Topic: Evacuation effectiveness.  Themes: Signage, testing plan elements and evaluation: 
Participants agreed that community participation in placing evacuation signs and other planning 
elements contributes to overall community evacuation effectiveness.  Expanding on this, several 
participants acknowledged that there are always pieces and parts of plans that will have room for 
improvement.  As long as those improvements are made and plans are not left static, the 
community is continually increasing and improving the overall evacuation effectiveness.   
Theme: Communication flows: The final thoughts regarding evacuation effectiveness 
centered on the TR Community program guidelines themselves and terminology.  Participants all 
agreed that the language used in the guidelines document should be defined and consistent, 
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particularly concerning the various maps (hazard, hazard zone, evacuation, safe zone, inundation 
zone, etc.).    
 Topic: Proportion of the population to be protected. Themes: 100% of population 
unrealistic and 100% of at-risk population: Participants agreed that ensuring the safety of 100% 
of the community population would be impossible.  Participants generally agreed that each 
community should aim to secure as much of the population as possible, though priority should be 
given to the most at-risk populations. 
Topic: Education of businesses and residents.  Theme: Useful: Participants discussed the 
costs associated with mandatory annual training, education, and outreach to both businesses and 
residents located within the inundation zone.  The majority of participants agreed that general 
education, going out and giving talks, was acceptable for this requirement.  As long as these 
activities were identified in the community preparedness plan, they most likely could be funded 
through resources that are already available.  During the discussion, the question was raised as to 
how these required activities would be tracked and recorded.  Emphasis was made that the 
current guidelines only require that training be conducted, there is no identification of the 
number of people required to be trained.  A matrix depicting the US Virgin Islands discussion 
topics with their supporting and opposing themes can be seen below in Table 14. 
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Table 14:    
US Virgin Islands Discussion Topics with Supporting and Opposing Themes 
Major Topics Supporting Themes Opposing Themes 
Subdivision of communities by 
vulnerability 
 Four standard actions  
 Prioritize local event for 
activities  
 Need education  
 Implementation questions  
 
Proportion of the population to 
be protected 
 100% of at-risk population  
 
 100% of population unrealistic  
Education of residents  Useful   
Education of businesses  Useful   
Evacuation effectiveness 
 
 
 
 Communication flows  
 Signage  
 Testing plan elements  
 Evaluation  
 Signage  
School evacuation drills or 
exercises 
 Useful  
 Necessary  
 School buy-in (public & 
private)  
Vertical evacuation  
 
 Costs 
 Time & money  
Guidelines document  NIMS formatting  Definitions  
 
Integrated Summary 
Across all six study sites, 102 individuals were contacted for inclusion in this research 
study.  Forty-seven individuals confirmed their participation and attendance at one of the six 
scheduled focus group discussions.  This provided a participant confirmation rate of 46% for the 
study.  Fifty individuals attended the focus group discussions.  Five participants who were 
invited but did not confirm participation attended the focus group discussions, increasing the 
total number of discussion participants above the expected confirmation number.  This provided 
an overall focus group discussion participation rate of 106% for the study.  In reviewing the 
attendance records for each focus group discussion, there were two sites that had multiple 
individuals who did not confirm their participation attend the discussion.  These nonconfirmed 
attendants pushed the participation rate over 100%.  Overall results and findings for the focus 
group discussions have been broken down by major topic below.   
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Theoretical Framework and Group Participatory Process.  After introductions and 
preliminary ground-setting, each focus group discussion was initiated by asking all participants if 
they had the chance to review the proposed TR Community program guidelines document before 
attending the discussion.  The vast majority of participants acknowledged at least skimming or 
viewing the document after confirming their participation in the focus group.  Following this, all 
participants were asked if they discussed the proposed TR Community program guidelines with 
anyone before attending the discussion.  Out of the 50 discussion participants, only one 
acknowledged that he had very briefly discussed the proposed guidelines document with 
someone else prior to attending the focus group discussion.  These responses support the fidelity 
of the ELM peripheral route as a data collection method for individual-level perceptions and 
opinions of participants.  These responses also support the conclusion that most community-level 
emergency responders may have inadequate information regarding the program definitions and 
guidelines changes of the TR Community program to form personal opinions and perceptions. 
 The ELM theoretical framework process for the central route blended smoothly with 
CBPR group processes used to guide and structure the focus group discussions.  During all focus 
group sessions, participants actively engaged in the discussions deliberating both opinions and 
perceptions regarding the various topics proposed by the researcher.  High quality and active 
discussions are the gold standard for eliciting strong central route attitudes and perceptions from 
participants.  In combining CBPR tailored facilitation skills, reflective listening and consensus 
building methods; the researchers and participants fully engaged in collaborative colearning.  
Some of the identified topics elicited tension and more heated debate as participants became 
more comfortable and animated over the course of each discussion.  The most common “trigger” 
for all focus group discussions was the proposed revision regarding vertical evacuation.  All sites 
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and participants increased intensity and animation during the vertical evacuation discussions; 
discussing associated time and monetary costs as major barriers to this action.  Similarly, all sites 
became uncomfortably quiet and required additional probing by the researchers before engaging 
in discussions that only obliquely addressed the questions regarding the proportion of the 
population to be protected by evacuation planning.  Regardless of topic, participants were fully-
engaged and invested throughout the focus group discussion process.  It was also noted that after 
several focus group sessions various participants engaged in community relationship 
strengthening by exchanging business cards, or agreeing to follow up with each other regarding 
some point raised earlier in the discussion.  The use of both the ELM theoretical framework in 
conjunction with CBPR participatory group processes helped engage the expert panel 
participants and build connections with each other. 
All focus group discussions were well-received by participants, with keen interest in the 
outcome of the focus group discussions and any changes that might be effected with the TR 
Community program.  Several sites requested a copy of the report describing the findings of the 
research study.  The sharing of findings and further information was agreed upon, and all sites 
demonstrated clear investment in continued collaboration with the researchers and with the 
NWS.   
Subdivision of Communities by Vulnerability.  Participants at all sites agreed that 
population should not have anything to do with preparedness or readiness requirements 
associated with earning TR Community program recognition.  Participants from several sites 
shared negative perceptions associated with the population-based guidelines which may be 
summed up by one participant's quote, "The population thing probably left a bad taste in the 
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people's mouths because it made it seem as if the higher population areas would have higher 
casualty rates so they are more important than lower population communities."   
Discussion surrounding the newly proposed subdivision of the TR Community program 
guidelines by local tsunami hazard vulnerability was largely positive and well received across all 
sites.  Generally, participants agreed that those communities with a local tsunami hazard should 
be required to do more activities that are aimed at protecting human life.  Emphasis was made by 
participants from several sites that there was a need for additional actions and activities that 
result in protection of human life and the TR Community program should focus more strongly on 
preparing for local tsunami hazards.  Accordingly, participants from all sites also recognized that 
those communities with only a distant tsunami hazard do not need to meet as many requirements 
for earning program recognition.  Those requirements should be focused on preparing the 
community for the eventuality of a distant tsunami that generally includes more orderly 
evacuation, securing of ports and harbors, and other coastal zone infrastructure. 
It was noted by the researchers that while the subdivision between local and distant-
tsunami hazard vulnerability would be useful for most communities, there are still those 
communities that take longer to evacuate their population regardless of the time allowed with 
either hazard designation (local or distant tsunami hazard threat).  To overcome this limitation of 
the subdivisions, each participant community was asked to evaluate the utility of requiring all 
communities, regardless of tsunami hazard classification, to engage in four standard actions to 
provide protection to the people living within each community.  The four standard actions would 
include identifying and providing information regarding the following points: 1) the expected 
extent of inundation, 2) the time it would take the wave to arrive, 3) how many people are in the 
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inundation zone, and 4) the time needed to evacuate those people from the inundation zone 
(described hereafter as the “four standard actions”). 
Discussion of the recommended four standard actions was mixed between participants at 
all sites, with some participants supporting the addition of these actions to the guidelines while 
other participants were more reticent regarding their inclusion.  It was noted in all discussions 
that the second action, the time it would take the wave to arrive, would be different depending on 
each actual tsunami event.  It was generally agreed that the remaining three actions would most 
likely be achievable activities for communities seeking TR recognition.  Participants from a few 
sites shared concern about providing an answer to question three, explaining that because of 
seasonal tourism changes the number of people in the inundation zone will vary depending on 
the time of year.  Regardless of concerns, participants from all sites conceded that communities 
should be able to provide the details required by each of the proposed four standard actions. 
Participants from all study sites unanimously agreed that the proposed TR Community 
program guidelines format is much more useful and aligns well with current NIMS hazard 
mitigation and emergency planning templates.  Similarly, all participants agreed that this format 
is acceptable and preferred to the guidelines current format.  Though one significant concern 
raised by all sites was that with the additional mandatory actions, the costs of participation may 
have increased enough to deincentivize the TR Community program for many communities. 
Proportion of the Population to be Protected.  Of all the topics raised, asking 
participants to identify the proportion of their population that should be protected through the 
tsunami evacuation plan was the most challenging.  Across all sites, participants were hesitant to 
provide a direct number, choosing to explain the complexities of this issue instead.  Most sites 
identified transient or seasonal population fluctuations as the most significant challenge to this 
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question.  Depending on the site location and the time of year, the local population that would 
need to be provided with protection could increase by the thousands.   
Over the course of each discussion, participants from most sites would not provide a 
numeric proportion of the population to be protected.  Instead, participants from several sites 
admitted that the goal or aim of any community tsunami plan should be to save 100% of the 
community population.  While that is the ultimate aim, all communities agreed that saving 100% 
of the people would never be possible.  Emphasizing this point, participants from multiple 
communities highlighted that there is no mandatory evacuation law in place for any of the study 
sites and community members may choose to evacuate or not.  As the participants continued this 
discussion, participants from several sites homed in on the concept of protecting 100% of certain 
populations within the community.  Participants from most sites agreed that it would be possible, 
and necessary, to ensure as close to 100% protection as possible to subpopulations most at-risk to 
a tsunami (schools, care facilities, or other special needs populations located within an 
inundation zone).   
Participants from two of the study communities expanded the conversation by discussing 
the evaluation of evacuation plans over time.  One participant summed this concept up saying, “I 
would want to start with a baseline and say ok, this is what we have for evacuation potential right 
now.  If we do these other things or if we keep working on this we can up that percentage.”  
Participants from both of these communities agreed that monitoring and evaluating the plans as 
additional actions would allow expert community stakeholders to better quantify the numbers of 
people they could protect and describe the improved quality of the evacuation plan.   
Evacuation Effectiveness.  Participants agreed that an effective evacuation strategy for 
any community seeking TR recognition would involve many different actions or activities, with 
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continual evaluation and evolution over time.  Participants at multiple sites felt that the 
recommended four standard actions (described by some participants as a “formula”) could be a 
potential metric for determining the effectiveness of a community evacuation plan or strategy.  
Another component of an effective evacuation strategy identified by participants was a well-
defined communications plan.  This communications plan would include details for the 
emergency managers receiving, understanding, and taking actions based on official NWS 
communications, and the dissemination of those messages to the general public.  Participants felt 
it was important for emergency managers to have a plan in place for the receipt of an emergency 
notification and the actions to be taken based on that message.  Once a notification is received 
and emergency managers move into actions based on message content, a plan must be in place 
describing how to notify and work with the public.  Distribution of that emergency message to 
the public should include consistent language and directions, and should be provided through 
multiple modes and sources. 
Another component of an effective evacuation strategy identified by participants was 
testing the plan or strategy for effectiveness.  While all communities agreed that a full-scale, 
community-wide test of all elements of a tsunami evacuation plan would be unrealistic or 
impossible; testing the various components of the plan would be possible and highly 
recommended.  For example, emergency sirens should be (and in most study sites are) tested 
regularly throughout the year.  Participants also agreed that table-top exercises or full-scale drills 
of smaller populations (for example, school populations) would also be useful for testing 
evacuation plans.  Regardless of the component being tested, participants from one site 
highlighted the need to evaluate the test for effectiveness and the need to identify areas needing 
improvement. 
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Evacuation Drills and Exercises.  Two of the states represented in this research (Oregon 
and Hawaii) currently have state legislation requiring mandatory annual school tsunami 
evacuation exercises for schools located within an inundation zone.  Participants from both of 
these communities shared their experiences conducting school evacuation drills, and emphasized 
its importance.  Participants from the other sites, without current legislation, agreed that those 
communities designated as having a local tsunami hazard should be required to conduct similar 
school evacuations annually for those schools located within the inundation zone.  Additionally, 
participants from all sites also agreed that for those schools located within the inundation zone of 
a distant tsunami hazard community should also be required to have at minimum a plan in place.  
Drills or exercises of that plan could then be recommended but not required.   
The only caveat raised during the discussion of mandatory school evacuation exercises 
was whether this requirement would be mandated for all schools – both public and private.  One 
site in particular has several private schools.  It was discussed that private schools are run in the 
same manner as private businesses; the local government cannot dictate how a private entity is 
run.  The participants at this site shared their concern in achieving TR recognition status when 
they would be unable to ensure private school participation saying, “…we cannot ‘require’ them 
to do that.  It is totally out of our hands, so you can’t put ‘requirements’ that we really can’t 
complete.” 
Participants from several sites also discussed the possibility of requiring other care 
facilities located within an inundation zone to conduct annual evacuation exercises.  The care 
facilities discussed ranged from preschools, to hospitals and federal or state agency offices.  
Participants from the majority of sites agreed, that each of these different agencies or businesses 
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should have a plan in place and conduct some type of drill or exercise (table-top, full-scale drill, 
etc.) every 3 years.   
Vertical Evacuation.  As of the completion of data collection, only one study site 
(Coronado) currently uses a vertical evacuation strategy.  Participants from all sites agreed that 
requiring communities to identify natural high or inland ground for people to use for self-
evacuation was a good practice.  Participants at all sites also agreed that recommending those 
communities without natural high or inland ground to build vertical evacuation structures would 
be acceptable.  While the recommendation would be acceptable, participants at all sites agreed 
that requiring a community to build a structure would be unrealistic and poorly received.  
Participants from several sites shared concerns regarding the costs associated with both the 
research process of identifying appropriate sites for vertical evacuation structures and the 
expenses of building such structures.  The majority of study sites also described zoning 
regulations prohibiting the construction of buildings above a certain height in many of the 
communities located along the coastline.  Regardless of study site location, all participants 
emphasized the barriers a requirement of building vertical evacuation structures would pose to 
many communities seeking TR recognition.  Participants from several sites shared the belief that 
many communities would choose not to engage in the TR Community program if such a 
requirement were added.   
Participants from two communities shared the opinion that the proposed guidelines were 
missing a “step” within the Mitigation section.  Participants from both of these communities 
agreed that emergency managers should prioritize funding and resources to evaluate, clear, 
“harden” or strengthen evacuation routes before spending money building vertical evacuation 
structures.  During both of these discussions, participants agreed that using municipal resources 
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to ensure safe and effective evacuation routes would be better received by communities and be 
more cost effective than building new structures.  Participants from several sites also emphasized 
the importance of education and outreach as a more useful means of preparing community 
members for a potential tsunami.    
Participants from several sites shared their own consideration of vertical evacuation and 
their major concerns.  Three major reasons cited for abandoning the inclusion of a vertical 
evacuation strategy in some community’s included:  
1) the queuing of people trying to get into a building during the panic of an actual event 
that would delay or eliminate a person’s ability to reach safe refuge from the tsunami,  
2) buildings being overrun by more people than they were created to accommodate, and  
3) the false sense of security people are given by being told to use a man-made structure 
that is not guaranteed to withstand both the tsunami and the tsunami-generating event 
(i.e. earthquake).    
Regardless of when a building or structure was built, participants were concerned that the 
building would need to be continually assessed and evaluated to ensure it would remain stable 
and safe for use during a tsunami.  While participants from study communities were largely 
against a vertical evacuation requirement, when pressed by the researchers the majority did 
acknowledge that a community that was unable to provide safe evacuation refuge for its 
population should not receive TR recognition.  One participant responded to this 
acknowledgement by stating, “…any requirement would have to come combined with 
commensurate resources to meet the requirement.  You can’t say [a community] is required to 
build a $50 million structure and then say; now you have to pay for it.” 
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Education.  All participants were asked to consider two newly proposed actions 
requiring training, education, or outreach to both residents and high occupancy or high volume 
businesses located within the tsunami hazard zone of a local-tsunami hazard designated 
community.  The majority of participants agreed that outreach education of any kind is highly 
valuable in any community at-risk to tsunamis.  Education is extremely important in 
communities that experience high transient or seasonal populations.  Participants from all sites 
agreed that providing education to the entire community (residents, businesses, all branches of 
government, etc.) is one of the most useful actions a community can take to increase tsunami 
preparedness.  However, participants at study sites also agreed that outreach education can also 
be quite expensive both in terms of money and time.  These costs were emphasized when 
discussing the requirement to provide annual training to part-time residents in communities 
where homes are often second homes and emergency mangers have no way of knowing when the 
owner will be in residence for educational offerings.  Participants from several sites shared 
concern for planning and implementing activities that would be wasted on few residents.   
When discussion focused on providing mandatory training, education, or outreach to 
business owners and staff of high occupancy or high volume businesses located within a tsunami 
hazard zone, participants voiced additional concerns.  Participants from several sites felt that 
local emergency management would be hard-pressed to get buy-in from the business community 
because of the costs associated with providing annual training to staff.  The majority of 
participants expressed frustration in working with various hotels and businesses because to date, 
very few have been willing to post or share tsunami preparedness information to guests, visitors, 
or patrons.  Participants from several study sites also highlighted the need to educate businesses 
and residents of the entire community, not just those located within an inundation zone.      
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Conversely, Kauai participants shared that they currently work very closely with the hotel 
associations and the security guard organizations including every hotel within the community to 
ensure that each hotel has an emergency plan in place.  Supporting this viewpoint, the Seaside 
community is currently working on creating their own “Business Ready” program modeled after 
the TR Community program.  This community recognizes the important role businesses play in 
providing education and guidance to tourists and transient populations visiting the community.  
By engaging the business community in a recognition program, it is hoped that these businesses 
will become interested in the program and become more engaged in tsunami preparedness. 
Participants from all sites agreed that regardless of any other outreach or education, 
communities should always include education at the local schools.  One participant summed up 
this perception by saying, “Basic fire safety is a generational thing, you have to keep doing it – 
any safety education – and this [tsunami education] is no different.  It doesn’t stop.”  Several 
sites agreed that one key to building community awareness and preparedness was to continue 
educating the children.  It was also emphasized that educating the children in distant tsunami 
hazard communities is also important.  Participants shared that in a distant tsunami hazard 
community, it was also important not to overwhelm people with too much information.  These 
same participants put emphasis on combining tsunami education with other educational events 
using YouTube© clips to teach natural cues, what to look for, and evacuation. 
A final integrated matrix depicting the focus group discussion topics with their 
supporting and opposing themes (described in the narrative above) can be seen below in Table 
15. 
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Table 15:  
Integrated Matrix Depicting Discussion Topics with Supporting and Opposing Themes 
Discussion Topics Supporting Themes Opposing Themes 
Subdivision of communities by 
vulnerability 
 Four standard actions (4) 
 Prioritize local event (6) 
 Need education (4) 
 Implementation questions (4) 
Proportion of the population to 
be protected 
 100% of at-risk population  (6)  100% of population unrealistic (6) 
 No mandatory evacuation laws (2) 
Education of residents  Useful (6) 
 Necessary (2)  
 Seasonality (3) 
 
Education of businesses  Useful (6) 
 Necessary (3)  
 Perceived lack of cooperation (2) 
 
Evacuation effectiveness 
 
 
 
 Communication flows (4) 
 Signage (2) 
 Testing plan elements (5) 
 Four standard actions (2) 
 Evaluation (4) 
 Full-scale test unrealistic (1) 
 Signage (2) 
 Seasonality (5)  
 
School evacuation drills or 
exercises 
 Useful (6) 
 Necessary (5) 
 Private school buy-in (1) 
Vertical evacuation  Protection of human life (3) 
 
 Missing a “step” or action  
 Secure & clear evacuation 
routes first (2) 
 Costs (6) 
 Time & money (6) 
 Zoning laws (2) 
 Limitations 
 Need education (3) 
 False sense of security (2) 
Guidelines document  Checklist (2) 
 NIMS formatting (6) 
 Definitions (3) 
The number in parentheses indicates the number of study sites discussing a particular theme 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this research was to evaluate the acceptability and usefulness of key 
components within a revised set of draft national guidelines for the TR Community program.  
The key components of the revised guidelines included: 1) perceptions of effective evacuation 
strategies, 2) perceptions of required evacuation strategies; specifically vertical evacuation, and 
3) perceptions of defining a proportion of population requiring protection through evacuation 
planning for inclusion in the TR Community program guidelines.  Analysis of prediscussion 
surveys and focus group discussions concentrated on a total of eight discussion topics.  The five 
main or overarching topics included: subdivision of communities by vulnerability, proportion of 
the population to be protected, education, evacuation, and the guidelines document format.  
Within evacuation, three subtopics were discussed: evacuation effectiveness, evacuation drills or 
exercises and vertical evacuation.  Within education, two additional subtopics were also 
discussed: education of businesses and education of residents.  A discussion of the evaluation 
process, findings, and the TR Community program guidelines recommendations are also 
discussed below.  Several of the recommendations in this discussion are reinforcing or 
supporting prior recommendations to the NWS.  In cases where these findings support prior 
recommendations, the author indicates that the recommendation should be “maintained” by the 
NWS.   
The Evaluation (Aim 4) 
 Participatory research strategies, involving various forms and methods of CBPR are 
increasingly being applied to emergency preparedness research (Gershon, Rubin, Qureshi, 
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Canton, & Matzner, 2008; Nepal, Banerjee, Perry, & Scott, 2012; Pelling, 2007).  This 
evaluation of the TR Community Program guidelines applied the ELM (Bitner  & Obermiller, 
1985; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979), in conjunction with CBPR participatory group processes 
working directly with panels of expert community stakeholders.  Using this theory and these 
CBPR methods allowed for use of two different qualitative data collection methods in 
conducting this evaluation research study.  Prediscussion surveys explored individual participant 
beliefs formed through observations and personal experiences using the peripheral route of the 
ELM; focus group discussions explored participant beliefs formed through discussion, debate 
and colearning among participants using the central route of the ELM (Bitner  & Obermiller, 
1985; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979).   
When comparing the survey response rate to the focus group participation rate, it may be 
hypothesized that the sampled expert community stakeholders may be invested in tsunami 
preparedness activities (a higher participation rate for the focus group discussions) but are busy 
individuals with time commitments to other projects and programs (a lower response rate for the 
surveys).  This hypothesis is supported by the highly engaged and active interaction between 
participants recorded at each focus group discussion compared with the minimalistic response 
depth found in the survey.  Additionally, there were five emergency mangers who did not 
confirm their participation in a focus group discussion, but attended a discussion anyway.  While 
the participants were clearly invested in the face-to-face interaction and immediate feedback 
cultivated during focus group discussions, they appeared to have less time to devote to reading a 
lengthy proposed guidelines document coupled with completing a short-answer survey 
 As we expected, data collected from participants in the prediscussion survey support the 
recognition that people are confused by or misunderstand some terms and definitions used in the 
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TR Community program guidelines.  Specifically, participants were most concerned with the 
proposed subdivision of the guidelines by community vulnerability to tsunami hazards with 
significant confusion regarding the definition of hazard classification.  Building on this concern, 
participants were unsure how the proposed guideline changes would be implemented and used 
within a local community setting.  Regardless of community hazard category, all participants 
questioned how the proposed changes would impact their own individual community.  
Prediscussion survey data allowed participants to share personal opinions and concerns without 
formally discussing or analyzing the proposed changes with other participants (Bitner  & 
Obermiller, 1985; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979).  These data provided researchers with useful 
opinion and perception information that helped to tailor each focus group discussion to the 
individual study site.  Researchers were able to spend more time explaining important 
background information regarding the definitions and terms being used as well as the proposed 
changes to the guidelines. 
The focus group discussions collected data using discussion, debate, and colearning 
between participants and researchers (Bitner  & Obermiller, 1985; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; 
Wood, 2000).  This collaborative interaction was informed by the prediscussion survey data and 
helped participants to better conceptualize and understand the proposed guideline changes.  
Participants were able to problem-solve with each other, and the researchers, to identify possible 
responses to individual concerns or questions.  Across study sites, the focus group discussions 
highlighted many of the preconceived notions and beliefs identified in the prediscussion surveys.  
This demonstrated the importance of discussion and group colearning for the sharing of 
information to refine and expand personal perceptions and opinions (Bitner  & Obermiller, 1985; 
Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Wood, 2000) regarding the TR Community program guidelines.  
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Dynamic group processes were observed as participants naturally engaged in discussing 
identified topics while also allowing researchers to facilitate specific inquiries within the 
discussion.   
Finally, participants from all sites were asked to discuss their knowledge of other 
communities engaging in specific tsunami hazard preparedness and mitigation activities 
(specifically, vertical evacuation).  The majority of participants admitted to having no knowledge 
of other communities and their activities, participants from all sites admitted to being very 
interested in learning more about those other communities.  Participants from two sites continued 
this discussion by asking specific questions regarding how other communities handled specific 
actions required for TR recognition.  Regardless of prior knowledge or connection to other 
communities engaged in the TR Community program, all participants agreed it would be very 
interesting and potentially useful to learn more about other community experiences with 
preparing for a tsunami hazard.  This participant interest supports the original research team’s 
prior recommendation made to the NWS advising the “transfer best practices and identification 
model communities to share experiences” across TR recognized and nonrecognized 
communities.  Using this current set of findings combined with the prior recommendation opens 
the door for the NWS to create a networking and communications forum that could be used to 
share best practices, challenges, and successes between communities engaged in tsunami 
preparedness and the TR Community program; similar to the CERT forum created by FEMA 
(FEMA, 2013).  This forum would also allow communities to brainstorm and problem solve 
together so that no single community is “reinventing the wheel” as they work through the 
recognition process with the NWS.   
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Recommendation: 
1) The NWS should establish a networking and communications forum for communities 
that have either earned or are seeking TR recognition status.   
TsunamiReady
TM
 Program (Aim 4) 
 Research describes three critical components of community emergency preparedness for 
natural disasters: planning, training, and written plans (Perry & Lindell, 2003).  The TR 
Community program guidelines help provide structure for communities to combine these three 
components into a community preparation process for a tsunami hazard.  The revised format of 
the proposed guidelines used for this research maintained the NTHMP and original research 
team’s recommended format with program activities identified by mitigation, preparedness, 
response, or recovery categories; rather than using the current NWS guidelines categories of 
communications and coordination, tsunami warning reception, local warning dissemination, 
community preparedness, and administration.  The recommended categories follow the FEMA 
NIMS formatting and standardize the tsunami preparedness process (planning, creating a written 
plan, and providing training or education) with the national all-hazards approach to emergency 
preparedness and response (FEMA, 2011).  All study sites discussed the importance and utility 
of using this specific formatting for individuals who also work with and plan for various other 
community hazards.  With unanimous support and approval for the proposed format, expert 
community stakeholders are invested in emergency preparedness programs and activities that 
build on NIMS infrastructure. 
 Recommendations:   
169 
 
1) NWS should maintain the recommended NIMS format used in the current revised TR 
Community program guidelines.   
2) NWS should maintain the recommended checklist of required activities so that 
communities can track their progress towards recognition.  These checklists may also be 
used to streamline reporting of community information to the NWS. 
Subdivision of Communities by Vulnerability (Aim 1, Aim 4) 
 The greatest amount of time during each focus group discussion was devoted to 
increasing participant understanding and discussing the proposed subdivision of the TR 
Community program guidelines by community tsunami hazard vulnerability.  The definition of 
terms used to describe the subdivision of tsunami hazard have not been widely used outside of 
the academic sphere and have some overlap between researchers and the NTHMP.  This overlap 
of terms, particularly regarding the wave-arrival times used to define the tsunami, can create 
confusion and disagreement when emergency managers apply the definitions in the field.  For 
the purposes of both this research, and in revising the TR Community program guidelines for the 
NWS, the definitions published by the NTHMP were used:   
Definitions:  
 Local (near-field) tsunami– wave arrives 30 minutes or less after it is generated 
(e.g. earthquake or landslide)   
 Regional tsunami – wave arrives between 30 minutes – 2 hours after a generation 
event  
 Distant (far-field) tsunami– wave arrives several hours after it is generated  
  (NTHMP, 2013)  
 Regardless of hazard classification (high, intermediate, or low) all communities discussed 
the proposed subdivision of guidelines and the recommendation of an NWS appointed panel of 
tsunami experts to assess community vulnerability.  Consistent with current research and 
literature (National Academy of Sciences, 2011; Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, 
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2012), participants from all sites agreed that the greatest hazard to human life is posed by a local 
tsunami.  If a community is identified as being at risk for a local tsunami, the planning and 
preparation activities should focus on protecting the people at risk.  Participants agreed with this 
priority, and granted that the TR Community program guidelines should be subdivided in a way 
that provided more rigorous requirements for communities with a local tsunami hazard 
distinction.  Participants also supported not mandating those communities with only a distant 
tsunami hazard to complete the more rigorous requirements.   
Additionally, to ensure standard implementation practices in determining community 
vulnerability, all sites supported the use of an NWS appointed panel of tsunami experts.  The 
panel would determine which Pacific, Caribbean and Atlantic Ocean state and territory coastal 
regions are vulnerable to local tsunamis and which are not. This committee would also clarify 
which tsunami trigger mechanisms (e.g. landslides, earthquakes, etc.) would be used for making 
the determination about community vulnerability to local versus distant tsunamis.  The expert 
panel would identify possible tsunami scenarios for a community, but focus on plausible hazards 
that communities could readily use for planning and mitigation efforts.   
 Recommendations:  
1) NWS should appoint an unbiased panel of tsunami experts who can assess and identify 
local tsunami hazard for communities seeking TsunamiReady
 TM
 recognition. 
2) NWS should maintain the recommended subdivision of the TR Community program 
guidelines by community vulnerability to a tsunami hazard. 
Proportion of the Population to be Protected (Aim 3, Aim 4) 
Throughout all discussions of hazard vulnerability and population to be protected through 
tsunami planning, participants from all communities also commented on the inclusion of 
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additional standard actions for any community seeking TR recognition.  Recognizing that 
community evacuation is dependent on local conditions and factors, communities largely 
supported the inclusion of additional mitigation activities that would improve tsunami mitigation 
efforts for at-risk populations within communities.  Expanding on the current governmental 
literature describing the local tsunami hazard to human life (National Academy of Sciences, 
2011; Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, 2012) and focusing on providing 
protection to those most at-risk populations, these added activities provide communities with 
focused at-risk population and evacuation information to use for tsunami planning (identifying 
at-risk populations within the inundation zone and assessing and estimating evacuation times for 
the at-risk populations within the inundation zone).  Regardless of tsunami hazard classification, 
these additional activities will improve tsunami preparedness for communities with any tsunami 
hazard vulnerability and increase the chance of protecting human life. 
 Recommendation: 
1) NWS should include the two recommended Mitigation activities in the TR Community 
program guidelines:  identifying at-risk populations within the inundation zone and 
assessing and estimating evacuation times for the at-risk populations within the 
inundation zone. 
Evacuation Effectiveness (Aim 2a, Aim 4) 
 Regardless of tsunami hazard classification, all participant communities supported the 
current emergency preparedness literature by agreeing that an effective evacuation strategy for 
any community seeking TR recognition would involve many different actions or activities, with 
continual evaluation and evolution over time (Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, & Paton, 2012).  This 
collaborative and iterative process is not only preparing a plan of action during an emergency, it 
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is building relationships and capacity within a community which helps strengthen a community’s 
overall resiliency (Paton, 2005; Sinclair et al., 2012).  Participants from several sites expanded 
on this concept by describing the various components of an effective evacuation strategy or plan 
and the collaborative nature necessary for emergency services within a community.   
 Participants discussed potential metrics, or scales, for testing the effectiveness of a 
community’s tsunami evacuation plan.  These participants highlighted the utility of the “four 
standard actions” recommended by the research team.  As participants returned to those 
recommended actions, some of the focus group discussions emphasized how communities may 
accept the inclusion of these actions as mandatory for all communities seeking TR recognition. 
 Recommendations: 
1) NWS should encourage TR recognized communities to share best practices, challenges, 
and successes regarding evacuation and plan effectiveness through the recommended 
networking and communications platform or forum.   
2) NWS should research and examine the potential for using the results of the two new 
Mitigation activities in the TR Community program guidelines mentioned under the 
Proportion of the Population to be Protected section above as potential performance 
standards for TR recognition and renewal of recognition.  
Evacuation Drills and Exercises (Aim 2a, Aim 4). Schools across the US are known to 
engage in certain state-specific emergency preparedness drills and exercises for both natural and 
human-caused emergencies.  While the societal demands to better protect US schools and 
children have increased significantly over the last few years, scant research on emergency 
preparedness is available specific to schools (Kano & Bourque, 2008).  Currently, only three 
states within the US are known by the researcher to have state mandates requiring schools 
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located within a tsunami inundation zone to practice tsunami evacuation drills annually: Oregon, 
Washington, and Hawaii (Dengler, 2005; Hawaii, focus group discussion, November 8, 2013).  
Both of the study communities (Oregon and Hawaii) with current state mandates supported 
current literature describing the efficacy of school tsunami evacuations by emphasizing the 
importance of their evacuation education and drilling exercises within schools as a means of 
preparing their communities for a tsunami event (Dengler, 2005; Ramirez, Kubicek, Peek-Asa, & 
Wong, 2009).   Expert community stakeholders from both of these communities highlighted the 
utility of educating and drilling students as a gateway to reach the parents and wider-community.   
The remaining four study sites (Alaska, California, North Carolina, US Virgin Islands) do 
not currently have any state or territory mandates requiring schools located within a tsunami 
inundation zone to engage in tsunami evacuation drills or exercises.  Despite this lack of formal, 
state-level guidance, all study participants recognized the significant role tsunami education and 
evacuation drills or exercises play in saving lives should a tsunami event occur.  Participants in 
several communities also discussed the American Samoa tsunami event in 2009 as a good 
example of the efficacy of tsunami education and evacuation drilling in saving human lives 
(Choudhary et al., 2012; Fritz et al., 2011; Leong-Nowell et al., 2012).  It is clear from each 
study site that expert community stakeholders recognize the benefits and are motivated to 
include school evacuation drills and exercies in their tsunami preparedness plans.  
All study sites expanded their discussion regarding tsunami education and evacuation 
exercises beyond only those communities with a local tsunami hazard.  As participants discussed 
schools and preparing students for a potential tsunami, most sites acknowledged that any school 
located within a tsunami inundation zone should be required to have a tsunami preparedness plan 
in place.  This plan could be modified and adapted to the specific tsunami threat of a given 
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community and school based on other emergency preparedness plans that may already be in 
place for that school.  The benefits of engaging in this risk reduction and plannimg activity 
would increase overall emergency preparedness for both the schools and the students (O'Brien & 
Mileti, 2003).   
One concern raised by a study site questioned the enforcability of this requirement for 
private schools operating within the inundation zone of a community with a local tsunami 
hazard.  Due to the nature of a privately run entity, the participants were unsure how the local 
government would be able to require an annual school evacuation drill.  The implementation of 
this requirement might be greatly facilitated through the recommended TR networking and 
communications platform or forum hosted or sponsored by the NWS.  Communities could use 
this platform or forum to share best practices and help troubleshoot community-specific issues 
like the public versus private school concern. 
Recommendations: 
1) NWS should maintain the recommended Preparedness activity requiring all communities 
with a local tsunami hazard to conduct annual tsunami evacuation drills with schools 
located within the inundation zone. 
2) NWS should consider including a Preparedness activity requiring all communities with a 
distant tsunami hazard to have a tsunami evacuation plan in place for schools located 
within the inundation zone as a topic to explore in future TR Community program 
research.   
Vertical Evacuation (Aim 2b, Aim 4).  While vertical evacuation is an acceptable 
practice in Japan (Fraser et al., 2012) and is being considered in other localities at-risk to tsunami 
("Project Safe Haven," 2011), many expert community stakeholders  and communities within the 
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US remain under-educated regarding vertical evacuation.  Most participants in this research had 
little or no knowledge of other US communities using or considering vertical evacuation but 
were very interested in learning from other community experiences.  While only one study site 
currently uses and educates community members to use a vertical evacuation strategy, some 
expert community stakeholders  admitted to considering and rejecting its use in local tsunami 
planning efforts.   
Participants at two sites specifically discussed the addition of a new Mitigation activity, 
which was recommended to be placed before the required action of planning for vertical 
evacuation.  These participants agreed that communities should first dedicate resources to 
evaluating evacuation routes for reliability and strengthening or “hardening” those routes as 
indicated by the evaluation.  These sites both recommended that once evacuation routes have 
been evaluated, upgraded, and strengthened; only then should communities begin looking at 
vertical evacuation strategies and building structures.  Discussion from all sites, including the 
site currently operating with a vertical evacuation strategy, agreed that the TR Community 
program guidelines should include the construction of vertical evacuation structures as an 
additional option or recommended activity.  As discussed by the various focus groups, this 
activity would be placed in the “Optional mitigation efforts” section of the guidelines instead of 
its current location in the proposed guidelines as the final required Mitigation activity.  Building 
on this discussion, no participants agreed, or was comfortable with the idea of making this action 
required or mandated by the guidelines (as it currently is by the proposed guidelines).  One 
particular participant quote sums up the general opinion from all study sites, "I can see a 
recommendation, but I can't see a requirement to build anything."   
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 When pressed to discuss the ability of a tsunami evacuation plan to protect the lives of 
the people living within a community, participants recognized that certain proposed actions, like 
vertical evacuation planning and building, would be very beneficial to all communities.  All 
participants recognized that the goal of any hazard planning and mitigation effort is to save as 
many of the people at risk as possible.  However, participants were very hesitant to support 
requiring the construction of vertical evacuation structures due to the significant monetary and 
time costs they perceived as being associated with completing the construction process.  When 
compelled to give a yes or no answer, the majority of participants acknowledged that 
communities should not be recognized as TR if they were unable to meet these requirements and 
provide a safe evacuation site for their residents, seasonal workers, and visitors. 
With multiple participants concerned with the research, engineering, and building costs 
associated with vertical evacuation structures, consideration should be given to expanding the 
FEMA P-646 guidance document (Applied Technology Council, 2012) to include a discussion 
on costs and funding.  The Safe Haven Project documents could potentially be used as a 
community-level case study for this discussion ("Project Safe Haven," 2011).  With this 
additional information, the FEMA P-646 could then be shared with all interested communities as 
a more comprehensive educational tool for alternative evacuation methods for tsunami.  The 
FEMA P-646 document itself could be used as an ELM peripheral route tool for expert 
community stakeholders and other emergency managers.  Providing detailed information that 
individuals and communities could use to help form personal perceptions of vertical evacuation, 
the FEMA P-646 document could be geared to educate and inform emergency services. 
Discussions and peer collaboration or problem-solving (activating the ELM central route 
of attitude and perception formation) regarding both the FEMA P-646 guidance document and 
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community experiences or perceptions of vertical evacuation strategies could also be facilitated 
through the recommended TR networking and communications forum to be created by the NWS.  
Communities could use this forum to strengthen the national tsunami emergency preparedness 
community and potentially generate innovative solutions to the concerns expressed by all study 
participants.  When discussion was encouraged regarding the Pacific County Safe Haven Project 
("Project Safe Haven," 2011), participants were interested in learning more about the project and 
the current status on funding.  The recommended communications forum could provide an 
avenue for sharing the Project Safe Haven experience and encourage other communities to build 
on the potential successes of the programs. 
 Recommendation: 
1) NWS should include the recommended Mitigation activity to evaluate evacuation routes 
for reliability and strengthen or upgrade as needed per the evaluation.  
2) NWS should maintain the recommended Mitigation activity requiring all communities 
with a local tsunami hazard to have a plan for vertical evacuation where it has been 
established that at-risk populations would be unable to reach natural high or inland 
ground before the tsunami wave arrival.  It should be clearly explained that this activity 
will require multiple actions and stages, so communities would be expected to track their 
progress throughout the course of implementation to both earn and maintain TR 
recognition. 
3) NWS should encourage TR participant communities to share best practices, challenges, 
and successes regarding vertical evacuation planning and construction processes through 
the recommended networking and communications platform or forum.   
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Education (Aim 2a, Aim 4) 
When asked to discuss the proposed Preparedness actions requiring communities with a 
local tsunami hazard to conduct annual education, training, or outreach activities for both 
residents and business staff located within a tsunami hazard zone, all participants agreed that 
tsunami education was a vital element in preparing for the eventuality of a tsunami.  Supporting 
evidence from current literature, participants from two sites specifically mentioned the American 
Samoa tsunami, and the importance of the tsunami emergency preparedness education in the 
protection of human lives (Choudhary et al., 2012; Fritz et al., 2011; Leong-Nowell et al., 2012).  
While not all participants supported making these actions mandatory, participants from all 
communities agreed that these types of outreach and training activities were important.   
Ongoing research in Coastal Washington by Johnston et al. (2007) has focused on 
tsunami education specifically for tourism businesses and associations.  After conducting a 
baseline assessment of tsunami preparedness education among local high occupancy businesses 
in a Washington community, Johnston et al. (2007) recommend collaborative training needs 
analyses and training cooporatives between local businesses.  Taking another twist on the 
concept of Johnston’s research, one of the study sites is currently in the process of creating their 
own “Business Ready” program, modeled after the TsunamiReadyTM program and aimed 
specifically at local businesses in a local tsunami vulnerable community.    This initiative 
demonstrates both creativity and dedication to changing the perception of tsunami perparedness 
in the business community.  This new “Business Ready” program changes the process of 
outreach and makes the businesses vital participants in providing training, education, and 
outreach.  The businesses themselves become change agents within the community and earn 
investment in their own recognition program.  While monetary costs were a significant concern 
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shared by all participant communities, current literature demonstrates the efficacy of such 
training and education programs (Choudhary et al., 2012; Fritz et al., 2011; Leong-Nowell et al., 
2012; Johnston et al. 2007).  By soliciting the investment of the businesses operating in a 
community vulnerable to tsunami hazards, expert community stakeholders widen their sphere of 
influence and begin to share responsibility within the greater community.  This type of inovative 
program, successes and challenges, should be shared with other communities that are also 
seeking new ways of engaging businesses in tsunami preparedness.   
As the guidelines are currently written, communities may start with smaller activities for 
the annual training, education, or outreach requirements and grow their tsunami education 
program over time through continued risk reduction planning (O'Brien & Mileti, 2003).  These 
smaller activities would work well to activate ELM peripheral route perceptions and attitudes by 
providing detailed definitions and concepts associated with community tsunami emergency 
preparedness messages.  With long-term preparedness planning and community or business 
engagement, expert community stakeholders can work with available funding to ensure outreach 
coverage of all businesses and residents within the tsunami hazard zone over a set period of time 
and track that training for the NWS.  These longer-term preparedness efforts could be used to 
activate ELM central route perceptions and attitudes by including a tsunami preparedness booth 
at community faires and events or holding community meetings.  These face-to-face encounters 
would allow expert community stakeholders to facilitate discussions that would help community 
members really develop their understanding of the hazard and their perception of necessary 
preparedness activities. 
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Recommendations:   
1) NWS should maintain the recommended Preparedness activity requiring all communities 
with a local tsunami hazard to conduct annual training, outreach, or education for 
businesses located within a tsunami hazard zone. 
2) NWS should maintain the recommended Preparedness activity requiring all communities 
with a local tsunami hazard to conduct annual training, outreach, or education for 
residents living within a tsunami hazard zone. 
Limitations 
Limitations to this research include those related to the use of qualitative data; primarily, 
the sample size is small with a limited number of participants and study sites.  Despite the small 
sample size, this is the largest collection of tsunami-related preparedness focus group studies 
every conducted within the US.  Additionally, a purposive or criterion-based sampling technique 
was used instead of random sampling to ensure a variety of emergency management perspectives 
within each community.  Study communities were not randomly selected, but rather chosen 
specifically to represent a range of tsunami hazard levels from low to medium to high as a means 
of improving research understanding of communities across all hazard levels.   
Another potential limitation to this research was the respondent burden associated with 
completing the prediscussion survey.  Participants were asked to review the proposed revised TR
 
Community program guidelines, which is a multipage document and a checklist.  After 
reviewing this document, participants were then asked seven questions regarding their opinions 
of the revised guidelines.  For already busy expert community stakeholders , the time required to 
both review the document and respond to the questions may have been asking too much, which 
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is most likely demonstrated through the low overall response rate (43%) for the prediscussion 
survey. 
Finally, the removal of two original study sites due to monetary restrictions for data 
collection added another limitation to this research evaluation.  Ideally, all eight of the original 
study sites would have been included in the second wave of focus group discussions and data 
collection.  In removing two sites, longitudinal community feedback and data regarding the TR 
Community program guidelines were reduced.  
Contribution to Public Health 
 This research contributes to the growing field of public health emergency preparedness, 
specifically to national tsunami community preparedness programming.  This evaluation 
research dissertation provides both the public health and the emergency management 
communities with insight and contextual information regarding community emergency 
preparedness and the TR Community program for communities with tsunami hazards ranging 
from low to medium to high.  Even more specifically, this research has provided both 
community-level data and written recommendations for the NWS based on community expert 
stakeholder input and the current emergency management and preparedness literature for 
updating and improving the TR Community program guidelines.   
Future Research Efforts 
 Future research and program evaluation studies should be considered following this 
study.  The most immediate avenue being a larger-scale sampling of communities from across 
the US and US territories to assess perceptions and opinions found to be significant in this study.  
Both communities already recognized as TR and those currently seeking recognition or 
unrecognized should be included in the sample for this larger, nation-wide study.  Extending the 
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sample to include more sites would bolster and increase generalizability, while also providing the 
NWS with stronger evidence for or against the programmatic guideline recommendations 
provided by this research.  Future studies should also note the utility of providing information to 
expert community stakeholders through both the central and peripheral routes of the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM).  Written materials including detailed definitions and explanations of 
concepts would be well placed to activate an individual’s peripheral route, while community 
meetings (both in-person or virtual) would allow in-depth discussion facilitating the central route 
of attitude formation.    
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Current NWS TsunamiReady
TM
 Guidelines 
TsunamiReady
TM
 Guidelines 
Guidelines for being designated TsunamiReady are given in the following table.  Each guideline 
is fully discussed following the table.  The guidelines are based on four population-based 
categories. 
Guidelines Population 
  < 
2,500 
2,500 - 
14,999 
15,000 - 
40,000 
> 40,000 
Guideline 1: Communications and Coordination 
Established 24-hour Warning Point (WP) X* X* X X 
Established Emergency Operations Center (EOC) X* X* X X 
Guideline 2: Tsunami Warning Reception         
Number of ways for EOC/WP to receive NWS tsunami 
messages. (If in range, one must be NWR receiver with tone 
alert; NWR-SAME is preferred) 
3 4 4 4 
Guideline 3: Local Warning Dissemination 
Number of ways EOC/WP can disseminate warnings to 
public 
1 2 3 4 
NWR - SAME receivers in public facilities X X X X 
For county/borough warning points, county/borough 
communication network that ensures information flow 
among communities 
X X X X 
Guideline 4: Community Preparedness 
Number of annual tsunami awareness programs 1 2 3 4 
Designate/establish tsunami shelter/area in safe zone X X X X 
Designate tsunami evacuation areas and evacuation routes, 
and install evacuation route signs 
X X X X 
Provide written, locally specific, tsunami hazard response 
material to public 
X X X X 
Schools: Encourage tsunami hazard curriculum, practice 
evacuations (if in hazard zone), and provide safety material 
to staff and students. 
X X X X 
Guideline 5: Administrative 
Formal tsunami hazard operations plan X X X X 
Biennial meeting between emergency manager and NWS X X X X 
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Visit by NWS official to community at least every other year X X X X 
* For cities or towns with less than 15,000 people, a 24-hour warning point and EOC are 
required; however, another jurisdiction within the county may provide that resource. 
Guideline 1: Communications and Coordination Center 
A key to effective hazards management is effective communication.  This is especially true in 
tsunami emergencies, since wave arrival times may be measured in just minutes.  Such a “short 
fused” event requires an immediate but careful response.  To ensure such a proper response, 
communities must have set up the following: 
1. 24-Hour Warning Point. To receive recognition under the TsunamiReady program, an 
agency needs to have a 24-hour Warning Point (WP) able to receive NWS Tsunami 
information and provide local reports and advice. Typically, this might be a law 
enforcement or fire department dispatching point.  For cities or towns without a local 
dispatching point, a county/borough agency could act for them in that capacity.  The 
warning point needs to have: 
o 24 hour operations 
o Warning reception capability 
o Warning communication/dissemination capability 
o Ability and authority to activate local warning system(s) 
2. Emergency Operations Center. Agencies serving jurisdictions of more than 2,500 people 
will need an emergency operations center (EOC).  It must be staffed during tsunami 
events to execute the warning point's tsunami warning functions.  Summarized below are 
tsunami-related roles of an EOC: 
 Activate based on predetermined guidelines related to NWS tsunami 
information and/or tsunami events 
 Staffed by emergency management director or designee 
 Possess warning reception/dissemination capabilities equal to or better 
than the warning point 
 Ability to communicate with adjacent EOCs/Warning Points C Ability to 
communicate with local NWS office. 
Guideline 2: Tsunami Warning Reception 
Warning points and EOCs each need multiple ways to receive NWS Tsunami Warnings. 
TsunamiReady guidelines to receive NWS warnings in an EOC/WP require a combination of the 
following, based on population: 
 NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) receiver with tone alert.  Specific Area Message Encoding 
(SAME) is preferred. Required for recognition only if within range of transmitter 
 NOAA Weather Wire drop: Satellite downlink from NWS. 
 Emergency Management Weather Information Network (EMWIN) receiver: Satellite 
feed and/or VHF radio transmission of NWS products 
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 Statewide Telecommunications System: Automatic relay of NWS products on statewide 
emergency management or law enforcement system 
 Statewide Warning Fan-out System: State authorized system of passing message 
throughout warning area 
 NOAA Weather Wire via Internet NOAAPort Lite: Provides alarmed warning messages 
through a dedicated Internet connection 
 Direct link to NWS office: For example, amateur or VHF radio 
 E-mail from Tsunami Warning Center: Direct e-mail from Warning Center to emergency 
manager 
 Pager Message from Tsunami Warning Center: Page issued from Warning Center 
directly to EOC/WP 
 Radio/TV via Emergency Alert System: Local radio/TV or cable TV 
 US Coast Guard Broadcasts: WP/EOC monitoring of USCG marine channels 
 National Warning System (NAWAS) drop: FEMA-controlled civil defense hot-line 
Guideline 3: Warning Dissemination 
1. Upon receipt of NWS tsunami warnings or other reliable information suggesting a 
Tsunami is imminent, local emergency officials should communicate the threat to  as 
much of the population as possible. Receiving TsunamiReady recognition requires 
having one or more of the following means of ensuring timely warning dissemination to 
citizens (based on population): 
o A community program subsidizing the purchase of NWR. 
o Outdoor warning sirens 
o Television audio/video overrides 
o Phone messaging (dial-down) systems 
o Other locally-controlled methods, e.g., local broadcast system or emergency 
vehicle sirens. 
2. Once NWS Tsunami Warnings are received, or local information suggests an imminent 
tsunami threat, the local emergency officials should communicate with as much of the 
population as possible. To be recognized as TsunamiReady, a community must have 
NOAA Weather Radio in the following facilities:  
Required Locations:   
o 24 hour Warning Point                                                
o Emergency Operations Center                         
o City Hall                                                                     
o School superintendent office or equivalent                      
Recommended Locations: 
o Courthouses 
o Public libraries 
o Hospitals 
o All schools 
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o Fairgrounds 
o Parks and recreation areas 
o Public utilities 
o Sports arenas 
o Transportation departments 
o Nursing Homes/Assisted Living 
o Harbors 
Receivers with SAME capability are preferred (this is required for recognition only if 
locations are within range of NWR transmitter). In addition, recognition will be 
contingent on having one or more of the following means (based on population) of 
ensuring timely warning dissemination to citizens: 
o Cable television audio/video overrides. 
o Local Flood warning systems with no single point of failure. 
o Other locally-controlled methods like a local broadcast system or sirens on 
emergency vehicles. 
o Outdoor warning sirens. 
3. Counties/Boroughs Only: A county/borough-wide communications network ensuring the 
flow of information among all cities and towns within its borders. This would include 
provision of a warning point for the smaller towns, and fanning out of the message as 
required by state policy.  Critical public access buildings should be defined by each 
community’s tsunami warning plan. 
Guideline 4: Awareness 
Public education is vital in preparing citizens to respond properly to Tsunami threats.  An 
educated public is more likely to take steps to receive tsunami warnings, recognize potentially 
threatening Tsunami events, and respond appropriately to those events.  Communities seeking 
recognition in the TsunamiReady program must: 
1. Conduct or sponsor Tsunami awareness programs.  Possible locations may include 
schools, hospitals, fairs, workshops, and community meetings (number of presentations 
per year is based on population). 
2. Define Tsunami evacuation areas and evacuation routes, and install evacuation route 
signs. 
3. Designate a Tsunami shelter/area outside the hazard zone. 
4. Provide written Tsunami hazard information to the populace, including: 
o Hazard zone maps 
o Evacuation routes 
o Basic tsunami information 
These instructions can be distributed through mailings, i.e, utility bills, within 
phone books, and poste at common meeting points such as libraries and public 
buildings throughout the community. 
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5. Local schools must meet the following criteria: 
o Encourage the inclusion of Tsunami information in primary and secondary school 
curriculums.  NWS will help identify curriculum support material. 
o Provide an opportunity biennially for a Tsunami awareness presentation by the 
local NWS office and/or the local Emergency Manager. 
o Schools within the defined hazard zone must have Tsunami evacuation drills at 
least biennially. 
o Written safety material should be provided to all staff and students. 
o Have an earthquake plan. 
Guideline 5: Administrative 
No program can be successful without formal planning and a pro-active administration.  To be 
recognized in the TsunamiReady Program: 
1. A Tsunami warning plan must be in place and approved by the local governing body. 
This plan must address the following: 
o Warning point procedures 
o EOC activation criteria and procedures 
o Warning point and EOC personnel specification 
o Hazard zone map with evacuation routes 
o Procedures for canceling an emergency for those less-than-destructive Tsunamis 
o Criteria and procedures for activation of sirens, cable television override, and/or 
local systems activation in accordance with state Emergency Alert System (EAS) 
plans, and warning fan-out procedures, if necessary 
o Annual exercises. 
2. Yearly visit/discussion with local NWS Office or Tsunami Warning Center personnel. 
Due to distance and other logistical constraint in the Alaska and Pacific Regions, this 
guideline can be met by a visit to the NWS office, phone discussion, or e-mail. 
NWS officials will commit to visit recognized communities, at least every other year, to tour 
EOCs/Warning points and meet with key officials. 
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Appendix B: Current Revised Draft of the TR Guidelines 
  Guidelines for Community Recognition as TsunamiReady™ 
BACKGROUND  
The TsunamiReady™ Program 
The TsunamiReady™ Program of the National Weather Service (NWS) recognizes coastal jurisdictions 
and other population centers (e.g., tribes, counties, universities) that take and maintain steps to reduce risk 
from tsunamis. Communities recognized as TsunamiReady™ become more resilient through a suite of 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities that address their vulnerability to either far-
field or near-field tsunamis.  
Addressing the appropriate tsunami threats in your community― far and near-field tsunamis 
Preparing for tsunamis in the United States (US) is complicated by the fact that two distinctly different 
types of tsunami threats exist for its coastal communities. Far-field tsunamis (also called distant tsunamis) 
are generated by distant earthquakes (such as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan). In the U.S., 
communities typically have several hours to respond before far-field tsunamis strike low-lying areas. 
Near-field tsunamis, on the other hand, are generated by local sources (such as an earthquake within the 
Cascadia subduction zone). They involve large-magnitude earthquakes followed by potentially 
catastrophic tsunami waves striking coastal communities in a matter of minutes. Usually, but not always, 
damage is greater from near-field tsunamis than far-field tsunamis. 
The TsunamiReady™ Program recognizes that reducing risks requires different strategies and provides 
guidelines that distinguish between far-field and near-field threats. For communities with only far-field 
tsunami threats, guidelines emphasize ensuring seamless communication among NWS Tsunami Warning 
Centers and stakeholders using modern communications capabilities. For communities that also have 
near-field tsunami threats, these same communications capabilities between NWS and practitioners are 
critical, but at-risk individuals also must: 
 recognize the natural warnings or environmental cues of a possible or imminent tsunami (e.g., ground 
shaking from an earthquake, unusual rapid rise or fall of a shoreline);  
 know where high ground is accessible in the limited time available; and  
 take personal responsibility to evacuate in the few minutes they have to survive. 
Addressing your community’s vulnerability to tsunamis 
Preparing your community for future far-field or near-field tsunamis means implementing risk-reduction 
actions that are tailored to local conditions and needs. Therefore, a critical element in preparing your 
community is understanding the threat and how it is specifically vulnerable to tsunamis, such as the types 
of people and systems that are exposed to tsunami hazards, factors that make them more sensitive to 
threats (e.g., age, language barriers, certain business sectors), and the capacity of individuals to respond 
effectively to potential or imminent threats.  
Incentives for becoming TsunamiReady™ 
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No coastal community is tsunami proof, but being recognized as TsunamiReady™ will help decision-
makers feel confident that they are engaged in risk-reduction activities that have been acknowledged by 
tsunami experts and by their peers from multiple states and territories to be necessary. The expectation is 
that TsunamiReady™ communities will have fewer human fatalities and injuries, as well as property 
damage, than communities who do not take similar preparedness actions. 
GUIDELINES 
Initial determination of tsunami threat 
TsunamiReady™ guidelines distinguish between near-field and far-field tsunami threats. They require all 
coastal communities seeking TsunamiReady™ recognition to meet the requirements (elements) for 
communities exposed to far-field threats. Communities with a near-field tsunami threat must meet 
additional elements. Headings for mandatory elements are shown in red below and underlined, for both 
far-field and near-field threats.  Optional elements are shown with a green, underlined heading, using 
bullets and open circles.   
NOTE: Determination of whether a community must meet additional requirements for near-field tsunami 
threats shall be made by the state representatives for the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation (NTHMP) 
in collaboration with the NWS WCM with responsibility for that area.   
I. MITIGATION (MIT) 
Mandatory elements for all coastal communities: 
Mit-1. Tsunami-hazard zones have been mapped. The primary source for mapping potential tsunami-
impact zones is inundation modeling. If this is unavailable, other acceptable sources include guidance 
from tsunami experts from the NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers, the U.S. or State Geological Surveys, 
universities, or consultants. Modeling and mapping efforts shall meet NOAA/NTHMP guidelines.  
Mit-2. Tsunami hazard and vulnerability are addressed in your FEMA-approved Local Multi-
Hazard Mitigation Plan. As detailed in section 44CFR Part 201.6 (c)(2) of the Stafford Disaster 
Mitigation Act, this shall include a tsunami-hazard profile (location, extent, previous occurrences, 
likelihood of future events) and a description of community vulnerability (exposure and impact summary 
of populations, individuals with access and functional needs, business, and critical facilities). 
Vulnerability information will help guide the development of preparedness and outreach efforts that are 
tailored to local conditions and needs. 
Mit-3. Designated tsunami hazard areas, evacuation routes, non-hazard areas, and assembly areas 
(sufficient to support the population) based on tsunami inundation modeling and mapping.   
Mit-4. Signage to identify tsunami hazard areas, evacuation routes and assembly areas  
 
Additional, mandatory elements for communities with near-field tsunami threats:  
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Mit-5. Availability of natural high or inland ground has been identified for at-risk populations. If 
suitable high or inland ground is available, then it should be determined if at-risk populations can 
reasonably reach these areas before tsunami waves are predicted to arrive. Evacuation assessments and/or 
modeling should take into account the types of at-risk individuals present (e.g., elderly, the very young, 
tourists, seasonal workers) and the reliability of evacuation routes (e.g., bridges, roads). Or, if natural high 
or inland ground is not accessible during predicted wave arrival, see Mit-6 
Mit-6. A plan for vertical-evacuation strategies (e.g., berms, structures) has been established if it is 
unlikely that at-risk populations would be able to reach natural high ground and inland locations before 
wave arrival. This plan identifies proposed locations of vertical evacuation structures, the at-risk 
populations they would serve, funding sources, land use considerations, and a timeline for 
implementation. At subsequent reviews of TsunamiReady™ recognition, communities will need to 
demonstrate progress in implementing this plan. 
Optional mitigation efforts to increase community resilience 
 Tsunami-related elements in nationally-recognized planning efforts, such as: 
o FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program, including the Community Rating System  
o No Adverse Impact (NAI) coastal floodplain management as outlined by the Association of 
State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM).    
o Multi-Objective Management/Special Area Management Plans (SAMPs) in accordance with 
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)   
 Tsunami-related elements in local planning efforts, such as: 
o Adoption of appropriate seismic standards and building codes 
o Local zoning ordinances to minimize or steer development away from tsunami-hazard zones   
o Critical-facility ordinance to minimize having critical facilities in tsunami-hazard zones 
o Tsunami hazard disclosure for permit applicants 
o Tsunami-resistant design and construction regulations 
o Open space in tsunami-hazard zone, such as parks, greenways, and natural areas 
o Incentives (e.g., density bonuses, fee waivers, set asides) to encourage mitigation 
o Plans that establish and/or preserve coastal buffers to slow shoreline erosion 
 Tsunami-related mitigation projects, such as 
o Infrastructure to support evacuations, including seismic strengthening of bridges and roads, as 
well as vertical-evacuation berms, structures or other shelter(s) using the criteria from FEMA 
P646 (Guidelines for Design of Structures for Vertical Evacuation from Tsunamis) 
o Port- and harbor-related efforts, such as tying down refueling-tanks, automatic shut-off 
valves, caps on pier moorings, minimal long-term storage of material that would become 
potential debris (e.g., empty shipping containers, logs and lumber) 
o Automatic shut off valves on major supply gas lines 
o Relocation of buildings, hazardous materials, and critical infrastructure out of hazard zone  
o Protection of structures using NFIP coastal flood-resistant design and construction 
requirements and the FEMA Coastal Construction Manual if relocation is not feasible 
o Store important documents where they will not be damaged or lost, such as in remote 
archives.  
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II. PREPAREDNESS (PREP) 
Mandatory elements for all coastal communities: 
Prep-1. Tsunami exercise at least every three years, such as a tabletop, functional or full-scale exercise 
Prep-2. Initial Responder training that includes tsunami hazard, warning and evacuation protocols  
Prep-3. Evacuation maps of tsunami hazard areas, evacuation routes, non-hazard areas and assembly 
areas 
Prep-4. Written materials that include tsunami information, hazard maps, evacuation routes, safety tips, 
and response protocols (e.g., natural cues of near-field tsunamis, warning system for far-field tsunamis). 
Information should be tailored to reflect local conditions and demographics such as appropriate languages 
or recognizing workforce differences between businesses where necessary. Information shall be 
disseminated using three or more of the following:    
o Visitor centers and local tourist businesses (e.g., restaurants, bars, hotels) 
o Local hotel and motel staff 
o Historical markers and interpretative signs 
o Radio and television spots 
o Libraries   
o Public utility/service industry bill safety notices.    
o Billboard, highway, or beach entry signs.  
o Local faith-based and civic organization bulletins/mailings.  
o Bulk mailings of tsunami safety information to local residents and businesses 
Prep-5. Events (at least one per year) to educate citizens on local tsunami hazards, evacuation routes, 
safety and response, such as  
o Community tsunami safety workshop and education campaign  
o Door-to-door safety awareness campaign with residents and businesses in your community’s 
tsunami inundation/hazard zone.  
o Local business workshop to help them to develop response and business continuity plans 
o Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) meetings.  
o Local Area Emergency Communications Committee  
o State Tsunami Technical Review/Advisory Committee  
o Presentations or workshops for faith-based organizations, community or civic groups  
o Booths at community events and county fairs.  
o Local public safety campaigns, such as “Tsunami Awareness” week/month.  
o Requirement to have weather radios in new buildings. 
Prep-6. Information provided annually to schools in tsunami-hazard zones. Emergency management 
must inform all schools and child care centers annually of their risk of tsunami hazards and provide 
information on warning and evacuation procedures; EM must provide information on recommended 
evacuation sites to schools, including vertical evacuation sites if necessary. Schools in the inundation 
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zone must have an Emergency Operations Plan that includes tsunami response. An offer for an in-person 
presentation from the local emergency management office should be included in the information that is 
sent to schools.  
Prep-7. Participation in NOAA/NWS Tsunami Warning Center communication tests 
Additional, mandatory elements for communities with near-field tsunami threats: 
Prep-8. Tsunami evacuation exercise for schools in the inundation zone at least once per year 
(possibly combined with fire drills or local field trips). To support school evacuation exercises, 
emergency managers shall also provide written safety material to school staff. 
Prep-9. Annual training, outreach or education that targets owners and staff for high-occupancy 
businesses in the tsunami-hazard zones (e.g., hotels, restaurants, fisheries, industrial sites) 
Prep-10. Annual training, outreach or education that targets residents living or working in 
tsunami-hazard zones on evacuation routes, safety and personal actions need to response. 
Optional preparedness efforts to increase community resilience 
 School-based training, such as:   
o Tsunami education program, including science and safety in primary and secondary schools  
o Tsunami awareness presentations by subject matter experts  
 Evacuation plans for facilities with access and functional need individuals (e.g., assisted living 
facilities, child-day-care centers) 
 Community-based training, such as: 
o COMET 
o “TsunamiReady Champions” to spearheads tsunami hazard education and awareness 
o “Map your Neighborhood,” Citizens Corp, or Community Emergency Response Team 
o FEMA’s “Are You Ready?” workshop  or others from Emergency Management Institute 
o State Emergency Training Services 
o American Red Cross sheltering training    
 Business-based preparedness training, such as: 
o Education materials distributed to guests (e.g. evacuation plans).  
o Appropriate tsunami evacuation signage placed at site 
o Employees trained in the site's procedures for a tsunami emergency.   
o Tsunami response policies and procedures, including MOUs/MOAs, plan annexes,  
 Participation in national emergency-management programs, such as: 
o Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) 
o Certified Emergency Manager® or Associate Emergency Manager® through the 
International Association of Emergency Managers 
 Preparedness projects  
o Designated harbor and marine vessel-evacuation areas in offshore deep-water areas 
o Interpretative tsunami hazard zone signs along beach/shore access points 
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o Participation in annual end-to-end communications test, including EAS activation, use of real 
event code (TSW) or EAS test message (e.g., RMT), evacuation drills/exercises, siren 
systems, and telephone mass notification system 
o Surveys to assess the success of your community tsunami awareness program.  
 
III. Response (RESP) 
Mandatory elements for all coastal communities: 
Resp–1. Tsunami hazards are addressed in the Emergency Operations Plan, including 
 Identify tsunami as a hazard and provide a risk assessment 
 Detail Communication/Dispatch Center procedures relating to tsunamis  
 Specify EOC activation criteria and demobilization procedures 
 Specify tsunami criteria and procedures for the activation of the public warning system in its area of 
responsibility  
o Criteria and procedures for siren activation, cable television override, and/or local activation 
in accordance with state EAS plans, warning fan-out procedures, and communication to 
functional and access needs populations.   
 Provide contact information for all jurisdictional agencies and response partners including the NWS  
 Evacuation plans for both far-field and near-field events, roles of community entities/agencies, hazard 
zones map with evacuation routes, and protocols for access and functional needs populations.  
  
 Procedures for updating information and “all-clear” messages after initiating a tsunami incident 
response 
 Procedures for providing security for evacuated zone.  
Resp–2. Emergency Operations Center (EOC) (for jurisdictions of 15,000 or more people) that is 
staffed during tsunami incidents and capable of: 
 Executing tsunami warning functions based on predetermined guidelines related to NWS tsunami 
information and/or tsunami incidents 
 24 hour operations or plan to activate the EOC for tsunami incidents in accordance with the EOP 
 Warning reception and dissemination capability 
 Staffed with trained and credentialed emergency management personnel  
 Has ability and authority to activate the public warning system in its area of responsibility  
 Maintains ability to communicate within and across jurisdictions (e.g., with other EOCs including 
those maintained by private organizations, Incident Command Posts, etc.) through resilient and 
redundant methods. Should have communication capabilities equal to or better than the 
Communication/Dispatch Center  
 Maintains established communication links with NWS (e.g., NWSChat, phone, etc.) to relay real-time 
weather and flood reports to support the warning decision making process. 
 
Or, for communities smaller than 15,000, there are ties to an EOC. 
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Resp–3. Redundant and reliable means for 24-Hour Warning Point and/or EOC to receive official 
tsunami watch, warning and advisory messages from NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers, local NWS 
Offices, or other officially-recognized warning centers.  At least three of the following must be met: 
 Public Alert™ certified NOAA Weather Radio receiver: Required for recognition only if within 
reliable reception range of a NWR transmitter 
 National Warning System (NAWAS) drop:  FEMA-controlled, 24-hour, continuous-private-line 
telephone system used to convey warnings to federal, state and local governments, as well as the 
military and civilian population.  
 NWSChat: An instant messaging program available via the Internet used by NWS operational 
personnel to share critical warning decision expertise and other significant weather information 
InteractiveNWS (iNWS): An experimental real-time, user-defined, warning messaging service for 
mobile devices intended for emergency management/response personnel 
 Emergency Management Weather Information Network (EMWIN) receiver:  Device that receives 
satellite feed and/or VHF radio transmission of NWS products 
 Statewide Telecommunications System: Automatic relay of NWS products, usually on law 
enforcement systems  
 CMAS/WEA Alerts: Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS)/Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) 
service that allows public safety authorities to use FEMA’s IPAWS Open Platform for Emergency 
Networks (IPAWS-OPEN) to send geographically targeted, text-like wireless emergency alerts to the 
public 
 Amateur Radio transceiver: Potential communications directly to NWS office. 
 Alerts provided through an AWCI provider: Typically received via email and/or a texting service to a 
smartphone, tablet, or computer 
 Television: Access to local network or cable TV 
 Local Radio: Emergency Alert System, LP1/LP2  
 Internet monitoring capability, including social media such as Facebook and Twitter 
 NOAA Weather Wire drop: Satellite downlink data feed from NWS. 
 Direct e-mail from Tsunami Warning Center  
 Direct fax from Tsunami Warning Center  
 Text message or direct pager message from Tsunami Warning Center 
 US Coast Guard Broadcasts: WP monitoring of USCG marine channels  
 Satellite Phone 
 Other Communications channel (please explain): For example, active participation in a state-run 
warning network, two-way, local emergency responder radio network, etc.  
Resp–4. Redundant and reliable means for 24-Hour Warning Point and/or EOC to disseminate 
official tsunami watch, warning and advisory messages to the public. At least three of the following 
capabilities must be met: 
 Emergency Alert System (EAS) message initiation and broadcast 
 Cable television audio/video overrides 
 Local flood warning systems ideally with no single point of failure 
 Plan for siren/megaphone notification on emergency vehicles  
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 Outdoor warning sirens  
 Other local alert broadcast system  
 Local pager/texting system 
 CMAS/WEA Alerts available capability throughout the jurisdiction 
 Amateur Radio Operator network (Ham Radio) 
 Telephone mass notification system 
 Telephone tree to critical facilities 
 Coordinated jurisdiction-wide radio network 
 Counties, Parishes, Boroughs, etc. - A countywide communications network that ensures the flow of 
information between all cities and towns within its borders. This would include acting as the 
surrogate WP and/or EOC for jurisdictions without those capabilities.  
 Social Media usage (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) 
 Other, please explain 
Resp–5. Public Alert Certified* NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) receivers in critical facilities and 
public venues in and around the tsunami inundation zone (where reception is available) including:  
 Required Locations: 
– Communication/Dispatch Center serving as the 24-hour WP 
– EOC 
– City Hall 
– Public School Superintendent office 
 
 Recommended, but not required, Locations: 
– Courthouses 
– Public libraries 
– Hospitals 
– All schools, usually located in Principal’s or designee office  
– Fairgrounds, parks and recreation areas*  
– Public utilities*  
– Large-event venues, e.g., arenas, stadiums, etc.*  
– Transportation departments* 
– Nursing homes/Assisted living facilities* 
– Harbor Masters’ Offices 
*Note: Usually, the NWR receivers would be located in the primary management office/facility that has 
the authority to alter operations and the ability to order protective actions based on the NWS hazardous 
weather or flood warning received.  
Additional, mandatory elements for communities with near-field tsunami threats: 
There are no additional mandatory response elements for communities with near-field tsunami threats. 
Immediate response to a near-field tsunami will be performed primarily by at-risk individuals. Any 
individuals in tsunami-prone areas, including emergency personnel, will need to take personal 
responsibility for evacuating after recognizing the natural warnings or environmental cues of a possible or 
imminent tsunami (e.g., ground shaking from an earthquake, unusual rapid rise or fall of a shoreline). 
Official communications and warnings may be difficult to perform given the potential for infrastructure  
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and telecommunication damage from the preceding earthquake and the limited time between the 
generation and arrival of near-field tsunamis. 
Optional response efforts to increase community resilience 
 Additional elements in Emergency Response Plan 
o Response plan for businesses to notify and evacuate visitors and employees 
o Exercises with businesses (e.g. seminar, table-top, meeting, etc.)   
o Transportation plans for contra flow and traffic maintenance for distant tsunami incidents. 
o Notification plan for marinas and harbormasters to expedite relocating vessels 
o MOUs with private land owners to allow evacuees access through gates and across land 
o Procedures for keeping evacuees and other impacted individuals informed throughout the 
incident 
o Procedures for opening assembly areas and evacuation shelters 
o Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) for tsunami response/recovery 
 Ensuring Critical Facilities such as hospitals, police stations, fire stations, utilities, etc. in and near the 
tsunami inundation zone have the tsunami hazard addressed in their Emergency Operations Plans. 
o Emergency service facilities and equipment (fire stations; police stations; custodial facilities, 
such as jails and juvenile detention centers, hospitals, and other health care facilities; rescue 
squads; public works facilities, etc.).  
o Communications networks (telephones, emergency service radio systems, repeater sites and 
base stations, television and radio stations, etc.).   
o Water supply system/facilities, to include waste water treatment.   
o  Utilities (power plants, substations, power lines, etc.)   
o Transportation networks (roads, bridges, airports, rail terminals, maritime ports).   
 Additional elements in Emergency Operation Center (EOC) communications – County-, parish-, or 
borough-wide communications network including warning points 
 Additional suggested places for NOAA weather radios: communications centers for life guards, 
courthouses, public libraries, fairgrounds, sports arenas, parks and recreation areas, public utilities, 
transportation departments, City Hall, other critical public facility 
   
IV. RECOVERY (REC) 
Mandatory elements for all coastal communities: 
Rec–1. A plan that considers how communities will continue to operate and recover after a tsunami 
disaster. 
Rec–2. A plan that considers how communities will manage debris after a tsunami disaster. 
Optional recovery efforts to increase community resilience 
 Identification of Long-Term Recovery Coordinator (local expert) in accordance with ESF-14 
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 Plan for conducting a post-tsunami incident Interagency After Action Review. Goals would include 
identifying lessons learned and best practices, and evolving the Emergency Operations Plan as 
necessary.   
 Plan that addresses a community’s housing strategy, both temporarily and long-term, for 
individuals/families that were directly impacted by a tsunami disaster.  
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Community Name:      Reviewer Name & Date: 
Checklist for Determining Completion of Mandatory Elements for TR recognition 
 Code Action Short Name Applicability Achieved Reviewer Notes 
Mit-1 Tsunami-hazard zones have been mapped All 
    
Mit-2 
Tsunami hazard and vulnerability are 
addressed in FEMA-approved Local Multi-
Hazard Mitigation Plan 
All 
    
Mit-3 
Designated tsunami hazard areas, evacuation 
routes, safe zones, and assembly areas 
All 
  
Mit-4 
Signage to identify tsunami hazard areas, 
evacuation routes, safe zones, and assembly 
areas 
All 
  
Mit-5 
Availability of natural high ground and inland 
locations has been identified for at-risk 
populations. Or, (see Mit-4) 
Near-field 
threats only 
    
Mit-6 
A plan for vertical-evacuation strategies has 
been established (e.g., berms, structures)  
Near-field 
threats only 
    
Prep-1 
Tsunami exercise at least every three years, 
such as a tabletop, functional or full-scale  
All 
    
Prep-2 
Initial Responder training that includes 
tsunami hazard, warning and evacuation 
protocols  
All 
    
Prep-3 
Evacuation maps of tsunami hazard areas, 
evacuation routes, safe zones, and assembly 
areas 
All 
    
Prep-4 
Written materials that include tsunami 
information, hazard maps, evacuation routes, 
safety tips, and response protocols  
 
All 
    
Prep-5 
Events (at least 1 per year) to educate all 
citizens on local tsunami hazards, evacuation 
routes, safety and response 
All 
    
To accompany TsunamiReady™ Guidelines, version dated October 3, 2012 
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Code Action Short Name Applicability Achieved Notes 
Prep-6 
Annual presentations to schools in tsunami-
hazard zones 
All 
    
Prep-7 
Participation in NOAA/NWS Tsunami 
Warning Center communication tests 
All 
    
Prep-8 
Tsunami evacuation exercise for schools in 
the inundation zone 
Near-field 
threats only     
Prep-9 
Annual training, outreach or education that 
targets owners and staff for high-occupancy 
businesses  
Near-field 
threats only 
    
Prep-
10 
Annual training, outreach  or education that 
targets residents living or working in tsunami-
hazard zones  
Near-field 
threats only 
    
Resp-
1 
Tsunami hazard addressed in Emergency 
Operations Plan 
All 
    
Resp-
2 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)  All 
    
Resp-
3 
Redundant and reliable means for 
Communication/Dispatch Center and/or EOC 
to receive official messages 
All 
    
Resp-
4 
Redundant and reliable means for 
Communication/Dispatch Center and/or EOC 
to disseminate official messages 
All 
    
Resp-
5 
Public Alert Certified* NOAA Weather 
Radio receivers in critical facilities and public 
venues 
All 
    
Rec-1 
Plan for continuity of operations plan and/or 
continuity of government   
All 
    
Rec-2 Plan for management of debris  All 
    
Mit = mitigation, Prep = preparedness, Resp = response, Rec = Recovery 
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Appendix C: Prediscussion Survey 
TR prediscussion survey 
In preparation for the upcoming state and territorial focus group meetings on the TsunamiReady (TR) program, 
we would like to ask you about a few important aspects of the revised TR guidelines under consideration.  Your 
input will help us frame our upcoming discussions. 
  
Background: 
During the 2011 focus group discussions we learned that the current method of subdividing the TR guidelines 
by population size was undesirable. Basing the guidelines on population allowed communities with larger 
populations to do more, which would result in ‘have’ and ‘have not’ communities. Focus Group participants 
preferred that guidelines be based on some aspect of community vulnerability to tsunamis.  Recognizing this, 
recent government reports have highlighted that locally-generated tsunamis represent the primary threat to 
human life, while distant tsunamis primarily represent a threat to development and loss of business. With these 
focus group and report findings in mind, we have proposed a new method for subdividing the requirements for 
TR recognition based on vulnerability to local versus distant tsunamis. In short, all communities would be 
required to comply with the guidelines for distant tsunami hazards, while the communities vulnerable to local 
tsunami hazards would have to comply with additional guidelines related to:  
1)  availability of evacuation and safe sheltering locations;  
2)  schools in inundation zones annually practicing evacuation drills; 
3)  annual education of staff of high occupancy visitor facilities; and  
4)  annual education of local residents.   
 
 
Additional Background Information: 
Community vulnerability to local tsunami versus distant tsunami hazards:  
Under this option, all coastal communities are assumed to be vulnerable to regional and distant tsunamis while 
fewer coastal communities are assumed to also be vulnerable to local tsunamis. The sources for local tsunamis 
could be nearby earthquakes or landslides, or both. An expert panel administered by the NWS Tsunami 
Program would determine which coastal regions are vulnerable to local tsunamis and which are not, for all of 
the Pacific, Caribbean and Atlantic Ocean states and territories. This committee would also determine which 
trigger mechanisms of tsunamis would be used for making a determination about community vulnerability to 
local versus distant tsunamis. For example, the panel may decide to only include tsunamis generated by 
earthquakes or earthquake-induced landslides. 
 
Definitions:  
 Local (near-field) tsunami– wave arrives 30 minutes or less after it is generated (e.g. earthquake 
or landslide)   
 Regional tsunami – wave arrives between 30 minutes – 2 hours after a generation event  
 Distant (far-field) tsunami– wave arrives several hours after it is generated  
 
We would appreciate your feedback regarding these ideas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 210 
 
 
Questions for Your Consideration: 
Question 1. Should communities vulnerable to a local tsunami have to take more actions to protect human life 
than those communities vulnerable only to distant tsunamis to receive TR recognition? What are your concerns 
about doing so or not? 
Question 2. Would this subdivision of community vulnerability to local versus distant tsunami hazards be 
appropriate in your community? Why or why not? 
Question 4a-e. Currently, the proposed guidelines require 5 additional actions for communities with local 
tsunami hazards or tsunami hazards for which at-risk people cannot reach a safe area before the first wave 
arrives. We want to ask you about each of these 5 actions. 
First (Question 4a), what are your thoughts about requiring communities to identify any available natural high 
or inland ground to which at-risk populations will have to self-evacuate?  
Question 4b. If at-risk populations in a community are unable to reach natural high or inland locations before 
arrival of the first tsunami wave, what are your thoughts about requiring the community to identify berms or 
other structures to which people can vertically evacuate?  If structures are not present, should communities have 
to construct vertical evacuation structures?  What are your concerns about doing so or not? 
Question 4c What are your thoughts about requiring that there be a tsunami evacuation exercise for schools 
located within the inundation zone at least once per year?  
Question 4d. What are your thoughts about requiring that there be annual training, outreach or education that 
targets owners and staff of high-occupancy businesses in the hazard zones for local tsunami threats (e.g., hotels, 
restaurants, fisheries, industrial sites)? 
Question 4e. What are your thoughts about requiring annual training, outreach or education for residents living 
or working in tsunami-hazard zones? This would include education on evacuation routes, safety, and personal 
actions needed to respond to tsunami (e.g., self-initiated evacuation).  
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Appendix D: Focus Group Discussion Guide 
Focus Group Discussion Guide 
 
→ You each received a copy of the proposed TsunamiReady™ (TR™) guidelines, how many of you were able 
to review those guidelines?  Did any of you discuss these revisions with anyone?  If so, who? 
 
→ Does anyone have any initial questions or comments before we get started? 
 
Background 
We have identified 8 topics that we believe are the most important and in need of discussion regarding the TR™ 
program guidelines. 
 
The current TR™ guidelines base community requirements on population size. The 2011 Focus Group results 
indicated that this was undesirable and that community vulnerability to tsunamis is a much better basis of 
subdivision. Based on these findings and recent government reports, our team has proposed an alternative for 
subdividing community requirements looking generally at a community’s vulnerability to local and distant 
tsunami events.  
 
Definitions:  
 Local (near-field) tsunami– wave arrives 30 minutes or less after it is generated (e.g. earthquake 
or landslide)   
 Regional tsunami – wave arrives between 30 minutes – 2 hours after a generation event  
 Distant (far-field) tsunami– wave arrives several hours after it is generated  
 
Community vulnerability to local tsunami versus distant tsunami hazards:  
 
Sources for local tsunamis could be nearby earthquakes or landslides, or both. An expert panel administered by 
the NWS Tsunami Program would determine which coastal regions are vulnerable to local tsunamis and which 
are not, for all of the Pacific, Caribbean and Atlantic Ocean states and territories. This committee would also 
determine which trigger mechanisms of tsunamis would be used for making a determination about community 
vulnerability to local versus distant tsunamis.  The expert panel would identify possible tsunamis for a 
community, but focus on plausible hazards.   
 
 
1. Would this subdivision of community vulnerability to local versus distant tsunami, assessed and 
identified by the expert panel, be appropriate in your community? 
 
 →Why or why not? 
 
 
One limitation with basing community vulnerability on local and distant tsunamis is that some communities 
require more than 1-hour to evacuate their at-risk population.  Consequently, we think that all communities 
should identify the: 
1) likely extent of inundation,  
2) time it would take for the first wave to arrive, 
3) number of people who would be in the inundation zone (and subgroups of people), and 
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4) time needed for them to get to a safe area (e.g., natural high ground).    
 
→ If at-risk people are unable to evacuate in the time available, they would need to evacuate to a 
berm or other vertical structure.  What do you think about this limitation? [Note: Question 4 will 
also return to the issue of vertical evacuation] 
 
2. Looking at the revised guidelines, there are additional mandatory requirements for those communities 
that have a local tsunami threat. (Section I. Mit-5 & Mit-6 and Section 2. Prep 8, 9, and 10 are for near-
field communities only.). What are your thoughts about having additional activity requirements for 
communities with local tsunami threats? 
 
→How acceptable is this for your community? 
 
3. Please describe any current tsunami evacuation plans or strategies you are using in your 
community.  
 
→Ask about storm surge if no tsunami plan 
 
→Would you describe the plan/strategy as effective? 
 
→Why or why not? 
 
4. What do you think an effective evacuation strategy should look like for a community to be 
considered TR™? 
 
→Consider the following as they affect ability to evacuate inland, to high ground, or vertically 
within the time available for various tsunami events (e.g., 30 minutes or up to 10 hours): 
 
→ Must everyone be able to evacuate in the time available?  If not, who?  What are your 
considerations regarding evacuating everyone? 
 
→ How would seasonal changes affect this number? Consider: 
 residents (smallest population) 
 seasonal workers (intermediate population) 
 visitors (largest population) 
 
→ Issues involving rapid self-initiated evacuation versus organized/orderly evacuation? 
 
→ Does population size or vulnerable subgroups change what is considered an effective evacuation 
strategy?   
 
→ Do you know of a methodology to determine the proportion of population which needs to be 
evacuated?  What seems ideal?  What seems more realistic? 
 
     → Are there analogies you think might be useful for determining this (e.g., other hazards like 
fire, flash flooding, industrial facilities, etc.)? 
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5. The revsied guidelines would require communities with local tsunami hazards to develop a vertical 
tsunami evacuation strategy (or a plan to do so when no natural high or inland ground or vertical 
evacuation structures exist (Section I. Mit-5 & Mit-6).  Are you familiar with any cities which have 
vertical evacuation structures (e.g., buildings, berms, etc.)? 
 
→What are your thoughts about requiring a vertical evacuation strategy? 
 
→What do you think are some barriers to communities adopting a vertical evacuation strategy? 
 
→Tell us more about those barriers?   
 
→What are some motivators or incentives that would help communities adopt a vertical evacuation 
strategy? 
 
6. The revised guidelines propose conducting mandatory, annual evacuation drills for schools in the 
inundation zone as a requirement for communities with local tsunami threats. How useful are these 
activities for a TR™ community? 
 
→How acceptable is this for your community? 
 
→How acceptable is this for communities with local tsunami threats? 
 
→How acceptable is this for communities with no local tsunami threats? 
 
→How achievable are these activities?  
 
7. Different communities have a different amount of risk tolerance for a tsunami. Some community 
residents may be more or less willing to accept higher risk than others (e.g., tourists who do not know 
about the tsunami hazard).   
Should the requirements for TR™ recognition account for these differences? If yes, how? 
→For example, should high occupancy businesses (e.g., hotels and restaurants) be required to have 
annual staff training, especially in high hazard regions?   
 
8. The revised guidelines utilize the NIMS classification system for stages of resiliency describing program 
actions and activities for mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. How useful are these 
activity divisions for a TR™ community? 
 
 
→How acceptable are these activity divisions? 
 
→How achievable are these activity divisions?  
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Appendix E: Focus Group Meeting Agenda 
Focus Group Discussion 
Review of Draft TsunamiReady™ Guidelines 
 
AGENDA 
 
1. Introduction  
a) Project Goal: To evaluate the acceptability and usefulness of the revised TsunamiReady™ guidelines for community 
recognition. 
b) Meeting Objectives:  
o To gain insight on the utility and acceptability of the proposed guidelines for becoming TsunamiReady™. 
o To discuss and gain insight on key questions regarding content of the TsunamiReady™ guidelines for community 
recognition. 
 
2. Self-introductions of participants - name, title, description of tsunami-related duties 
 
3. Review of Revised Guidelines for TR & Discussion of key questions regarding content 
of the TR Program 
 Review revised guidelines for the TsunamiReady™ program. 
 Discuss the usefulness and achievability of the revised TsunamiReady™ guidelines for stakeholders and 
communities, effective evacuation strategies as a possible requirement for recognition, vertical evacuation strategies 
as a possible requirement for recognition, various methods for subdividing the TsunamiReady™ guidelines based on 
community vulnerability to tsunamis, and mandatory evacuation drills. 
 
4. End of Meeting – comments on project next steps  
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Appendix F: ETSU IRB Approval
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Appendix G: Invitation Letter 
 
East Tennessee State University 
Department of Geosciences 
Box 70357Johnson City, TN 37614 
Telephone (423) 439-7526Facsimile (423) 439-7520 
 
 
[DATE] 
 
 
RE: Focus Group Meeting on TsunamiReady™ guidelines 
 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
Your presence is requested at a small Focus Group meeting to be held at the [INSERT LOCATION]. The meeting 
will take place on [INSERT TIME AND DATE].   
 
Background:  Initial community focus groups were held in 2011 to review and provide comments on proposed 
revisions to NOAA’s TsunamiReady™ program guidelines.  Using the information we collected from those focus group 
discussions, we have drafted a revised set of TsunamiReady™ guidelines.  We substantially shortened the guidelines and 
modified the content and format.  We would like to discuss these revised guidelines with community members to gain a 
community perspective on how useful and achievable these revisions will be for communities.  Some of the major topics 
to discuss include, for example, the subdivision of required guidelines into two groups based on aspects of community 
vulnerability to local tsunamis versus distant tsunamis (or, those from nearby earthquake sources versus more distant 
sources), inland and vertical evacuation, and evacuation drills for schools.  
 
This is a collaborative project between researchers at East Tennessee State University, University of Colorado and 
University of North Carolina at Wilmington, US Geological Survey, the University of Hawaii and Massey 
University/GNS Science, New Zealand. This meeting will be one of several other focus group meetings being held in five 
states and two territories (CA, OR, AK, HI, NC, American Samoa and US Virgin Islands) between October 2013 and 
January 2014.  
 
To confirm your participation or to ask questions, please contact Colleen Scott at: scottc1@goldmail.etsu.edu or 
720-442-3250.  The meeting is being organized by the PI on the project, Chris Gregg. He may be contacted at: 
gregg@etsu.edu or 423-439-7526 (office); 423-930-3806 (cell).  
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Sincerely, 
 
 
Chris E Gregg, Associate Professor of Geology 
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Appendix H: Informed Consent Document
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Appendix I: Site Specific Prediscussion Survey Response Matrices 
 
Appendix I1:  Kodiak, Alaska prediscussion survey response matrix 
 Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3 Participant 4 
Should 
communities 
with a local-
tsunami threat 
take more 
actions to 
protect human 
life? 
 Yes 
 
 It depends on the 
extent of additional 
actions 
 Small communities 
might be prevented 
from achieving TR 
status by 
unnecessary 
mandatory actions 
 
 Yes 
 “Just have to plan out 
the program and 
implement” 
 
 Yes 
 All vulnerable 
communities should be 
recognized, with those 
vulnerable to local 
tsunamis having to 
comply with more 
stringent guidelines 
 
Would 
subdividing 
community 
vulnerability to 
local versus 
distant tsunami 
hazards be 
appropriate? 
 Yes 
 
 Yes 
 All AK communities 
are vulnerable to 
both local and 
distant tsunami 
 Yes 
 Kodiak qualifies for 
both local and distant 
tsunami hazards 
 Yes 
 Kodiak is vulnerable to 
local-tsunamis and 
should have to comply 
with more stringent 
guidelines 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
communities to 
identify natural 
high or inland 
ground for at-
risk persons 
self-evacuation  
 
 Necessary  
 Part of local 
planning for tsunami 
 
 
 Yes 
 Natural high ground 
should be identified 
for potential 
evacuation 
 
 Yes 
 Good idea! 
 Yes 
 Needs to be included in 
the Emergency 
Operations Plan 
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Thoughts about 
communities 
being required 
to identify or 
build berms or 
other structures 
for vertical 
evacuation 
 More cost-effect if 
local residents assist 
at-risk populations 
 Simpler to have 
people help others 
 
 ID of berms/structures 
should be optional not 
required 
 Small communities 
(subsistence lifestyle) 
will not have access to 
resources to build 
berms/structures for 
vertical evacuation 
 
 Good idea 
 Hard to find funding to 
implement 
 “The necessary steps 
must be taken to protect 
the population” 
 Unfortunately – costly to 
implement 
 Could be paid for by 
grants if communities 
have a hazard mitigation 
plan 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual tsunami 
evacuation 
exercises for 
schools located 
within the 
inundation zone 
 
 Yes 
 Very in-favor of this 
requirement 
 
 Yes – highly 
encouraged in AK 
 “I agree with this 
requirement” 
 Yes 
 Great idea! 
 Does not apply to 
schools on the Kodiak 
road system 
 Yes  
 Once a year is the 
minimum that should be 
required 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual training, 
education, 
outreach for 
owners/staff of 
high-occupancy 
businesses in the 
zone 
 
 
 
 
 
 Yes 
 In-favor of this 
requirement 
 
 Great goal, somewhat 
unsuccessful in many 
communities 
 Communities need a 
“tsunami champion” 
to make this goal more 
realistic 
 Biennial outreach is 
more realistic 
 
 Great idea! 
 Very do-able! 
 Good idea 
 How would you require 
this? 
 Who would 
administer or 
monitor the training?  
 How would it be 
tracked? 
 Who would pay for 
it? 
 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
 Yes 
 In-favor 
 Great goal, unrealistic 
 Communities need a 
 Another great idea 
 Very do-able 
 Good idea 
 How would you require 
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annual training, 
education, 
outreach for 
residents living 
in the 
inundation zone 
 “tsunami champion” 
to make this goal more 
realistic 
 Biennial outreach is 
more realistic 
 
 
 
 
this? 
 Who would 
administer or 
monitor the training?  
 How would it be 
tracked? 
 Who would pay for 
it? 
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Appendix I2: Coronado, California prediscussion survey response matrix 
 Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3 
Should 
communities 
with a local-
tsunami threat 
take more 
actions to 
protect human 
life? 
 No 
 The standards 
should be the same 
for all tsunami 
prone areas 
 Emergency plans for 
notification, 
evacuation, and 
sheltering are 
required by all 
tsunami 
communities 
 
NO RESPONSE  Depends on the 
geography of the 
community 
 Needs to be a balance 
of the two options not 
one or the other 
 
Would 
subdividing 
community 
vulnerability to 
local versus 
distant tsunami 
hazards be 
appropriate? 
 Yes 
 My community is 
vulnerable to local, 
regional and distant 
tsunami 
 
NO RESPONSE  Yes 
 Coronado is very 
limited on evacuation 
routes and access to 
high ground 
 Coronado’s ability to 
react will depend on 
the time to respond 
and the height of the 
predicted wave 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
communities to 
identify natural 
high or inland 
ground for at-
risk persons 
 Yes 
 All tsunami 
vulnerable areas 
should identify 
evacuation routes to 
higher elevations 
and inland safe 
 Yes 
 City government has 
the responsibility to 
provide a written 
plan identifying 
areas of risk and 
areas for safe 
 Yes 
 This should be 
required 
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self-evacuation  
 
areas evacuation 
 Plans should also 
include public 
outreach 
 
Thoughts about 
communities 
being required 
to identify or 
build berms or 
other structures 
for vertical 
evacuation 
 Yes 
 All tsunami 
vulnerable areas 
should identify 
vertical evacuation 
sites/facilities 
 Requirement to 
construct vertical 
evacuation 
structures relies on 
many variables that 
may not be 
affordable in small 
communities 
 
 Yes   
 I support that city 
government should 
identify vertical 
evacuation structures 
for the public  
 Good idea 
 Not always feasible  
Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual tsunami 
evacuation 
exercises for 
schools located 
within the 
inundation zone 
 
 Yes 
 All jurisdictions 
(first and emergency 
responders, schools, 
public works) 
located in tsunami 
vulnerable areas 
should exercise 
emergency plans at 
least once a year 
similar to Great CA 
Shakeout 
 
 Tsunami evacuation 
exercises for schools 
in inundation zones 
should be held at least 
twice per year  
 
 Good idea 
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Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual training, 
education, 
outreach for 
owners/staff of 
high-occupancy 
businesses in the 
zone 
 
 Yes 
 I agree on all 
outreach 
requirements 
 
 Public outreach and 
education workshops 
should be available to 
the entire community 
– including residents 
and businesses both in 
and outside of the 
inundation zone 
annually 
NO RESPONSE 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual training, 
education, 
outreach for 
residents living 
in the 
inundation zone 
 Training all residents 
would be quite 
difficult to administer 
and track 
 Offering briefings, 
workshops, and 
education material as 
we do for all most 
probable hazards and 
threats seem more 
achievable 
 Public outreach and 
education workshops 
should be available to 
the entire community 
– including residents 
and businesses both in 
and outside of the 
inundation zone 
annually 
 
NO RESPONSE 
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Appendix I3: Seaside, Oregon prediscussion survey response matrix 
 Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3 Participant 4 
Should 
communities 
with a local-
tsunami threat 
take more 
actions to 
protect human 
life? 
 No 
 The threat may be 
different, but both 
can cause significant 
impacts 
 Preparedness, 
education/outreach 
and exercises and 
drills are essential 
for either hazard 
 
 No 
 Too difficult to 
know when/where a 
local versus a distant 
tsunami might 
happen 
 If one lives in a 
coastal community 
they should prepare 
for a worst case 
event 
 This will save 
more lives and 
those who evacuate 
will be in a safe 
location regardless 
of actual event 
 
 Yes 
 Communities 
vulnerable to local 
tsunamis should take 
more actions than 
those communities 
who are not 
 I have never heard the 
definitions of 
local/distant tsunamis 
before – based on time 
of wave arrival 
o Thinks definitions 
will create 
confusion 
 
 Yes 
 Known threats like 
local tsunamis should 
require communities to 
take more actions to 
protect human life to 
receive TR recognition 
 Not doing so places 
human life in 
potentially more 
jeopardy 
Would 
subdividing 
community 
vulnerability to 
local versus 
distant tsunami 
hazards be 
appropriate? 
 This division for TR 
recognition would be 
inappropriate 
 The division is 
useful for mapping 
only 
 
 Not appropriate 
 It is not the cause, 
but the effects of the 
tsunami which make 
a community 
vulnerable 
 It is too difficult to 
determine the wave 
behaviors depending 
on local conditions 
 It makes more sense 
to determine one 
evacuation site 
 Oregon gets both local 
and distant tsunamis 
 NWS spends a 
disproportionate amount 
of time providing 
warning and resources 
for distant events, when 
local events are more 
lethal 
 
 Yes 
 Local vulnerability is 
substantially higher 
with limited time to 
respond/escape from 
the tsunami event 
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located in a safe 
area, outside the 
maximum threat or 
inundation area. 
 Too difficult to train 
local citizens to take 
different actions 
depending on local, 
regional or distant 
events – train to the 
worst case scenario 
only 
 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
communities to 
identify natural 
high or inland 
ground for at-
risk persons 
self-evacuation  
 
 Good idea  This is very important 
 State of Oregon 
requires all coastal 
communities to have 
tsunami inundation 
maps and safe 
evacuation sites 
 Dept. of Geology and 
Mineral Industries is 
tasked with 
developing state 
hazard maps 
 
 Great idea, but who is 
requiring and who is 
enforcing? 
 What are the 
ramifications for 
not doing this? 
 Yes 
 Communities should 
have to identify 
available natural high or 
inland ground 
Thoughts about 
communities 
being required 
to identify or 
build berms or 
other structures 
for vertical 
evacuation 
 Good idea to identify 
berms or structures, 
but not to build/create 
them if they are not 
there 
 Many coastal 
communities do not 
have resources to 
build or maintain 
 Structures are great – 
if you can clear all the 
environmental 
regulations, ESA, 
nesting areas for 
endangered birds, 
erosion patterns, 
defending law suits 
from 3
rd
 party 
 I prefer behavioral 
responses over 
engineering responses 
 Who requires these 
types of actions and who 
pays for them? 
 Building or identifying 
structures for vertical 
evacuation stops people 
 Yes, berms or other 
structures should be 
identified 
 No, communities should 
not be required to 
construct vertical 
evacuation structures  
 People who choose to live 
in danger zones should 
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these structures 
 
environmental groups, 
etc. 
 My community looked 
at developing vertical 
evacuation structures, 
but could not secure 
funding for all of the 
aforementioned 
reasons 
  
from thinking about how 
best to save their lives, 
they rely on a building 
which most likely will 
not be safe 
not expect other people to 
pay for their ignorant 
decisions 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual tsunami 
evacuation 
exercises for 
schools located 
within the 
inundation zone 
 
 Excellent idea 
 
 State of Oregon 
already requires all 
schools located in 
tsunami inundation 
zones to conduct 
annual evacuation 
drills 
 
 Our schools already 
require these drills 
 I prefer the idea of 
moving schools out of 
inundation zones 
completely 
 Moving schools out of 
the inundation zone will 
get people/parents doing 
the wrong thing 
(driving) moving in the 
right direction (up and 
out of the danger zone) 
 Yes, there should be a 
tsunami evacuation 
exercise each year 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual training, 
education, 
outreach for 
owners/staff of 
high-occupancy 
businesses in the 
zone 
 
 
 
 I like the idea, but do 
not want it as a 
“required” element for 
TR recognition 
 Communities should 
strive to reach these 
businesses but it can’t 
be made mandatory 
 Implementing and 
tracking this type of 
requirement would 
result in many 
 This is a current 
requirement for our 
TR recognition by 
NOAA 
 
 Good idea 
 I am currently 
frustrated by my 
attempts to conduct 
these types of 
trainings, making it a 
requirement of the TR 
program would be 
great 
 Who would require 
this, monitor it, and 
what would the 
 Yes, there should be 
annual outreach and 
education 
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communities not 
pursuing TR 
recognition 
 
ramifications be? (I 
don’t think the TR 
program has the 
teeth to require this) 
 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual training, 
education, 
outreach for 
residents living 
in the 
inundation zone 
 I like the idea of 
annual training and 
outreach 
 I prefer to keep the 
requirement more 
generic to the entire 
community  
 
 Cannot be mandated 
or required 
 The county does 
conduct annual 
exercises, and most 
cities do too 
 
 This is a great idea, is it 
realistic? 
 
 Yes, there should be 
annual outreach and 
education 
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Appendix I4: Kauai, Hawaii prediscussion survey response matrix 
 Participant 1 Participant 2 
Should 
communities 
with a local-
tsunami threat 
take more 
actions to 
protect human 
life? 
 No 
 Should be the same – a 
tsunami is a disaster 
regardless of the source 
 
 Yes 
 The two threats are very 
different and require different 
levels of response 
 There should definitely be a 
second, distinct plan for local 
versus distant 
 
Would 
subdividing 
community 
vulnerability to 
local versus 
distant tsunami 
hazards be 
appropriate? 
 Hawaii has both threats 
 
 Yes 
 Hawaii is vulnerable to both 
kinds of tsunamis 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
communities to 
identify natural 
high or inland 
ground for at-
risk persons 
self-evacuation  
 Private ownership of land 
make access by public 
difficult 
 This should be required 
 
Thoughts about 
communities 
being required 
to identify or 
build berms or 
other structures 
for vertical 
evacuation 
 Constructing unnatural berms 
for an “unlikely” tsunami 
events seems wrong 
 Man-made structures would 
be cost prohibited 
 
 There should be some kind of 
plan in place 
  
Thoughts about  Great!  Should be required 
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requiring 
annual tsunami 
evacuation 
exercises for 
schools located 
within the 
inundation zone 
 Hawaii has been doing this 
for all schools 
 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual training, 
education, 
outreach for 
owners/staff of 
high-occupancy 
businesses in the 
zone 
 This should be a requirement  Should be required 
Thoughts about 
requiring 
annual training, 
education, 
outreach for 
residents living 
in the 
inundation zone 
 This should be a requirement 
 
 Should be required 
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Appendix I5: New Hanover County, North Carolina prediscussion survey response matrix 
 Participant 1 Participant 2 Participant 3 Participant 4 Participant 5 
Should 
communities 
with a local-
tsunami 
threat take 
more actions 
to protect 
human life? 
 Yes 
 
 Yes 
 Each community 
should be 
recognized as TR 
if they are 
prepared for the 
expected impact to 
their area 
 
 Requiring more 
extensive 
preparedness efforts 
seems on the surface 
to make sense for 
communities that are 
at greatest risk for a 
local tsunami 
 Common sense 
tells me any 
community at risk 
should be well 
prepared 
 
 Yes 
 A system for 
immediate 
notification through 
cellular and TV 
should be used 
 
 Yes 
 I think that the 
local tsunami 
would not 
produce a lot of 
damage outside 
the beach zone 
Would 
subdividing 
community 
vulnerability 
to local 
versus distant 
tsunami 
hazards be 
appropriate? 
 
 
 
 
 No 
 
 No 
 We would add 
unneeded 
complexity to the 
process 
 How a community 
perceives risk 
determines how well 
it prepares 
 I’m not sure our 
community would 
understand the 
concept of being 
“a little prepared” 
as opposed to 
“fully prepared” 
 
 No 
 
 I’m not sure 
 I don’t know how 
the subdivision 
would be handled 
Thoughts 
about 
requiring 
communities 
to identify 
natural high 
 Good idea 
 
 Should be helpful, 
but costly 
 This is a need for 
areas that have 
high impact such 
as West Coast 
 Identifying “tsunami 
shelters” or “tsunami 
free zones” might 
prove difficult in 
coastal areas where 
elevation changes 
 Yes 
 Planning is 
appropriate for any 
emergency 
 Yes 
 This should be a 
requirement if 
you are in a 
tsunami zone 
 Could be simple 
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or inland 
ground for 
at-risk 
persons self-
evacuation  
cities versus East 
Coast cities 
 
are slight and 
gradual 
signage leading to 
a high rise 
building 
Thoughts 
about 
communities 
being 
required to 
identify or 
build berms 
or other 
structures for 
vertical 
evacuation 
 Yes 
 Good idea 
 No thoughts  I’m not sure there 
are any areas along 
our coast where 
substantial multi-
storey buildings 
don’t already exist 
that could serve as 
vertical evacuation 
shelters – provided 
they meet some 
resiliency standard 
 Vertical evacuation is 
a good idea 
 It should not be a 
community 
responsibility to 
build designated 
vertical structures 
 Yes vertical 
evacuation is a 
good idea 
 The cost to build 
a structure for 
vertical 
evacuation for an 
event that might 
never occur 
would be cost 
prohibitive and 
politically 
unpopular  - a 
waste of funds 
 
Thoughts 
about 
requiring 
annual 
tsunami 
evacuation 
exercises for 
schools 
located 
within the 
inundation 
zone 
 
 Good idea 
 
 Yes 
 They do fire drills, 
tornado drills, lock 
down drills, so in 
case of a tsunami 
there will be a 
plan to save lives 
 Yes 
 I think this is a 
reasonable 
requirement 
 We do fire and 
lockdown (active 
shooter) exercises, 
so why not 
tsunami 
evacuation 
exercises?? 
 Yes  
 It’s a good idea to 
be prepared 
 Yes 
 This saved lives 
in American 
Samoa! 
Thoughts 
about 
 Good idea 
 
 Yearly training is 
preferable 
 Yes 
 I think this is a 
 Yes  
 It’s a good idea to 
 Yes 
 Great idea, it 
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requiring 
annual 
training, 
education, 
outreach for 
owners/staff 
of high-
occupancy 
businesses in 
the zone 
 
 If this is not 
feasible than each 
business should 
have training once 
every three years 
reasonable 
requirement 
be prepared  should be 
mandatory 
Thoughts 
about 
requiring 
annual 
training, 
education, 
outreach for 
residents 
living in the 
inundation 
zone 
 Good idea 
 
 Yearly training is 
preferable 
 If this is not 
feasible than each 
business should 
have training once 
every three years  
 Yes 
 I think this is a 
reasonable 
requirement 
 
 
 Yes  
 It’s a good idea to 
be prepared 
 Yes 
 Good idea 
 Education on a 
tsunami would at 
least give the 
people some 
background 
information and 
they can decide 
on what they want 
to do 
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Appendix I6: US Virgin Islands prediscussion survey response matrix 
 Participant 1 
Should communities with a local-
tsunami threat take more actions to 
protect human life? 
 Definitely 
 Region local earthquake/tsunamis are our 
main concern 
 Here time to take action is no more than few 
minutes without official alert, so people 
must be aware and be self-prepared 
Would subdividing community 
vulnerability to local versus distant 
tsunami hazards be appropriate? 
 Yes 
 Distant tsunamis are low probability events 
in our area 
Thoughts about requiring 
communities to identify natural 
high or inland ground for at-risk 
persons self-evacuation  
 This is good 
 Little time to react 
Thoughts about communities being 
required to identify or build berms 
or other structures for vertical 
evacuation 
 Good recommendation 
 Very expensive 
 
Thoughts about requiring annual 
tsunami evacuation exercises for 
schools located within the 
inundation zone 
 Definitely good idea 
 There should also be an evaluation of the 
drilling/exercise 
 
Thoughts about requiring annual 
training, education, outreach for 
owners/staff of high-occupancy 
businesses in the zone 
 Good idea 
 Need a complete and comprehensive plan 
Thoughts about requiring annual 
training, education, outreach for 
residents living in the inundation 
zone 
 Good idea 
 Need resources – can be expensive 
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